FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
THE end of the holidays is an opportune moment for reviewing the European situation. The first and most obvious fact, at any rate as far as this country is concerned, is the quiescence, or temporary quiescence, of Germany. The Aga.dir mood has, for the moment, passed away, and there seems to be a general agreement that nothing could be more peaceful or less aggressive than the present attitude of the Berlin Government. Germany no doubt presses on with her "big Navy" policy as per- sistently and as rapidly as ever, but she is not causing trouble of any kind in the diplomatic world or asserting her "right to a place in the sun," which is the storm signal always hoisted by her. What is the reason for this most happy change of tone ? We have no doubt whatever as to the answer. Germany has come to realize very fully during the last few months that France, Russia, and Britain are holding firmly together, and mean to hold together, and that, for the time at any rate, the efforts to make bad blood between the Powers of the Triple Entente have proved a complete failure. The Potsdam agreement turned out useless as a lever for creating dissension, and the attempts to encourage Radical protests against the wicked- ness of maintaining peace through a. Russian agreement have signally failed. In fact, the world at large is realizing, what wise men here have realized for many years, i.e., that as long as France, Russia, and Britain are loyal to each other there will be no great war, and that German threats that the agreement of the three Powers will be treated as an attempt to hem in Germany, and may be so bitterly resented as to lead to war, are all bluff. Germany will only stir if the three Powers fall into disagreement. Then no doubt she will strike, and strike with all her strength. Probably proof of the stead- fastness of the agreement of the three Powers would have been enough of itself to restrain German ambitions and aspirations. If, however, we add to this the embarrass- ments caused to the Triple Alliance by the Italian war on the one hand and by the serious Balkan preoccupations of Austria-Hungary on the other, we reach a situation which makes not only for peace, but makes desistence from any threat of war imperative upon Germany. The sabre- clanking solo is out of the bill. If Germany were to take any provocative action just now she would run the risk of fighting at an enormous disadvantage. Italy would in all probability be obliged to decline to support her altogether, and Austria-Hungary would be compelled to tell her that if she were summoned to repay the services of the "friend in shining armour," she would be obliged to do it with one hand tied behind her back.
The lesson to be derived from the considerations we have just stated is one which we trust will not be missed in this country or in the rest of Europe. As we have said, the peace of the world depends upon the maintenance of our understanding with Russia. That is the long and the short of it all, and that is the answer to those well-meaning but unbalanced persons who are pre- pared to quarrel with Russia over Persia. Those who would run the risk of estranging Russia in order to try what we believe is the hopeless experiment of creating a system of self-government in Persia, and so securing the independence of that country, are bereft of any sense of proportion. Things being as they are in Persia, we most sincerely trust that Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, who is now the guest of this country, will be able to come to a clear understanding, and that we shall not attempt to deal grudgingly with Russia, but admit that the Anglo- Russian agreement in regard to Persia must not only be carried out in the spirit as well as in the letter, but must be extended to meet future developments. People here sometimes talk as if Russia were a kind of intruder into Persian affairs, and had no right to have a Persian policy of her own. As a matter of fact, Russia has had relations with Persia. ever since the time of Peter the Great—that is, long before the East India Company ever sent a just to Teheran. No doubt it behoves Russia, as much as it behoves us, to act reasonably and loyally in regard to Persia, but we most strongly deprecate the hectoring tone which a portion of our Radical press adopts in regard to Russia and the Persian question, merely because they happen to dislike the Government of the Tsar and find a kind of political luxury in patronizing the so-called patriots of Teheran. We are exceedingly sorry that the people of Persia should not have shown themselves more capable of maintaining their independence, but it is inconceivable that the peace of the world is to be imperilled in order to try an experiment that has never yet been successful, namely, that of endowing an Oriental country with representative and democratic institutions Sir Edward Grey may be well trusted to do the best he can for the people of Persia, and he is far more likely to be successful if their friends here refrain from violent and ill-mannered attacks upon the Russians.
It is difficult to know what to say about the prospects of peace between Italy and Turkey. Speaking generally, we cannot help thinking that those who prophesy the con- clusion of peace in a very few weeks are right. No doubt the Turkish Government will prefer to get the elections over before they agree to the Italian terms, but directly those elections are over, which will be early in November, we may expect to see an agreement reached. The ground, at any rate, has already been explored and prepared by the unofficial negotiations that have been taking place in Switzerland. The fact, too, that the Italians have during the last week won a hardly contested fight in Cyrenaica is all to the good. When the peace with Italy does come, it is much to be hoped that the opportunity will be taken to obtain a general understanding upon a ques- tion the settlement of which is long overdue. For the last ten or fifteen years we have supported in these columns the claim of the Russians to pass their Black Sea warships through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean. In the past we advocated it as a piece of justice to Russia, for it has always appeared to us most unfair that her Southern Fleet should be cut off from access to other waters as effectually as if it were in the Caspian. Now, however, to these general considera- tions of justice are added British interests. The rise of the power of the Triple Alliance in the Mediterranean makes it advisable to add another naval element to those already existing there, and we should, therefore, be very glad to see a Russian battle fleet in the Egean. It would help to maintain the general balance of power. That the Austrians, and therefore the Germans, would greatly dislike the advent of the Russian ships is possible ; but after all, and in spite of the fact that we have no desire to show our- selves hostile to Austria, we are bound to say that this is her affair and not ours. Considering how Austria-Hungary has yielded to the orders of Germany to squeeze us, if possible, out of the Mediterranean, we are really not called upon to consider Austria-Hungary's feelings in this respect. Happily Italy is not likely to object to the opening of the Dardanelles, for her relations with Russia are of the beet. Might it not be possible, then, as part of the peace settlement, that one of the islands now occupied by Italy should, with the consent of Turkey, be handed over to Russia as a naval base for her Mediterranean squadron? If Russia were to possess an island in the Agean the need for allowing her ships to come down from the Black Sea would be obvious to all. And here we may say that we trust our Foreign Office will not attempt to assert that if Russian ships are allowed free access to and egress from the Black Sea, Turkey ought to accord the same privilege to the warships of other nations. If Russia were to propose such an arrangement we should have no objection. If, on the other hand, as seems probable, Russia asks for a peculiar and exclusive privilege, we hold that it would be a piece of pedantic folly to oppose her. And. for this very good reason. Unless we are acting in strict alliance with Turkey, we shall never, we trust, be so foolish as to use the Dardanelles and Bosporus and send war- ships into the Black Sea. We cannot imagine any situation more disastrous, from the naval point of view, than that of a British Admiral who has got his ships into the Black Sea, and then finds the Straits closed behind him by floating mines. He would be like a man in an underground passage who has wormed himself into a rook chamber, but when he has got in finds that he is unable to get out. In our survey of the situation we have kept the worst till the last. As is shown by the speech of the Austrian Chancellor to the delegations from Austria and Hungary, the situation in the Balkans is viewed in Vienna as one of extreme peril. We do not wonder. It has lately become plain that an agreement has been reached between Bulgaria and Servia, Montenegro and Greece, which, if acted upon, would mean the partition of Turkey, and there seems every reason to suppose that it will be acted upon if Turkey is not able to put an end first to the Albanian insurrection, and next to the chronic disturbances which are now laying waste Macedonia. But if the four Balkan Powers were to move, and -were actually to begin hos- tilities with Turkey, which is far from impossible, the Balkan danger would have arisen in the worst possible form. No doubt the Powers will do their utmost to prevent such an attack upon Turkey and to forbid any recourse to hostilities. Suppose, however, the States named defy the coalition of Europe, bow are they to be coerced ? The only Power which could stop them would be Austria, but Austria could only do this by herself occupying the coveted provinces of Macedonia and Albania. Action of this kind by Austria- Hungary, however, would create a situation which we can hardly expect that her Russian and Italian colleagues among the Great Powers would view with any favour. Italy may be at war with Turkey, but the last thing she wants to see is Austria-Hungary occupying the Turkish shores of the Adriatic on the one side and Salonika on the other. Russia, again, would hardly care to see Austria-Hungary at Salonika or attacking Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, in order that the Roman rather than the Eastern form of Christianity should be dominant among the South Slays. The problem, indeed, is one of such extreme difficulty that we may be sure every possible effort will be made by the Powers to prevent Bulgaria and her satellites moving. Wise men can only pray that they will succeed. Happily, there does not seem to be any statesman in any of the Balkan States who is likely to play an ambitious or headstrong game. Certainly King Ferdinand of Bulgaria is not likely to do so. On the other hand, however, it is conceivable that this astute politician may come to think that the retention of his throne depends upon his satisfying the racial, religious, and political ambitions of his people. No doubt Turkey's external difficulties are many and great, but when we turn to the internal situation it is only to find a worse state of affairs. The Committee has been half-killed, and there seems no one of any real strength of character to take the lead. The best that can be hoped for is probably a coalition between the Independent Liberals and the moderate section of the Committee men. But even if such a coalition could be arranged, which is, we fear, unlikely, would the leaders be able to control the army ?
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