LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
An American and Mr. Wilmot
Sut,—Mr. Chester Wilmot's letter (the Spectator,-February 22nd) is of such interest that I am anxious to reply to some of the points he has made.
1. Unconditional Surrender. Mr. Wilmot does not answer the essen- tial point that in January, 1943, when a new German attack on Russia was imminent, it was vital that the Russians should realise, as Churchill bad already assured them, that no separate negotiated peace would be made with Germany by the Western Allies. This was all the more important in view of the fact that no landing in France could be made that year. But even if we think in terms of 1944 there is little evidence that this declaration had any effect in Germany. ?sr. Dulles's opinion, while he was stationed in Switzerland, is hardly proof. Since the war the whole of German internal history has been open to us, but there Is nothing to show that the declaration affected a single German leader. The remakkable thing is that up to the last minute men like Himmler and Goering thought that they would be able to negotiate with the Western Powers.
2. The Campaign in Italy. The main question here concerns the plan for sending a force across the Adriatic to assist Tito's Partisans and open a route to Vienna. Mr. Wilmot agrees that, owing to the shortage of American landing-craft, the issue lay between fighting a major cam- paign in the Balkans or in the Pacific. His argument seems to be that the landing-craft should not have been sent to the Far East because Japan would in any case have collapsed after the defeat of Germ- any. If he is correct, then the American decision to fight in the Pacific is one of the most tragic in all history, because the hundreds of thousands of casualties suffered by the American forces in their attacks on Leyte, Okinawa and the other Japanese strongholds must have been unnecessary. The answer to this argument is that there was no reason to assume that the surrender of Japan would follow automatically after Germany had ceased to fight, and that, unless the Japanese hold over the Yellow Sea could be broken as soon as possible, the war in the Far East, both against Japan and on the Asiatic mainland, might continue for an incalculable time.
3. The Invasion of Southern France. Mr. Wilmot says that this "came too late to affect the issue in Normandy." This is doubtful, but in any case it is irrelevant because no one had any right to expect that the Normandy landing would be as successful as it proved to be. _If a general, before the battle, always knew as much as the historian does after it, then his probjems would be considerably simplified.
4. "Broad Front" or "Single Thrust." Mr. Wihnot is convinced that Montgomery's plan of "a single thrust "- Was right, and that Eisenhower and his advisers, including Air Chief Marshal Tedder, were unduly cautious in rejecting it. I do not feel that my military know- ledge, acquired as a Second Lieutenant in World War I, entitles me to give a categorical ,answer to this question. It may, however, be suggested that, as Eisenhower had calmly faced the terrible risk of ordering the invasion of Normandy, in June, 1944, when the weather was uncertain, it js unlikely that he was over-cautious in refusing to agree to a major attack across the Rhine in September. 5. Yalta. Mr. Wilmot is certain that "there was no need to buy Russian aid in the Pacific." The Pentagon took the opposite view. In view of this uncertainty the President was not in a position to reject Russian help, which might save hundreds of thousands of American lives. Mr. Wilmot's chief objection is that Yalta "provided Stalin with a moral cloak for aggressive designs in Asia." As the main thesis of his book is that Roosevelt should have known that Stalin had no regard for morality and was ready to break his word whenever it suited him, it seems inconsistent to argue that Stalin needed a moral cloak for the recovery of territory which had been held by Russia before 1904. Mr. Wilmot does not tell us what military or political concessions were made at Yalta other than the acceptance of the existing facts.
6. Berlin. Mr. Wilmot repeats his view that the Western Powers would have gained great political prestige if they had been the first to enter Berlin, but he does not say why this is so. It is difficult to see how the later blockade of Berlin by the Russians has weakened the present position of the Western Powers in Europe. This blockade was probably the greatest political mistake which the Russians had ever made, because it demonstrated the determination of Great Britain and the United States not to surrender to illegal force. Finally; Mr. Wilmot argues that all our troubles are due to "the destruction not only of Germali but also of the European balance of power." The European balance of power was inevitably destroyed by the defeat of Germany and by the return of the British and American armies to their homes. If by "destruction of Germany" he means that Russia obtained the Eastern Zone, it is difficult to see how the Western Powers could have prevented this without the use of force. If he is speaking of the destruction of the German army, then it is of course true to say that the Western Powers might have allowed the German army to remain intact in the hope that it could be used there- after in the balance of power against Russia. This is, of course, a tenable point of view today, even though it would be met with violent opposition in France and in most other European countries which still fear a German army. It was not an argument that anyone could have accepted in 1945, when there was some hope that the Russians would play their part in the maintenance of peace.—Yours faithfully,
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