Before Sir M. Hicks-Beach's despatch of censure was signed, the
Government had received Sir Bartle Frere's final explanation of his reasons for declaring war, written after Isandlana. The High Commissioner repeats that, in presence of Cetewayo's army, Natal could only exist as an armed camp ; and that the uneasiness among the natives was so great that it would have been impossible to delay war more than a few weeks, during which the favourable season would have been lost. It would have been folly to wait the convenience of the Zulu King. With regard to the inadequacy of Sir Bartle's preparations, he had every reason to believe the force at his disposal sufficient. Of the
three persons in the colony supposed to be best informed as to the Zulu character and designs, one held that the terms offered would be accepted without fighting; another believed that the Zulu power had been greatly over-rated; and a third main- tained—speaking, singularly enough, while the fight at Isand- lana was going on—that the Zulu nation would themselves rise and abolish the tyrant. Sir Bartle quotes these opinions as if he had acted on them, but they leave him in this singular dilemma :—If he believed them, then the colony was not in the extreme danger of which he speaks, and he could easily have repulsed a Zulu invasion ; while if he disbelieved them, they were no excuse for his rash confidence in his resources. He cannot be allowed to plead that Cetewayo's "celibate, man- destroying gladiators," were so terribly formidable that the colony could not exist in their neighbourhood, and also plead that it was safe to invade Cetewayo's country with only 6,000 -Europeans and no supports.
