An ideal wartime coalition government would not be led by Tony Blair

Traditionally, Britain's big wars do not end with the same prime minister, war Cabinet and Cabinet that started them.

What if this present war were a bigger, different one? To whom would we turn for prime minister and war Cabinet?

Attempting to answer those questions is a useful exercise. It tells us which politicians we would rely on in time of trouble.

We would want the most `able'; but ability, among politicians, is hard to define or agree about. Politicians abilities seem to have nothing to do with their opinions or beliefs, and, in an■,, case, these tend to be suspended in time of war. Somehow, we are able to see that mysterious ability in politicians with whose opinions or beliefs we disagree or may even regard as ridiculous.

The Conservatives understood this in 1916. Before the war, there was no Liberal whose beliefs and actions they disapproved of more than Lloyd George. But when they decided that the prime minister was not up to being a war leader, being the junior partners in the coalition, they knew that only another Liberal could replace him. The only candidate was the minister of munitions, Lloyd George, because he gave off energy and resolution.

When, after the war, the time came in 1922 for the Tories to withdraw from the coalition and overthrow Lloyd George, Stanley Baldwin said that this had to be done because Lloyd George represented a 'dynamic force', and a dynamic force, he said, could be a terrible thing. So the Tories overthrew him in 1922 for the same reason that they raised him up in 1916.

Thus the same qualities are not looked for in a peacetime prime minister as in a wartime prime minister. The only one who had both in the 20th century was Mrs Thatcher, and then only because of the state of the country when she came to power in 1979, and until the miners' defeat. That was not a normal peacetime: rather a time of industrial civil war, calling for some of a war leader's instincts. When enough Tories decided that she remained too warlike for 1990, they overthrew her.

Let us suppose, then, for the sake of this exercise, that a war coalition had to be formed from the Commons elected in 2001. One does not have to dislike Mr Blair, which I do not, to conclude that he is not a war leader in the sense of Lloyd George, Churchill or Mrs Thatcher. He has plenty of qualities, and they seem to be suited to the — we must hope — limited war into which he has led us. But he lacks the air of resolution and ruthlessness which would be needed for a longer and wider war.

The war prime minister in those circumstances would be. I suggest. Gordon Brown. One could imagine the Tories in the coalition, after serving under Mr Blair for a while, clamouring and intriguing for Mr Brown to replace him, just as they did for Lloyd George to replace Asquith. They would regard his chancellorship as an irrelevance. In 1916, the Liberal chancellor whom they had fought hardest had been Lloyd George. Were Mr Brown to become a triumphant war leader, historians would say that his wartime premiership redeemed a chancellorship in which he disastrously miscalculated the economy's ability to bear his public spending and taxation.

Wartime coalitions have to contain the opposition leader. The Conservative Bonar Law served under the Liberals Asquith and Lloyd George. Attlee served under Churchill. But most of the House would be wary of Mr Duncan Smith receiving a portfolio. He has never held office. He is fighting to hold the Conservative leadership. He would have to be content for a while with lord privy seal, lord president, chancellor of the duchy or whatever. But he might be moved to greater things should he prove wise or energetic in war counsel. He is, after all, a former professional soldier. Yet he is opposition leader, so may have to be deputy prime minister. But experience suggests that, as a title, this is as much a sinecure as lord privy seal, etc.

Foreign secretary? Mr Blair. No one would deny that he has 'people skills'. Or at least, skills with people who are foreigners and politicians. It is to be suspected that he will soon mend fences with President Chirac. Chancellor? Michael Howard. But let us hope that Mr Brown lets him do the job. Secretary for defence? Menzies Campbell. The Liberals would have to be in the coalition, just as they were in 1940, though I am assuming that they would support my imaginary war even though they did not initially support this one. But Mr Campbell would also qualify on grounds of that mysterious 'ability'. The Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, was in the Churchill coalition, though the party was less a force then than now; a sinecure, then, for Charles Kennedy.

The only figure with the air of an alternative prime minister would be Kenneth Clarke, assuming that 'Europe' approved of the war. He would have to be in the government. On the backbenches he would be too dangerous. In all wars, at one stage or another, there is backbench discontent with how the war is being conducted. It would use him, or he would use it. He would have to be given some big, or bigsounding, job to do with manpower or production or anything that sounds vital.

Home Secretary? David Blunkett. Leader of the House? Robin Cook. (Mine is an imaginary war, not the present one which he has opposed.) Leader of the House would not be an important wartime post. But Mr Cook's energy and brains, and perhaps at times ruthlessness, are what we would want him for.

Mr Portillo? No. He passes the 'ability' test. But his ability would be nullified by the distrust which he arouses. Also. the Tories would never be sure that he was not about to come out against our war aims or blame the war on our past insensitivity to the enemy.

A job should be found for John Redwood. It does not matter that he is `right-wing' or 'odd' — two characteristics nowadays regarded as synonymous. Unlike Mr Portillo, he would risk unpopularity with the liberal media, and he has energy. John Reid would also justify his place. He passes the 'ability test'. He could either run a department directly connected with the war effort or do his present job of minister for going on radio and television when things go wrong.

No one else in the present Commons comes obviously to mind for jobs connected with the war. Nearly all those apportioned above are there on merit. Perhaps surprisingly, the politicians concerned compare well with most of those in the two world wars. We have the war government. Happily, we do not have the war — at the time of writing.