CASABLANCA AND AFTER
N the speech he is apparently to deliver on Saturday Herr 10 Hitler may be expected to impress on his audience the part t ten years of Nazi rule have played in putting Germany in the ace she holds in the world today. If that audience is still in apable after ten years of Nazi rule of any independent intellectual sa; xercise it will concern itself even more with the question of the lace Germany is likely to hold in the world tomorrow—a sub- ct which has been equally engaging the attention of the con- rence which so dramatically assembled at Casablanca on January 4th. The importance of that gathering is better measured by the ere fact that it took place at all, involving as it did journeys sa es rom Washington by President Roosevelt and from London by Mr.
urchill, than by the necessarily colourless communiqué in which he result of the discussions is presented to the world. And yet here is sufficient colour at any rate in the closing paragraph, its sober but inspiringly suggestive intimation that " the Presi- ent and the Prime Minister and the Combined Staffs, having ompleted their plans for the offensive campaigns of 1943, have ow separated to put them into active and concerted execution." e only commentary needed on that is the reminder that the ast time President and Prime Minister met in conference the result as the landing in North Africa and the occupation of the very erritory on which this month's conference has been held. The ormer meeting synchronised with the capture of Tobruk by ommel, the latter with the capture of Tripoli by Montgomery. One word may be added to that, and it is worth adding. An ne announcement made at Moscow simultaneously with the announce- ent made about Casablanca makes it probable that by the time tler speaks on Saturday the last vestiges of the German army ncircled at Stalingrad will have ceased to exist—a fact that can ardly fail, even in Berlin, or perhaps least of all in Berlin, to ecall the assurance given by Hitler the last time he addressed his eople that " Stalingrad will be taken, you can be certain of that." at was on September 3oth. On November 8th . he added he information that " we have got it now except for some very at mall parts." There was some truth in that. The Germans did -ome within an ace of taking Stalingrad. But they are today not vithin 15o miles of it, apart from the last tragic remnants of the :ncircled army. Everywhere along the front they are being driven back with immense losses of material and men. It is incredible that no one in Germany should be asking himself, and even daring to ask his neighbour, who it was that was responsible for turning away from victory in the west to launch what was to be a six-weeks' campaign against a State that at that moment was ° linked to Germany by a formal agreement and was giving her material and valuable assistance. What effect, if any, those ques- tionings may have on Germany's power of resistance we have no means of knowing. Through the Gestapo and the S.S. Hitler no doubt has the people still in an iron grip. But he is submitting them at present to a strange treatment. The suddes transforma- tion of Press comment from exultation in victory to something like open admission of defeat needs some explaining. The sweat, blood and tears appeal is one thing—and the right thing—when t is a question of bracing a virile people in the early stages of a great war, but quite another when addressed in the hour of mili- tary disaster to a people assured repeatedly that Stalingrad would he taken, that the Russian armies would cease to exist by the end of 1942, that no foreign aeroplane would ever fly over Berlin.
It is against a Germany so placed that the campaign of 1943 has bem planned. Of the details of what was decided at Casablanca W ‘: know one thing only, and that could have been taken for granted —that the first task is to clear the Germans out of Africa and secure safe passage for Allied shipping through the Mediterranean. That must be the preliminary to the coming offensive or offensives against Germany in Europe, and how long the operation will take remains to be seen. Time presses here, for the shipping situation is serious, and it is urgent that the Narrows be opened at the earliest moment possible. Recent delays are explicable. It is obviously to be desired that the enemy should be engaged by the British and American forces in Tunisia and the victorious Eighth Army simultaneously. The weather may cause more post- ponement still, but it will be a serious disappointment and gravely compromise future operations if North Africa is not cleared within a period to be measured by weeks, and not very many weeks. It was no doubt unfortunate that Premier Stalin and General Chiang Kai-Shek could not be present at the conference, but the reasons for their absence are obvious, and the comments on it made in one or two quarters in this country exhibit an almost incredible per- versity. Both the Russian and the Chinese leaders have been fully informed of the decisions reached, and so far as can be seen no new co-ordination with Russia is needed, or even possible, at this moment. Russia's part is to go on doing precisely what she is doing with such brilliance of strategy and persistence in effort— driving the enemy from her territory, robbing him of his last hopes of oil and wearing him down by ceaseless attrition of equipment and men. The part of Russia's allies is to do what M. Stalin himself has always urged, and what the Casablanca decisions publicly pledge them to do, " draw as much of the weight as possible off the Russian armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points." There is no reason to believe that M. Stalin either could or would ask more than that.
It is not to be supposed that every aspect of the ten-days' con- versations at Casablanca is indicated in the official communiqué, but one question is specifically stated, and another may confidently be assumed, to have engaged the President and Prime Minister and their staffs. The first, and less important, is the political situation in North Africa and the relations between General Giraud on the one hand and General de Gaulle and the Fighting French movement on the other. Some progress was clearly made in the right direction, but more is as clearly needed still. On the other hand, agitation about the North African situation has been excessive. The Anglo-American forces could have landed there and attempted to occupy the country as the Germans occupied France, or they could have landed to join forces with Frenchmen whom they regarded as allies and were prepared to treat in all respects as such. The former was the wrong and the latter the right way, and it has proved unexpectedly successful. It is per- fectly true that many of the administrators in office in North Africa are unsatisfactory persons, but the fact that they collaborated with Vichy, which collaborated with Germany because itsbelieved, how- ever misguidedly, that that was the only way to preserve any semblance of a France, does not mean that they desire a German victory, or would hesitate to give full support to the Allies now that the defeat of Germany by the Allies is certain. Their motives may not be admirable, but self-interest if nothing else will keep them in the strait path, and loyalty to Marshal Petain, though it may be perverse, is after all not a crime. As for General Giraud and General de Gaulle, they have agreed at any rate to fight the Germans in concert. That is the immediate business in hand ; other things may be left ; full accord can be looked for with some confidence on the solvitur ambulando for pugnando) principle.
One subject about which nothing has been said in the com- muniqué, the U-boat menace, is almost the most important of all. It is inconceivable that it was not discussed, or that Lord Leathers, who is Minister of War Transport and Shipping, was at Casa- blanca in the former capacity only. There is no doubt that the submarine menace is as grave as ever, for if measures to cope with it are developing in volume and efficiency so is the number of U-boats in action. They represent Hitler's last card, and if vigilance and endeavour were relaxed for a moment it might still prove a trump card. Counter-measures are a technical question not appropriate for discussion here, but grave problems are ob- viously raised. Are our merchant-ships too slow? Is the convoy- system, which saved the situation in the last war, the right ex- pedient in face of the new U-boat strategy of hunting in packs' Are destroyers and fast motor-boats being built quickly enough, and in sufficient numbers? Is there any way of providing more extended air-cover for convoys? These and many other questions present themselves, and are no doubt receiving answers in the proper quarters. It is reasonable to hope that the Casablanca discussions will make a first contribution to the solution of the problem by securing the opening of the Mediterranean, and that that will prove not to have been their only contribution.
Previous page
