TOPICS OF THE DAY.
A MINORITY PREMIER..
BEFORE we attempt to deal with the constitutional problems which surround the question of dissolu- tion and a Minority Premier, we desire to say how strongly we scout the notion that either the Unionists or the Liberals have a divine right to rule, and that the Labour Party can only be tolerated, kindly or the reverse according to circumstances. The Labour Party stands on an exact equality with the other parties. We are, on the other hand, entirely unmoved by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's demands for what he calls " fair play." He can command fair play whenever he is the representative of the majority. Till then he and the Labour Party have no more right to special con- sideration than the Unionists or the Liberals.
In every Constitutional crisis the King must act auto- matically, i.e., not on any individual views, however sound, but in accordance with certain strict rules and principles. Under our Constitution the King must never, and does never, intrude his personal likes or dislikes. How are these principles to be applied ? Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, though he can count upon Liberal votes to put him into office, cannot count upon them to keep him there provided he does what he pro- poses to do and tries to carry out the Labour Party programme. Let us assume that Mr. Baldwin is beaten in the Commons and that the King, as, of course, must be the case, sends for Mr. MacDonald. The first point to note here is that Mr. MacDonald will not be the leader of the majority which turned out the Govern- ment, but only of the bigger of the two parties which temporarily combined to make up that majority. The consequence of this fact is that the King will not be able to accept the advice of Mr. MacDonald as unreservedly as he could and would were Mr. MacDonald the leader of a homogeneous, independent majority of the House. It has been announced by the Liberals that though Labour may count on them to turn out Mr. Baldwin's Government, it must not count upon their supporting Labour except upon matters on which they agree with Labour. In other words, Mr. MacDonald by the force of circumstances, will be a Minority Premier, We say this not to belittle him or to prejudice him— there have been instances of memorable Minority Premiers before in our history, Mr. Pitt for example— but because it is a fact. It is on a failure to appreciate this fact that the public has been misled in regard to the Constitutional issues concerned with the problem of dissolution, and of the duties of the King.
A British Prime Minister who has the support (1) of a majority of the House of Commons, and (2) of his Cabinet, is the most powerful man in the world. While these conditions prevail he holds, clenched in his hand, the powers of. the Executive of the Legislature, and of almost the whole of the powers of the Crown. The right to dissolve Parliament on his sole initiative, and without reserve or limitation is alone ultra rims in the case of a Majority Prime Minister, with an acquiescent Cabinet behind him. And even here a Majority Prime Minister can, in fact, though not in theory, make his will prevail. He can enforce his wishes on the King, even should the King consider a dissolution injurious. The reason is easily given. If the King refuses a dissolution to a Majority Premier, the Premier resigns. But that will not prevent a dissolution, for the leader of the Opposition, when sent for by the King, will be obliged, save in an exceptional case, to admit that he cannot, carry on the Government as he has no majority, and that therefore he cannot accept office unless. the King will agree to a dissolution. In a word, the Majority Premier can carry his point by the strength of his position, not because he has an inherent right to claim a dissolution at will, but because he can (quite legitimately, no doubt) deprive the Sovereign of every other way of performing his function in the Constitution—that of providing the country with a responsible Government able to carry out its wishes.
As an illustration, take the situation of a month ago.
It is freely stated, though we take no responsibility for the truth of the rumour that the King considered that a dissolution ought not to take place. Nevertheless, he was obliged to accept Mr. Baldwin's advice. There had been no Cabinet resignations, no signs of any unwillingness of the majority in Parliament to support their leader, and no willingness to support either of his rivals. That being so, the King quite rightly felt that he could not reject the advice tendered him by a Prime Minister able to enforce that advice by resignation. When a Minority Premier asks for a dissolution the position is entirely different. He cannot claim a dissolution as of right, because he cannot enforce one. The King, in that case, has, before agreeing, to ascertain whether in giving that advice the Premier represents a majority in the House of Commons, and, if not, whether there is a leader of one of the other parties in the House who will take office, without requiring a dissolution, and who can give assurances that he will receive the general support of a majority of the Commons. The King must then decide. If he thinks the prospects of the new Ministry good he will accept the resignation of the Premier in being. If not, he will tell him that having ascertained that no other course is open, he grants the dissolution asked for.
A good way of realizing the soundness of our con- tention is to consider what might happen if the King did not shape his action in accordance with the will of the majority in the Commons. If that majority, as might very well happen if Mr. MacDonald were put out of office by a combined Liberal and Unionist vote, did not want a dissolution they would immediately follow their vote of want of confidence by " a humble petition " to the King asking him not to accept the advice of any Minister or Cabinet to dissolve Parliament until he had ascertained that there was no person able and willing to carry on the Government " with the support of a majority of the Members of this House." It might not—and indeed would not—be desirable to prevent a dissolution by such a vote, but it could and would happen if a Minority Minister claimed the right to dissolve on his " mere motion," and if there were any signs of the King yielding to the pressure of his Minority Minister. The King is always and rightly anxious to avoid anything approaching a conflict of opinion with the House of Commons. That is why his action must be what we have called automatic—i.e., action based on rules and not on personal opinions.
The Premiership is one of immense, almost unlimited, power, but power is to be exercised ex officio—not per- sonally. The power is derived from and is dependent on the confidence, i.e., the will of a majority of the Commons. When that confidence is entirely and not merely tem- porarily, locally and accidentally withdrawn, the oak that had grown so tall and straight withers at the root.
When in doubt ask whence the Prime Minister derives his powers, and the difficulties that seemed so great vanish. There is no innate, intrinsic power in the position of a Prime Minister. His power while Prime Minister is immense, but it is in essence derivative.
J. ST. LOE STRACHEY.
Previous page
