29 MARCH 1946, Page 10

MARGINAL COMMENT

By HAROLD NICOLSON

UNLESS some last-minute hitch occurs the Greek elections will be held on Sunday next, March 3rst. It is, as we well

know, impossible to forecast the result of any election, but it is considered probable by competent observers that the royalists, who are known as the Populist Party, will obtain a majority. It had been agreed, when the Sophoulis Government took office in Novem ber last, that the constitutional issue, namely the question whether Greece should be a monarchy or a republic, should be postponed for a period of two years, and that no plebiscite should be held on this issue before March, 1948. It is conceivable thai if the Populists are returned to power their leader, M. Tsaldaris, will seek to reverse this agreement and will demand that the Greek people shall be allowed without further delay to express their desires regarding the future constitution of their country. A plebiscite held in such circumstances would in all probability result in the return of King George to Athens. It would then be believed, not only in Russia, not only in the United States, not only in certain circles in this country, but even in Greece itself, that the British Government had profited by the presence of British troops in Greece to impose an unwanted and unrepresentative election upon the country and thereby to secure the return of the government and the system which, in spite of their assurances, they had in their hearts always desired. Such an assumption would be unfair and incorrect. In the first place we have retained our forces in the country for the sole purpose of preventing a further outbreak of civil war and in the hope of discouraging the extremists both of the Right and of the Left from intimidating the Greek electors. In the second place we have made it abundantly clear, in so far as our advice and influence were concerned, that we did not believe that any government formed from the extreme Right or the extreme Left would be of advantage to Greece, and we have sought to encourage and assist those elements of the Centre and Left-Centre which we optimistically hoped would constitute a neutral or liberal administra- tion capable of tiding over the difficult phase of reconstruction which after all her sufferings Greece is bound to traverse.

Thus, although we have not abused the position which was thrust upon us, and although if the Populists are returned we shall be faced with an administration which we considered undesirable, the legend will persist that we wanted the Right to win and that we helped them to do so. It is not sufficient to dismiss this legend as fantastic: it is necessary to examine how it arose. It is an axiom with foreign, although not with British, critics that Greece, owing to her geographical position, is of great strategic importance to us in the Eastern Mediterranean and that it is therefore essential for us to maintain Greece .within our own zone of security. Such people argue that now that the balance of power in Eastern Europe has been reversed, now that a united Slav bloc extends from Istria to Varna, now that Turkey is menaced and the future of the Straits is most uncertain, it is only logical for us to preserve our influence in Greece by any means at our command. It is no use explaining to such people that the British public today is not strategically- minded, that the age of Palmerston and Curzon is now remote, and that even our strategical experts would hesitate to affirm that the old defensive formulas can still apply to what, in the atomic age, have become very narrow seas. They persist in believing that we cannot afford to allow Greece to fall under Russian influence or permit conditions under which a Communist system could be established in so vital an area. Even those of us who know that the Labour Party are unaware of, or indifferent to, such considerations cannot deny that they are logical considerations and that as such they ought to be taken into careful account. * * * * There are other circumstances which induce foreign, and some British, observers to doubt the sincerity of our assurances. It is quite true that during the, war years the then British Government considered themselves to be under a personal obligation to the King of the Hellenes. I cannot understand the attitude of those who see something discreditable in that loyalty. It was King George who personally defied Mussolini ; it was under his leader- ship that the Greek armies were able to inflict such defeats upon the Italian armies that the whole German drive against Moscow was demonstrably, and fatally, delayed; it was he who, when the German invasion came, conducted himself with unflinching deter- mination and great personal courage He proved himself a sturdy combatant and a most loyal ally ; it would have indeed been dis- creditable if thereafter we had repudiated every obligation. It is true, again, that when the Germans were in occupation of Greece we inclined at moments to supply more assistance to the anti- Communist irregulars than we supplied to E.L.A.S.; yet this differ- entiation, which has been much exaggerated, was dictated by mili- tary rather than political considerations ; for whereas the Right-wing organisations were ready to fight the Germans, the Left-wing organi- sations displayed a marked tendency to use the weapons provided, not against the common enemy, but against their own compatriots. Our foreign critics assume that we had from the start a definite " policy " in mind and that all our actions were conceived to further deliberate political and strategic aims. If one accepts the assump- tion, then our apparent inconsequence assumes the shape of a neatly devised plan ; but I do not accept the assumption ; it was not a policy which directed our actions, but an unfortunate chain of circumstance.

What, in fact, has been our policy in Greece ever since the Agree- ment of Varkiza, in February, 1945, put an end to the civil war? We realised on the one hand that the fear and rage aroused among the Greek population by the conduct of E.L.A.S. had brought upon the political leaders of the Left a degree of discredit which they did not all of them deserve. We realised, on the other hand, that the extreme Right, if given a free hand, would exploit the panic which had resulted and might well seize power and establish a system of reaction and reprisal. We therefore decided that the Greek people should be allowed a breathing-space in which to recover from the strain to which they had been subjected. With this in mind, we advised the Regent to postpone the constitutional issue for two years and to announce that elections would only be held in the present March. During the interval we sought to support a care- taker Government of the Centre and Left-Centre, and we did every- thing possible—by advice and monetary assistance—to encourage that Government in coping with the grave economic and financial situation which threatened to overwhelm the country in chaos and famine. We went further. In order to ensure that the elections this March should be demonstrably free elections, we induced the Greek Government to allow an Allied Observer Mission, consisting of some ',Goo American, French and British assessors, divided into some 25o different teams, to proceed to Greece. This, surely, was the right and reasonable course to pursue ; it is too early as yet to say that it has failed ; it would be even more premature to say that it has succeeded. * * * * There are three main factors which hamper the efficacy of our curative treatment. There is, in the first place, the " ancient malady of the Athenians " which renders it impossible for any Greek to take his politics sensibly. There is, in the second place, the fact that in the provinces the officers of the gendarmerie have not in every case displayed impartiality. And in the third place, the politicians of the Left and the Left-Centre have thought too much about ac- quiring popularity and too little about imposing on the country those restrictions which the economic situation demands. The decisions of many politicians to boycott the elections is not a creditable decision ; they are abstaining because they think they will not win. But, even as it is, there are as many as fourteen parties from which the Electorate can choose on Sunday. We shall have to accept their decision and thereafter pray earnestly that it will not mean a second civil war.