WAR IN PRACTICE.*
WE remember a course of lectures delivered by a certain gallant Colonel which began with the earliest of recorded battles, that of the four Kings against five in the Slime-pits, and proceeded through Arbela and Agincourt to the Franco- Prussian War. The lecturer maintained that the art of war rested on eternal and immutable principles, and that no change of weapons or conditions, however complete, could supersede the strategy of Chedorlaomer or Abraham.
The Inspector-General of Cavalry is of the same opinion, for in his neat little preface to his brother's book he declares that "no new principles of strategy or major tactics have been exploited" in the South African War, and that success in war is now as ever "the outcome of the three C's,—courage, common-sense, and cunning." We are glad that the General places courage first. Abraham would undoubtedly have done so. The hero of Mafeking is well qualified to speak on this subject, and it is a quality which is much rarer than most of us imagine, even in our own Army. For common-sense, and even for cunning, the other two attributes of the soldier, we commend our readers to Major Baden-Powell's bright little book ; it is cram full of both. Major Baden-Powell's book is compiled from notes taken in the field by himself, and he had, as he tells us, rather exceptional opportunities of studying the various aspects of the practical side of war, having served on different occasions as Staff Officer and column leader, in addition to having done a considerable deal of regimental duty. And although the primary laws of war are immutable, we agree with our author and with Private Mulvaney that the experience gained in some three years of continuous active service is worth all the " theouries " of war put together. "Experience," said Burke, "is the school of mankind ; they will learn at none other " ; and Major Baden- Powell's book is full of significant facts and practical con- clusions which, as his brother points out, should be of service to all, and even to the youngest, soldiers.
To those who served with him in South Africa the writer recalls certain facts which they might otherwise be apt to forget. We are sure that he is thereby doing good service to the Army ; there is too much evidence already that many of the hard lessons we then learnt are being forgotten, in some cases, we fear, wilfully forgotten, particularly the more dis- agreeable of them. The list on p. 79 of the occasions on which small well-posted garrisons surrendered, with a state- ment of the cause in each case, is very instructive reading, though we wonder why the case of Dewetsdorp is omitted from the list. So is the next page which records the successful resist- ances made by small garrisons, and gives us the bright side of the medal. The pages on the action of mounted troops in the field in chap. 7 are also most interesting reading. For those who have not had the good fortune to make their own mental notes in South Africa the book is more useful still, and puts forward suggestions on many points which the author modestly hopes may form " wrinkles " worth bearing in mind.
War in Practice is clearly intended for professional con- sumption; it claims to be no more than a collection of jottings, though these are, in our opinion, admirably sorted and ar- ranged under the heads of "General Conduct of Operations," "Attack," "Defence," "Selection of Ground and Positions," "Fortification," "Outposts and Screens," "Arms and Arma- ments," and illustrated by photographs and diagrams. To the company officer, Regular or Irregular, we particularly recommend the book as an admirable text for the lectures which he is, under Lord Roberts's reformed training, required to deliver to his company. But the subject still retains a certain fascination for a large class of civilians whom the crisis of three years ago found "full of strange oaths"; and such persons will find War in Practice a particularly suggestive little book. General Baden-Powell tells us in his introduction that one product of the war—the worst, no doubt, in his view, although he does not explicitly say so—is the amateur military critic.
• War in Practice. By Major B. F. S. Baden-Powell, Scots Guards. With Diagraras and Illustrations. London Isbister and Co, [5s.]
Perhaps his prejudice against this unfortunate person will be assuaged if he learns that be is prepared to read and appreciate his brother's book.
The chapter on "Field Fortification" is a capital summary of the results of a war against a people who dug like moles, and forms a striking commentary on the official works on the subject of what we might call the pre-Paardeberg epoch. The diagrams illustrative of skilful loopholing and of that snare of the unwary, "dead ground," are excellent ; so is that on p. 83 illustrative of the concentration of fire obtained by the occupation of an extended defensive position. We are glad to observe that Major Baden-Powell devotes some very con- vincing arguments in chap. 4 to knocking down that most fatal of theories (witness Majuba and Nicholson's Nek, and on our side Talana Hill, Elandslaagte, and Pieter's Hill) that the top of a hill is the most suitable defensive position. On the contrary, we concur with him in holding that flat and open country gives every advantage to the defence. We also applaud his bold denial of the Napoleonic maxim, Concentrer pour com- battre. Tactically "the tendency in modern fighting," he says, "from the individual man to the large force, is to extend. The separation of the larger units enables the commander to work the country better, to reconnoitre on the very large scale now necessary, to outflank positions taken up by the enemy, and yet the great long lines are, owing to the range of modern firearms, able to offer considerable opposition to attack." On the other hand, "at all events in a country like South Africa, where we were almost entirely dependent for supplies on the railway or from certain depots, it became necessary, or at least desirable, for all the forces to come near to that base for their food,—hence to concentrate for supply "—i.e., concentrer pour vivre. Thc eternal principles of war are unchanged ; but common-sense renders necessary their adaptation to the conditions of modern life. If this were not so, indeed, what excuses could we find for the ill-starred debut in Natal?
The chapter on "Outposts" merits very careful reading. We have noticed that the rules for outposts in the tactical exer- cises which have followed the war still preserve what we believe to be too great a rigidity and sameness of form. Major Baden-Powell reminds us that "the systems of disposing the troops during the war varied considerably, and were not usually in accordance with the regulation methods previously described in drill-books." Stereotyped methods die hard, especially in the Army, but we think that the author's restate- ment of the primary objects of outposts, which are "to check an attack until the main force has had time to prepare for it," and to give a maximum number of men a maximum of sleep and rest, together with his summary of the various ways in which under varying conditions these objects can be obtained, should not be neglected by those responsible for the present peace training of our troops.
War in Practice does not pretend to any literary style. We can strike at times across faulty passages like the following:— " A good line can be taken up in front of a railway, the latter not only facilitating the distribution of supplies, but could also transport reinforcements, &c." Nor does it lay itself out for "tall" writing or picturesque description. The dramatic possibilities of the story of the war are now exhausted, and we have entered upon a strictly scientific epoch. Major Baden-Powell has made a very satisfactory contribution in this direction. It is, indeed, one of the best attempts we have seen from an English pen to deduce tactical lessons from the late war, and should be read as a commentary on Lord Roberts's Infantry Training, the conclusions of which it will be found on the whole, though written quite inde- pendently, to endorse. Meanwhile we await the official history of the war, and would remind the authorities that unless they are able to expedite its publication, all the ground, even the scientific, will already have been well covered by independent writers. But perhaps they wish us to forget a good deal about the war first!
Previous page
