IS A COLONIAL NAVY DESIRABLE P
[TO THE EDITOR OF TIM "SPECTATORM Srn,—A suggestion made recently by the Commander of the Forces in Queensland that the Cofnmonwealth should in con- sidering the question of Australian defence endeavour to lay the foundation of a Colonial Navy rather than continue the present system of paying a monetary contribution to the Imperial Navy has led to widespread discussion both in the Colonies and the United Kingdom. The discussion shows that the weight of opinion among those competent to judge is adverse to the proposal. The Commander of the Forces in Queensland does not appear to have considered the question in all its aspects, and, as might be expected, entirely eliminates political considerations. But in weighing any proposal which, if effectuated, would tend to emphasise the existence of a Colony as a separate national entity, and not as a province or part of one great Empire, the political results which would be likely to follow its adoption should undoubtedly be a factor in determining the matter. Naval strategists of all ages agree that concentration of force, and not its dispersal, is one of the so-called secrets of success so far as the belligerent power of a Navy is concerned. That a great dispersal of cruisers for the con.. voying of ships of commerce may be necessary in time of war is admitted, but for the actual duties of fighting your enemy it is essential that there should be a strong, united, and mobile fleet capable of concentrating on a given point and dealing smashing blows immediately on the outbreak of war. A small Colonial Navy tied to its base as is suggested would, I think, be but a paltry substitute for the protection of a great Imperial Fleet commanded by one mind and able to protect Australasia by destroying an enemy in the China Sea, for example, long before he could reach Australian waters. A large fleet or squadron could search out the enemy wherever he might be lurking and could bring an overwhelming force to bear on him, and the moral results of an early naval victory by the employment of "offensive" defence would far exceed the effect of even a high state of preparedness of a number of tiny locally managed squadrons scattered through- out the Colonial Empire and waiting to be attacked. The cost of small Colonial squadrons, if they were to be kept in a state of efficiency, would very much exceed the contri- bution which the Colonies would be expected to make to, the Imperial Navy, and no commensurate gain would result to the Colonies. The Imperial Navy affords a wider field for Colonial boys entering upon a naval career than any local naval force could offer, and there is no reason why there should not be Admirals of Colonial birth commanding the Channel and Mediterranean Squadrons. The Imperial Navy, after some reforms are effected which are now imminent, can draw for its personnel on the whole Empire, and thus by the law of averages will necessarily have a larger proportion of able men than if its source of supply were the British Islands alone. The moral effect, upon other nations of one strong, united Imperial Fleet would be greater than that of a congeries of naval atoms scattered over the globe.' Caesar, Napoleon, Nelson, and every great captain in the world's history attest the supreme importance of combination and unity of control in' the art of fighting. The Australasian Squadron of the Imperial Navy should be under the unfettered control of the Admiral on the station, and no conditions as to the ships not leaving Colonial waters, should be imposed. The present hamper- ing conditions might paralyse the squadron in time of war and prevent it from achieving perhaps a decisive naval victory. Now as to the political aspect. The setting up of a purely Australian fleet would unquestionably have a disintegrating effect so far as the unification of all parts of the Empire is concerned. We should no longer have the Imperial Fleet calling in our ports, we should no longer be able to meet the Officers and men of the Imperial Navy serving, so to speak,
yesterday in the China Sea, to-day in South America, to. morrow in Australasia, wherever, in fact, the British flag floats, men who are living exponents and symbols of the universality and unity of the Empire. That the effect of the permanent absence of his Majesty's ships from our waters would be centrifugal, and not centripetal, cannot, I think, be gainsaid. Though I am opposed, therefore, to the creation of a Colonial Navy, yet I am strongly of opinion that there should be a Colonial Naval Reserve Force capable of manning the Imperial Fleet in time of war. It took many years of agitation by public opinion to convince the Admiralty of the necessity for an adequate number of coaling stations throughout the Empire, and even now the Navy sadly lacks stores depots outside the British Isles. But the fact that no provision is made except in the United Kingdom for remanning the Navy or replacing casualties in time of war shows a most surprising want of foresight and business apti- tude on the part of the responsible authorities. Ships fighting in Australasian waters or on the coasts of Africa would be seriously handicapped, and perhaps imperilled, if they had to go thousands of miles to replace the losses of men incidental to a state of war. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that there should be a Naval Reserve Force in the Colonies trained annually on board his Majesty's ships with the guns and in the duties that they would be called upon to perform in time of war. The present Naval Volunteers of New Zealand and Australia, trained as they are as garrison artillery, are useless as a naval force. They are not a naval force at all. While they should be converted into garrison artillery in name as they now are in fact, there should be organised a Naval Reserve Force. There is plenty of material available for such a force. Its members, in addition to the ordinary capitation payment as Colonial Volunteers, should receive Imperial pay at Colonial rates during the annual period of six weeks or two months they were being trained on board the war vessels. As the Admiralty has now made Auckland (New Zealand) an Imperial naval base, with repair- ing shops, dockyard facilities, and coal depot, and probably also in the near future stores depot, the next step is to see that trained men will be available in the Colonies for active naval service when war breaks out.—I am, Sir, 8r..c., W. J. NAPIER, Member of Parliament (New Zealand), Captain Garrison Artillery (N.Z.) Volunteers, Member of the Defence Committee (N.Z.) [When we have advocated an Australian Navy created by Australia we have never supposed that the Australian people could be so foolish as to make it a home-waters Navy, or could fail to see that a Navy which is not ocean-going, and not ready to defend Australia and the Empire in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean if need be, is no Navy at all. Our point is that a mere annual subscription to the British Navy will give us no real increase of strength, but will in the end prove nothing but a minute grant-in-aid to the British taxpayer. A sea,- going Australian Squadron must, however, provide a bon4-fide increase in our naval strength. However, we agree that unless and until Australia feels able to provide an auxiliary squadron, the providing of a Naval Reserve would be an excellent plan.—En. Spectator.]
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