PRELUDE TO INVASION
By STRATEGICUS
THERE is no secret that the present lull in ground operations is only the prelude to invasion ; but in a very real sense it is even more. It is even more than a preparation: it is the pre- liminary stage. The use of the air-arm of the Allied Forces has been extended to such a degree that there cannot be any doubt that it is doing immense damage. But it is the direction in which it is inflicting, and is designed to inflict, damage that is most interesting. It is clear that no operations of offensive scope can be launched with any chance of success which lack any one arm. It is peissible to conceive purely defensive operations being successfully carried out if, for instance, armoured formations were gravely reduced, on condition that the elaborate web-defensive was thoroughly estab- lished. Artillery from the very beginning of the war has been able to check and defeat armoured attack. Even when Rommel made his brilliant, though mistaken, attack upon the Eighth Army's communi- cations during Cunningham's offensive, it was found that it did little damage against the Fourth Indian Division, then standing steadily on its positions at the frontier. This was not due to the admitted excellence of the division or the peculiar elaboration of the defences. It was rather attributable to the tank-attack approaching the limits of its effective use. For, of course, every weapon has its limits, and the conditions under which it can best achieve its effect. •
But it is difficult to imagine a successful attack launched with a lack of, or grave inferiority in, armour ; and it is, of course, now inconceivable that successful attack or defence should be conducted without the air-arm or in a grave inferiority of air-support. The concluding phase of the Tunisian campaign may be cited as complete proof of that. proposition ; and now that we are beghming to realise the immensity of the stocks of ammunition, and even food, abandoned by the enemy in his surrender, this defect appears to assume greater importance than ever. The destruction of tanks also figured in the final breakdown ; and it is not merely that an army deficient in this manner declines through lack of symmetry. It is apparently a question of absolute dependence upon the two arms mentioned. Cf these it is the air-arm which takes the more important place. But, if this is so in operations of a normal char- acter, it is so beyond all dispute or question when the operation envisaged is invasion.
The most difficult operation in warfare when it involves landing from the sea, invasion under modern conditions is almost impossible without the command of a strong air-arm. , With complete com- mand of the air the operation takes on an entirely different character. The shore defences which prohibit the use of the indispensable naval, support can be attacked and destroyed by other means. At Dieppe one of the shore batteries was put out of action com- pletely by a Commando ; and if the other survived to do its deadly work it was mainly due to the unhappy mischance that gave the alarm on the eastern sector of the coast. But it does not seem at all impossible that there should be such a saturation of shore batteries on the vital sectors of the European coast that the task of reduction by means of Commandos would be impracticable. If that were to be the case naval co-operation would be impossible, and, for success, it is indispensable.
Naval co-operation could not be given even if the shore batteries were reduced, if the amphibious expedition could not command air-supremacy ; since the ships could not remain inshore for any time while they were subject to air-attack. Furthermore, there are other ways irt which shore batteries could be dealt with, granted air-supremacy. Parachute troops and airborne divisions have been comparatively little used by the Allies as yet, but it is obvious that full and effective use would entirely transform the \problem. Such operations would be hardly feasible if the Allies had not full com- mand of the air. Even if the expedition could land without undue loss, and establish some sort of bridgehead swiftly, it could not hop4 for a successful development unless it had the co-operation of aircraft to blast a way through the defensive, to open the road for tanks, to block the approach of enemy reinforcements, and W assist in the thousand and one ways in which air power, scientifically used, can dominate the battlefield.
One of the main objectives of the air-offensive, and possibly the principal, is the " shooting-out " of the enemy air-arm. Particularly is-this obvious in the Mediterranean, where the factor which con- trols the mobility—the aerodrome—is being attacked consistently. It is not that the destruction of the enemy airfields would of itself entail the destruction of enemy aircraft, though commonly that is a direct effect. Aircraft are being destroyed on the ground many times as fast as they are being shot out of the air. But the design is to confront the enemy with the dilemma—either to accept battle in defence of his airfields, or to have them destroyed, with the con-' sequence of being unable to give fighter support within their radius: of action. In a word, the present air-offensive has as one, if not the main, objective, compulsion on the enemy to engage his air resources. Already in the Mediterranean the relative damage he has suffered is very great indeed. It seems that he is beginning to fear that his air-arm will be shot out of the sky ; for in the last few days the aircraft have met with little opposition either by *day or by night.
The nuisance raids which the enemy is carrying out over this country are merely whistling to keep his courage up. He is using so few aircraft that he must suffer disproportionate damage ; but because of the smallness of the numbers involved they do not Seriously affect his air-strength. But this fact, this reluctance to engage in battle does not necessarily imply a present decisive shortage so much as the fear that by engaging in battle that con-. dition might be produced. Here, of course, the Allied strategy' seeks to claim as a forfeit something of the result the enemy is trying to avoid. It aims at the factories which product his air- craft, or the engines which supply the machinery that enables them to fly, the petrol that is their motive power or the transport that conveys all, or any, of these factors to assembly-sheds or the places where they are needed. The dilemma is as disturbing, though it does not inevitably affect the air-arm so immediately. Every such attack is an added incentive to accept battle in defence of the objects which are being bombarded. Already production has been wrenched round from the offensive types to the defensive. Already more and more of the production is being ear-marked for mere defence of the constantly growing area subject to attack The effective strength of the army is being reduced by the call upon more and more of the material which should form the reservoir of its recruits for anti-aircraft defence. The output of more and more factories is being allocated to anti-aircraft guns and material. In the Mediterranean this work is proceeding at panic speed, and it ii only in its initial stages.
The air-offensive is, therefore, causing a grave dislocation in the industrial output, the reinforcement of the Axis forces, and in the material that supplies them with weight and speed in attack. But it is the destruction of the enemy's air-power that is the most important effect ; and at present he is very reluctant to pit his dwindling strength against the growing might of the Allies, when it may make the difference between checking or failing to arrest invasion. Yet it seems difficult to believe that this attitude can be maintained much longer. The enemy peoples arc becoming more and more restive under the bombardment ; and particularly is this the case in the Mediterranean. If the complaints are so pointed, and so loud, in Germany, it is the more intelligible that they should be widespread in Italy and the Italian islands, where the war was never popular with the people. There is evidence that Musso- lini has made demands upon the Germans for more anti-aircraft guns, but without much effect. Even he must recognise that there is only one way of dealing with the offensive, and reluctance to adopt it must vanish under the continuous blows he is suffering. The German resolution is harder ; but it is Germany which is suffering the more terrible destruction. Incautious statements have been made by German spokesmen that show the broad effect of the offensive ; and the German people have lived through so prolonged a campaign of lying that they may insist upon some unchallengeable counter-attack.
It cannot be said how long the refusal to accept battle will continue. But it is safe to predict that the offensive will continue to develop, and to be shaped on more provocative lines. The direct attempt to weaken the Allied attack may, in fact, be deferred only to be made under much worse conditions than obtain at present. The enemy air-arm is far from being " shot out " as yet. Complete supremacy was indeed achieved over Tunisia. It may be argued that this was less due to lack of aircraft than to reluctance to engage a still strong reserve in a battle which had already been written off as lost. Even such 2n argument admits the grave weakening of enemy air-power. During the last fortnight it has been weakened much more. It is possible that even yet Goering may be driven to attempt by battle to ward off some of the Worse effects of our offensive. The Allies are waiting for that.
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