Soldiers of the Queen
By PETER THORNEYCROFT
WHATEVER else Mr Verrier manages to describe in his book,* it is certainly not an army for the 'sixties. Somewhere in the closing passages he does foreshadow a kind of blueprint for a Golden Age with Britain's role carefully confined to one European division with supporting troops, a reserve in England living in carefree domesticity with their wives in houses thoughtfully provided within an expanding building programme, and with their risks limited to a possible subscription to a UN force. It might, of course, develop that way, but there's not much sign of it in the 'sixties and it would be a re- markably dangerous assumption to plan upon.
Mr Verrier writes with compassion and under- standing of the soldier in the diverse rOles he has to play and the varied operations he has to undertake. The technique of illustrating the theme with quotations, romantic or otherwise, certainly lends colour to what is in any event a fascinating story. Mr Verrier is more critical of the commanders and the defence planners, and in a story as complicated and stormy as that of the British army, it would be odd if some occasions for criticism could not be found. Since, however, Mr Verrier chooses to aim his barbs at a number of targets, it is perhaps reasonable to express a few doubts as to whether he has chosen the right ones or shown a particularly good aim.
A professional who reads this book will be disappointed. His disappointment will not be in the fact that his profession is criticised, but rather in the fact that Mr Verrier—who has had a fairish opportunity of studying military matters —does not really seem to have grasped much of the real substance of the matter. Above all, I doubt whether he ever really understood the quotation from Sir John Fortescue on William Napier and his History of the Peninsular War with which he starts his book. 'He knew private soldiers and he knew strategists and he realised that both alike were men and the playthings of fortune, not the arbiters of their own destinies.' A true comprehension of the second half of this quotation is indeed requisite in any military commentator. Defence is the servant, not the architect, of foreign policy.
Mr Healey is quoted as saying that the Ministry of Defence is the place where foreign policy is costed. This is, or at least should be, an accurate statement. Mr Verrier, on the other hand, is absorbed with the myth that defence policy is somehow dictated by the addiction of British officers to an outdated imperial idea.
There are many reasons why the British army has a role outside Europe and they could and should be debated. They have very little to do, however, with the fact that some officers' mess once had a good view of the Himalayas. In the real and sometimes dangerous world in which we live, .‘ soldiers have to go where the jobs for soldiers happen to be. It is not a matter of choice but of necessity. To argue that we ought to have reinforced Europe, where happily no imminent danger of war existed, at the expense of the Far East and Middle East, where the need for soldiers either to fight or to carry out police work was urgent, is flying in the face of logic. To assert that all this was somehow due to imperialistic tendencies in the higher levels of the army is to reduce the argument to farce.
0 AN ARMY FOR THE SixTies. By Anthony Verrier. 4111106113*§VelfirAKTvi., - - 'tis The fact is that in the judgment of the over- seas department of the British government reties did exist in Malaysia, Borneo, Sarawak, the South Arabian Federation, Tanganyika, Kenya, Cyprus and British Guiana. It is possible to attack the foreign policy which gives rise to these responsibilities, but not the army which dis- charged them with speed, efficiency and the minimum of casualties.
The same confusion creeps into the arguments about the nuclear deterrent. We really are en- titled to expect from Mr Verrier a more searching analysis of the arguments which govern this complex issue than is to be found within these pages. Of course, there are arguments both ways, but the plain truth is that no conventional method of defending this island exists, and this argument convinced first a Conservative and subsequently a Socialist government. Moreover, if one is to write about nuclear matters, a clearer account of the arguments on tactical nuclear weapons should be given. My impression is that Mr Verrier has got the protagonists of the main schools of thought in this field the wrong way round. Had he got them right he might have had a clearer picture of the reasons for cancelling Blue Water.
Perhaps the main defect of this book is that it fails to recognise that war is at best an untidy business, with defeats as well as victories, or that strategic planning is concerned not with future certainties but with providing the means and the mobility to deal with the utterly unexpected.
Some of the argument seems oddly dated. Three years ago powerful critics attacked the nuclear deterrent and questioned the wisdom of a voluntary system of recruitment. Today these matters hardly seem to be an issue. As Mr Verrier rather sadly points out, the Socialist government has not only explicitly accepted the need for nuclear weapons, it appears if anything to be even more firmly attached to them than were its predecessors. It might, of course, in its present desperate straits, do anything, but to turn yet another somersault in this branch of policy would seem unlikely. The success and value of the voluntary system has been bril- liantly demonstrated in a whole series of difficult operations. Mr Verrier is thus left a rather lonely figure on a stricken field.
Nevertheless, there is gold amid the dross— Mr Harold Wilson's quotation from Charles Lamb—'that there is nothing so irrelevant as a poor relation'—comes home to roost most aptly at this moment! Mr Verrier stumbles on parts of the truth, and they are important parts. There is a need for light, portable combat weapons. Contrary to Mr Verrier's account, the lack of them was due in part to an over-preoccupation by the army with the European theatre and the possibilities of a tactical nuclear battle. Mr Verrier is, however, on firm ground when he claims that it is men that matter most.
It is at this point that the argument comes at last right up to date. Mr Verrier is concerned to demonstrate that neither dominant weapons nor deviously argued White Papers are a sub- stitute for men upon the ground. Mr Healey's Defence Review is recognised by the author as perhaps the greatest non-event of the year. The rOles remain; all that happened was a sharp reduction in the means with which to execute them. 'Since then, of course, ado has been AV announcement of i further cut of 1100million, which, it is still claimed, can be carried oul `without altering the basic lines of external policy.' To cut the men and not to cut the rille would be a betrayal of the reponsibilities of the Secre- tary of State for Defence and Mr Verrier's warnings on this are well-timed and relevant.
The army, about which this book is written, is now closely integrated with its sister services. The test of its efficiency will be found in its discipline and training and, above all, in the speed with which it can be swung into action to meet the next new and unexpected situation wherever that situation may arise. If Mr Verrier had worried less about nuclear weapons and out-of-date theories of imperialism and concen- trated more on speed, flexibility and fire-power, as well as the economies which could flow from a unified defence system, his book would have been a better one. It is still worth reading by amateur and professional alike.
Previous page
