WRONG ROADS TO INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS.
WE must all appreciate the objects of the Anglo- German Friendship Committee, and share in the satisfaction which has suggested their letter to various newspapers. To us, as well as to them, "the good inter- national relations which now exist between the two nations" are a matter of sincere satisfaction. We can hardly imagine a greater calamity to Europe than a war between Germany and Great Britain. If the importance which the Committee attach to such incidents as the "very kind and generous reception given last summer in Germany to the representatives of the British Press," or "the prospect of the visit this summer to England of prominent German pastors," seems to us a little exaggerated, it is not that we set any less store by the promotion of friendly feelings and the increase of mutual respect and esteem between the people of the two countries. Any doubts we may entertain on the subject relate, not to the end for which the Com- mittee exist, but to the methods which they propose for our adoption. Most of us can recall instances in which the well-meant efforts of some kindly friend to make two people like one another have been defeated by their purpose becoming too evident. It is not in human nature to be always willing to play a part which has been assigned to us by others. We prefer to make our friends for ourselves rather than to accept them from even the wisest of advisers. But the very establishment of an " Anglo-German Friend- ship Committee" seems to imply that something of this somewhat officious kind is wanted ; that in the absence of such a body neither "the immense interests " which Britain and Germany "have in common," nor the "absence of any serious cause of difference" between them, is sufficient to secure the maintenance of good international relations. We question whether the friendly feeling which the Com- mittee are anxious to foster really benefits by the some- what fussy methods which they choose for its cultivation. Plants are often seen to flourish best under a little healthy neglect.
This is not the opinion of the Anglo-German Friendship Committee. Evidently they think that the Foreign Offices of the two countries stand in need of outside advice. Nor are they troubled with any hesitation as to the propriety of offering that advice, not only without its being asked, but even in presence of the clearest possible proof that it will not be taken if offered. Their first suggestion is that "representatives of both nations" shall be authorised by their respective Governments "to meet and confer as to whether some understanding cannot be arrived at as to a reduction or limitation of our respective naval armaments." That is a proposal as to the wisdom of which a good deal might be said. But if any advantage is to follow from saying it, there must be a genuine readiness on both sides to enter upon the dis- cussion. In the present instance it is just this readiness that is wanting. The proposal was actually made at the Hague Conference by Great Britain, and politely declined by Germany. In our opinion, this refusal was both natural and reasonable. The limits of national armaments must be fixed with constant reference to the objects of national policy. There may, no doubt, be occasions which admit of these objects being considered in concert with another Power, but such occasions are likely to present themselves but seldom. For the most part, Governments will be disposed to keep their purposes to themselves. Let us imagine that such a discussion had been begun at the Hague, and that the German Plenipotentiaries had opened it with an announcement that the object of the German Admiralty was to raise their Navy to a strength equal to, or at any rate more nearly approaching, that of the British Navy. That would have been a perfectly legitimate statement for the repre- sentatives of Germany to make. Englishmen may think it a part of the providential order of the world that they should be content with a big Navy and Germany be content with a big Army. But they cannot wonder if their reading of the providential order does not meet with unquestioning acceptance from the Germans. Each nation will consult the oracle for itself, and put its own interpretation on the answer. From a con- troversy conducted on these lines no good that we can see could have been looked for. Those actually engaged in it would no doubt have carried it on in the temper dictated by a proper regard for the independence of the two Powers, but we cannot be sure that this decent reserve would equally have characterised the utterances of the Journalists and speakers who would sooner or later have borne their full share in the debate. The naval policy of other nations must ordinarily be for us simply a. subject for observation with a view to ascertaining the liabilities it may impose on ourselves. It is not for us to criticise the amount they choose to spend, or the benefits they expect to gain from spending it. And we feel sure that such a Conference as that suggested. by the Anglo. German Friendship Committee might easily lead to quite other consequences than those which they expect from it. If the point to be considered were simply whether the two Powers might not safely reduce their armaments, the existing proportion between them being maintained, the case would be different. But Germany has not deter- mined what the proportion of her Navy to that of other Powers shall be, and until she has done so it is not for a Power possessing a very much stronger Navy to offer any suggestions upon the subject. We should not welcome such interference ourselves, and we know of no reason why Germany should be more tolerant in this respect than we are.
The Committee's second suggestion is more questionable still. The Conference they desire is further to consider "whether it would not be possible for the Governments of Germany and Great Britain to approach conjointly the Governments of France and Russia" with proposals for some amount of disarmament. This is the Committee's scheme for promoting the peace of Europe. Germany an Great Britain are to set to work to convince France and Russia of the folly of exaggerated naval preparations. The two Powers to whom this good advice is to be offered might fairly reply : "Physician, heal thyself." Why should Great Britain, who is already in possession of a strong Navy, and Germany, who is doing her best to obtain one, think it necessary to preach reduction of armaments to Russia, who cannot be said to have any Navy, and finds it difficult to raise the money necessary for creating one ? France, no doubt, has a Navy, but it has never been suggested that its strength is at all in excess of the requirements of a great maritime Power, or that her Government have shown any undue haste in bringing it up to that level. Any counsel offered to either country on the part of Powers far more favourably placed in respect of their strength at sea would be so purely gratuitous and unprovoked that it would be far more likely to disturb the peace of Europe than to promote it. Frenchmen and Russians would at once be tempted to speculate as to the motives of Great Britain and Germany in preaching disarmament to Powers weaker than themselves. Suspicions entertained by whole nations are not always reasonable, and few things are better calculated to give rise to them than so unexpected a combination of counsellors as that suggested by the Anglo-German Friendship Committee. However important it may be to arrive at a good understanding with Germany— the first paragraph of the Committee's appeal led us to suppose that this already existed—it would hardly be worth the sacrifice of the Agreements already arrived at with France and Russia.
It is difficult to comprehend the nervous anxiety which some politicians seem to feel with regard to our relations with Germany. They are possessed apparently by the conviction that unless they can do something positive—go off to be entertained at Berlin, open their houses to visitors from Berlin, set the two Governments at work to hold conferences and consider proposals—it is impossible for Englishmen and Germans to remain friends. Unless they have information about possible causes of ill- feeling between the two countries which has not reached us, we cannot imagine that there is any foundation for these immediate terrors. At all events, whether our view or that which we are almost compelled to attri. bute to the Committee should prove to be nearer the truth, we are quite sure that the road to a better state of things does not lie through the preaching of naval disarmament by Germany and Great Britain— to France and Russia.
Previous page
