THE MEDITERRANEAN IN POLITICS
BOOKS OF THE DAY
By E. H. CARR
MISS MONROE has performed a remarkable feat. She has produced a volume which is as lively as good journalism and as varied and colourful as a travel book, and which is at the same time a contribution to the serious study of one of the most complicated problems in current international politics. She has travelled all round the Mediterranean littoral, and visited the principal islands. Everywhere she has seen and listened, and has shrewd comments to make. In some of the less familiar fields, she has given a wealth of information which will be new to most English readers and which is probably not elsewhere accessible in English.
The book is divided into three main sections—on British, French and Italian interests—followed by two chapters on Turkey, " the next-of-kin," and Spain, " the sick man of Europe." The division gives the clue to the treatment of the subject. The Mediterranean can hardly be discussed today in any other terms than those of Realpolitik ; and this is pre- eminently a study in Realpolitik. It is symptomatic of the book and of the period that the League of Nations gets only a bare half-dozen mentions—and these only as a matter of history. There is no attempt to blur the issues with optimistic formula-. Another absentee from the picture is Soviet Russia. The prognostications made at the time of the Montreux Conference that she was about to " re-enter " Mediterranean politics have not been fulfilled. Russian supplies for Spain travel via the Kid Canal, the North Sea and Bordeaux.
The French section is perhaps the freshest in the book. More dramatic events in the Mediterranean and the overriding character of French interests elsewhere have combined to distract attention from the extent and quality of the French stake in the Mediterranean ; and the field has hardly been touched by English writers since the War. Her whole energies bent on defence in Europe, France is more and more relaxing her hold on the Eastern Mediterranean. Even in the first years after the War, when she seemed almost omnipotent in Europe, she was half-hearted over the Syrian mandate. With a few distinguished exceptions, her administrators there have not been of a high calibre and have not enhanced the French reputa- tion. Now it looks as if France recognised that Syria is more of a liability than an asset, and aimed at little more than clinging to the end of her pipe-line at Tripoli and trusting Great Britain for the rest. But North Africa is a different story. Here are the reserves in military man-power from which she must fill the gaps in her own depleted population. Algeria is already— with reserves—a part of France. Tunis and Morocco are far behind in political development ; and nascent nationalism is beginning to prove awkward and threatening. Not the least absorbing and important part of Miss Monroe's book is her survey of the conditions and problems, in each case so different, of the three French territories.
But the main Mediterranean issue, for which everything else is the setting, is, of course, the Anglo-Italian duel. Here there is little new to be said ; but what had to be said is said with discretion and balance. Miss Monroe pays a tribute to the success of Fascism in educating, organising and rehabilita- ting the once down-at-heel and despised Italian communities scattered throughout the Levant. About the extraordinary success of this aspect of Italian propaganda " superlatives are warranted." In some other respects Miss Monroe rates Italian successes perhaps a shade too low. The Albanian may be haughty and independent ; but a combination of Italian threats and Italian money brings him to heel'at critical moments. (Incidentally, there is no mention of the famous resolution of the Ambassadors' Conference, which was tantamount to a The Mediterranean in Politics. By Elizabeth Monroe. (Oxford University Press. los.)
recognition by the Allies of Italy's special position in Albania.) In general, however, Miss Monroe's appraisal of the vul- nerability of Italy's position is judicious and convincirg. Great Britain and France suffer from " two Mediterranean weaknesses " : long lines of communication, and the restive- ness of subject populations among whom the ferment of nationalism is working. Italy shares these weaknesses, and adds to them a third : her dependence on the world outside the Mediterranean which she is powerless to control. If Italy realised her present maximum ambitions and were strong enough to exclude Great Britain from the Mediterranean altogether, the British navy could still make the Mediterranean a prison for Italy. No Mediterranean victories can make Italy self- supporting. Her trade with the world beyond is still vital to her existence ; and it could be stifled by a Power which sealed the exits from the Mediterranean against her. Italy is " a young Empire and an impecunious country," and a naval war is " an adventure she can ill afford." Moreover, her recent gains have been offset by serious diplomatic defeats. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which recognises the Suez Canal as " an integral part of Egypt," has in fact strengthened the authority of Egypt's ally, Great Britain, and weakened the rights which other foreign Powers enjoyed under the inter- national convention of 1888. Hence Italy's anxiety to get that convention re-affirmed in her agreement with Great Britain. The Montreux Conference, which Italy refused to attend, was another blow : agreement was reached over her head, with disastrous results to her prestige and to her relations with Turkey. Nor does Miss Monroe think much of Italian prospects in Spain. She appears to endorse the view that Spaniards and Italians are " too much like oil and water " to permit of Italy's obtaining a permanent foothold there ; and she gives a guarded approval to the British Government's present policy.
In the background is Germany's Drang mach Siden. So far as the Mediterranean basin is concerned, it is still primarily economic. Already in 1935, Germany was showing signs of repeating in Spain the economic successes which she has scored in the Balkans. The issue turns on her capacity to capture the Spanish market, not on the acquisition of Spanish raw materials. These she can now secure in exchange for munitions ; but she cannot secure them permanently unless she is able to develop other exports to Spain in order to pay for them. The necessary statistics are given in the appendices to the volume. But Miss Monroe, who observes that the French move towards autarky in North Africa is the natural counterpart to the Ottawa agreements, might also have pointed out that the German economic drive in the Balkans and more recently in Spain is also in part the sequel of her gradual exclu- sion from the British and Dominion markets. We cannot have it both ways. British commercial policy since 1931 has had a lot to d3 with German economic expansion in Europe.
There are a few minor questions of perspective about which one is inclined to register disagreement. Italy did not wait for the Hitler-Schuschnigg conversations which were the beginning of the end of Austria in order to start conversations with Great Britain. There is no reason to suppose that Central European anxieties were responsible for the start, though they may afterwards have accelerated the pace, of the talks. Nor does it give a correct picture to say that the Viennese were revolted by the humiliations which the Storm-Troopers in- flicted on the Jews. Vienna was the home of anti-Semitism long before it spread to Northern Germany ; and cases are on record where Jews were saved by German Nazis from the worse persecutions of native Austrians.
Previous page
