UNITED FRANCE
By PIERRE MAILLAUD
THE fact that General de Gaulle, accompan?ed by M. Rene Massigli, National Commissaire for Foreign Affairs, and M. Andre Philip, National Commissaire for Home Affairs, i.e., action in France, is about to leave for Algiers to meet General Giraud, makes it almost certain that French unity will be achieved reasonably soon, and that a Central Authority will be set up for the prosecution of the war on behalf of the French nation. For the first time in many months, and even years, it is permissible for Frenchmen to rejoice over a political development, irrespective of group, party or personal interests. At a time when the war is likely to enter its most important, and perhaps final, phase, the forces which France can throw into the scales can now be marshalled by a Central Power capable of wielding physical as well as sym- bolical and emotional strength. On the success of the negotiations in the throes of innumerable difficulties, on the removal of dogmatic and individual obstacles, General Catroux may justly be con- gratulated. He has played not only the part of an able diplomatist, but that of a true and responsible Frenchman. Moreover, he has acted without prejudice, a difficult virtue under the circumstances.
Substantial and tangible advantages will be derived from an agreement between General de Gaulle and General Giraud. In the first place, it will have a powerful and stimulating effect upon the French people at home. Unity in France against the enemy has been achieved long since. Yet the differences betweeen French- men abroad must have been a cause of uneasiness and apprehen- sion. The sentimental allegiance to General de Gaulle is indis- putably more widespread than the popularity of General Giraud ; but the minority which acclaimed General Giraud was an efficient body of men, comprising a large section of the army and of the former Second Bureau, which, even under Vichy, has consistently been associated with a policy of revenge. Moreover, the influence of General Giraud over the North African army cannot be ques- tioned. The establishment at Algiers of a Central Authority should therefore weld all forces of resistance into a powerful weapon. Furthermore, the lingering distrust between Right and Left, which persisted at home as an undercurrent to the National Front against the invader, should disappear, or at least be notably mitigated, in the process.
In the second place, French unity of action must strengthen the position of France among the Allied Powers and vis-à-vis neutral countries. As General Giraud. has rightly said on several occasions, no administration created under such a situation of emergency can be truly held to be the legitimate government of France. A government is the emanation of the people, not by virtue of emotional want and fiduciary currency, but as the result of actual contact between leaders and people and common experience on the national territory. Yet, as I have pointed out before in these columns, the limitations of the new administration's powers over
the French nation itself should not involve corresponding limita- tions in the international field. A French authority set up at Algiers cannot truly claim to represent the French people in matters of internal policy or national institutions. On these only the French nation can decide, after it has regained its freedom, and when it can form an opinion, not under the pressure of moral and physical distress, but in full independence of judgement. On the other hand, such an authority clearly represents the French will to fight, to recover territorial and constitutional integrity, and to protect French imperial interests. As such, it is entitled to national recogni- tion, and all the more so since imperial France alone carries a weight at least equal to that of some Allied countries whose national territory is free from occupatiot.
It is too often suggested implicitly or explicitly that France is a newcomer in the Allied camp. Memories are short, especially in the midst of tragic and changing events. One is apt to think of the participation of French troops in the war, or the resistance of the French people at home, as mere accidents of the conflict due to skilful Allied propaganda or to Allied successes in the field. Actually, France, together with Great Britain, was the first country to declare war upon Germany, when she was still her national self. She was first exposed to the impact of German armies which no European force at the time could have resisted alone. She was defeated in the field, and her defeat was accepted or exploited by political elements which had been at no time acknowledged by the French people as its leaders. What was abnormal in France was not the resistance of the French people inside and outside France ; that was the true expression of the national will, in con- formity with a thousand years' history. What was abnormal and fortuitous was Vichy.
For these reasons, any administration which represents that re- sistance and pursues the policy approved by the French nation on September 3rd, 1939, is entitled to full diplomatic recognition the moment it is placed right above considerations of personal, group or party interests, and freed from any suspicion of identifying French resistance with the success of persons, groups or parties. I consider that these conditions will be fulfilled when an administra- tion born of an agreement between the Comite National and General Giraud's organisation, is set up in Algiers. That administration will comprise General Giraud, General de Gaulle and seven other members. The responsibility will be collective. Decisions will be taken by a majority vote. It is to be assumed that this directorate will appoint heads of departments which may or may not (prefer- ably not) be chosen from among its members. It is also to be assumed that some kind of consultative body or advisory assembly may be established. Whether or not that be the case is not a matter of paramount importance. Some commentators in this country have suggested for North Africa systetns of government which would be excellent in England, America or France, but which cannot work in North Africa at a time of emergency. Those would involve a very wide use of politicians, whether from local bodies or members of the last French Parliament. Local politics in North Africa have seldom been very successful and responsible. As for parliamentarians of the Third .Republic, most of them have followed in the wake of French popular resistance far more than they have led it. I have no doubt that the establishment in Algeria of a French administration would attract a good many of them to North Africa. Unfortunately, they do not represent the present mood of the French people, who will look for other representatives corresponding more accurately to its spirit of resistance. Moreover, if the exercise of excessive personal power is feared, there is far more restrictive value in a limited body of men of some stature than there would be in a crowd of politicians whose capacity for resistance to it is considerably weakened by the fact that for months and even years they have complied with, or been passively resigned to, the state of things created by Vichy and by the French State set up in France on the ' basis of the Fiihrer- Prinzip.
The solution likely to be adopted as a result of long negotiations between General Giraud and General de Gaulle is not perfect. There could be no perfect solution in the present circumstances.. But if it is enforced, and if the new administration is created, it is at
least the best that could be devised under existing conditions in the interest of France, and of the prosecution of the war. The greater the support the Allies give it, the greater the chances of its satis- factory working are likely to be.
It is, of course, imperative that there should be a common control of all organisations of resistance in France. It is by unity of action in that sphere that the new authority can best serve French interests, and prevent future divisions amongst the French people. If that condition is fulfilled, then the Allies can truly afford to recognise the combined administration as representative of France in all international affairs, and as the force inspiring and directing French resistance at home.
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