THE TREATY-MAKING POWER.
TT has become so much of a truism in politics that a democracy is at its worst in dealing with foreign affairs, that we are apt to forget it till some event startles us into attention. As we recently pointed out, the very cardinal merits of this form of government forbid its success in this particular sphere. The subject is generally reserved for academic discussion, but it is so important in itself, and at the present moment so prominent, that we make no apology for again raising it. Government by the people for the people means a direct responsibility, an immediate appreciation of popular wants, and, if given a fair chance, a greater elasticity than other forms. But it is necessarily slow, since a great constitutional machine cannot be moved without time. It is necessarily a govern- ment rather by broad and obvious political truths than by special knowledge ; it gives no scope for subtlety and tact ; and it is public in every detail. On most matters such qualities are desirable; but in foreign affairs they are little short of calamitous. A diplomacy where every step had to win the public approval of an elected body would be ridiculous. A Foreign Office which directed its affairs solely by cheap rhetoric and an occasional reference to some treatise on the rights of man would not exist for a week, and a State which placed the di rect control of foreign affairs in the hands of a popular Legis- lature would disappear shortly from the family of nations. Granted that there must be some ultimate control of the people over every department, yet if such control appear except in the last resort it means disorganisation and in- efficiency. Take the least glaring instance, a case where a popular body might reasonably claim a more immediate authority,—the making of treaties. The importance of this treaty-making power can hardly be exaggerated. A treaty is, so to speak, the documentary side of foreign re- lations. It is the sum and aim of all foreign policy. It gives a legal sanction, so far as international law and ethics can give it, to the vague and transient alliances between peoples. Skilfully used, it may avert war and increase a country's wealth ; the Chancelleries and the corps diplomatique are its servants ; and it requires in a high degree tact, despatch, and intimate knowledge. Yet at the same time on its other side it seems to touch directly upon popular interests. It is less a matter of detail administration than of broad national policy. It affects profoundly the interests of many citizens ; why, then, should it not be regarded simply as the people's judgment upon a course of action and made an attribute of the popular body ? The argument is spcioug, but we believe it to be a false one, and modern politics seem to us to show clearly that the treaty-making power, except in a few.specified matters, should be regarded as the peculiar property of the Executive. On this point the action of the American Senate last week supplies a significant com- mentary.
The Senate of the United States has for some reason been always regarded as the special glory of that form of democracy. It is the fixed star among the planets of the Constitution, a restriction upon eccentric legislation and an admirable bureau for foreign affairs. It is an equipoise to the empire of mere numbers which prevails in the Lower House. And because it is so clarified and select a body, it has been entrusted with the chief authority in dealings with other nations. No treaty with a foreign Power can be contracted and no Ambassador appointed without its assent ; that is to say, its Standing Committee presides at the inception and the consummation of every scheme of external policy. But, unfortunately, into this superior Chamber the rude winds of American party politics have penetrated. Mr. Bryce, a most friendly critic, has noted that there is less respect for the Senate collectively, and for most of the Senators individually, now than there was eighteen years ago. The Caucus has appeared in the Senatorial elections ; the Senators are men who have private and local interests to defend which may be other than national; they have no necessary knowledge of the conditions of foreign politics, and their numbers are sufficiently large to make debate cumbrous and lengthy. The Senate's merits as a treaty-making power have appeared to some disadvantage last week. The Convention on the subject of the Nicaragua Canal, drafted by Mr. Secretary Hay and agreed to by Lord Pauncefote on behalf of her Majesty's Government, was submitted to it in due course by President McKinley. That body first amended it by reserving to the United States all the benefits, and taking away from neutral nations most of the securities, which bad been the consideration of the agreement ; and in the second place, it declared with the utmost calmness that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is hence- forth superseded. It is quite possible, no doubt, that in reality the changes made by the Senate will not injure the interests of this country, but that does not alter the recklessness and ineptitude with which the Senate handled the whole matter. It is, indeed, difficult to under- stand the point of view involved in their action. We cannot suppose that the Senate is ignorant of the rudimentary principles of bargaining, or of the outlines of that inter- national law, to which it renders such devout lip-service, on the subject of treaties. If ignorance is the cause, then it is strange that a body so ingenuous and so ill-versed in the practice of nations should be entrusted for one moment with foreign affairs. But it seems more probable that conflicting interests, connected, perhaps, with the trans-continental railways, are strong in the Senate, and that its aim is really to wreck the canal scheme, in the belief that such high-handed abrogation of treaties and alteration of agreements will never be passed over by Britain. In that case the matter is even more serious, for it seems a doubtful policy to entrust an interested body with questions of great national importance. This argument, it may be said, would apply against any government by a popular House, but there is all the difference in the world between a conflict of interests in home affairs, where abundant knowledge is presumed, and foreign affairs, where the whole significance of a, scheme is only at first apparent to an expert.
If we turn to France we find that the treaty-making power is vested, and very properly, not in the Senate, but in the Executive. The President, under the Consti- tution of 1875, has the power to negotiate and ratify agreements with foreign nations. There may be an understanding with a foreign nation which is never published or debated upon in either House. For example, it used to be a moot point whether during France's long friendship with Russia President Carnot had ever concluded a treaty with the Czar, and the text of the present Franco-Russian Convention has never been laid before the Senate. We think it a sound precaution, for many of the moves in the international game are so delicate and tentative that secrecy is indispensable to their value. But at the same time it is only right that treaties which involve some serious change in the law, some charge upon the people, or some decision in a matter of great popular interest should be submitted for popular ratification. In France treaties of peace and commerce, and those which affect the State finances, must be voted by the two Chambers. In England we have no such hard-and-fast rule, but it is a convention of the Con- stitution, amounting in practice to law, that treaties involving a charge on the people, such as a treaty of commerce, or a change in the law of the land, such as an extradition treaty, cannot be carried into effect without the sanction of Parliament. The Crown can cede terri- tory or make peace at its will, but the responsible Ministry will usually make sure of a Parliamentary sanction to avoid future difficulties. This, we submit, is the proper view of the subject. By all means let the popular Assembly ratify any treaty which directly concerns the people, and which can be subjected to public discussion without hurt, but let the treaty-making power reside primarily and fundamentally in the Executive. Let popular ratification be an advisable, but not an essential element. Only then will a nation escape the endless heart - breaking delays, inconsistencies, and interested obstructions which attend popular experiments in foreign policy.
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