The Naval War
War at Sea, Vol. I. By Captain S. W. Roskill, R.N. (H.M.S.O. 42s,)
op% E. experiences of the last war," writes Captain Roskill in his 4.141,118 pages, "appear to reinforce those of earlier struggles which tevs. snown that the prosecution of a maritime strategy passes through tikperal Phases." In the first phase "our maritime power is used to hSLnd these islands from invasion; to cut the enemy off from the of the world and weaken his economy by enforcing a blockade ' and to bring to this country the supplies Which are essential to its survival." The second phase, "the period of balance," is used to consolidate strength and gather momentum; while in the third phase "the full advantages of the patient pursuit of a maritime strategy are reaped and our forces are transported overseas to assume the offensive."
This is the doctrine of sea-power, the creed which has enabled us to win most of our wars and whose most exact parallel is to be found in the struggles against Napoleonic France. In accordance With it, the official naval history of the war is being presented in three volumes. The present volume covers the first phase and follows the story until the end of 1941. It consists of some quarter niillion words and is illustrated by 43 maps and 56 photographs.
Considering the mass of documents at Captain Roskill's disposal and the complexity and world-wide scope of naval events, his text Is a model of selection and compression. Nothing of interest or Ihmportance has been omitted, yet equally nothing ltas been given undue emphasis. The story is told against the background of the wider 'struggle of which it was a part, and thus maintains a continuous `'narrative thread. The exposition is lucid and objective, the con- clusions fair and restrained.
Our early misfortunes at sea were due to a number of causes. First, a general lack of foresight as to the shape the sea war would take, especially as regards the air. The discovery that in enemy , Waters air-power is an integral part of sea-power was to cost us dear. , Secondly, our intelligence seems to have been as poor as the enemy's ‘sivas good. The first news of the break-out of the Scharnhorst and O'neisenau in November, 1939, came from the Rawalpindi's sighting *port. Yet a day or two later the German Naval Staff knew all the dispositions of the Home Fleet. The reason for this and other disasters was, incredibly, that "the Germans were able to read our yphered messages"; and they continued to read them until the lbooks were changed in August, 1940, It Thirdly, much of the sea war in the early days was conducted with a temerity which reads strangely in the light of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was Admiral Fisher, I think, who said that moderation In war was madness. Yet in 1939 it was not considered ethical to loomb the bases of seaplanes which had been laying mines in our *eters; and it was not until the war had been on a year and a half that permission was given to attack enemy shipping.
' But Captain Roskill reserves his main criticisms for what he calls "the division of command." Before the war Admiral Pound had agreed with his Commanders-in-Chief that they should have full 'operational control, that the Admiralty should 'feed' them with :information but intervene directly only in very special circumstances.
the layman this policy may seem strange, but it is only the Admiral , on the spot who has knowledge of such changing conditions as wind, light, sea, fuel consumption, which can so greatly influence the course of operations. Yet during the' early months the Admiralty by-passed the Cs-in-C time and time again, often with unfortunate ircsults. The blame for this must, alas, go in the main to Sir Winston Churchill, since "many of the signals sent. . . bear the unmistakable ?imprint of his language and personality." But his principal naval • adviser might have done more to restrain him; and Admiral Pound , emerges from these pages as an officer of quiet competence rather than distinction. The book has been well produced and the price asked is model t' The maps are excellent, but some of the photographs are too s- nce and of rather poor quality. Captain Roskill overworks two Phr— d "It is outside the scope of these volumes" and" which will be recount' ' in a later chapter": both are extraneous and I hope will be °mitt' d from future volumes. There is one error of fact. It is stated ( page 412 that during the chase of the Bismarck "the destroYe s € screening the heavy ships all had to return to replenish their tanks." That was not so. The Tartar, in which I was servt° remained with the Rodney from the time of leaving harbour tin just before the Bismarck foundered. ci
LUDOVIC KENN--
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