THE POWER OF ENGLAND.
IVIR. DISRAELI'S reply to Lord Hartington on Monday night authenticates the rumour which we mentioned last week as generally accepted both abroad and at home, that England did really "make a representation" at Berlin "respect-
ing the existing relations between Germany and France," "of a nature to correct misconceptions and ensure peace." We are not disposed to indulge in any fervid congratulations such as are pressed upon us from abroad on this occasion, as if it proved that England had again taken up the great
position which, as a Power with no selfish hopes of her own on the Continent of Europe, and of very formidable resources available at any time against a wanton aggressor, she might take up, and we believe ought to take up, in securing Europe from the caprices of any wanton aggressor. No one would ap- preciate the courage of any Government—no matter whether Conservative or Liberal—willing to assert such a position for her more than we should. To gur mind, it would be one of the greatest guarantees against the overweening pretensions of any European State, which Europe could by any possibility gain. But we must remember the character of Lord Derby's previous interventions to secure peace, and especially of that famous one in guaranteeing Luxembourg, which was made one day and explained away the next. It is very unlikely, we think, that England said anything which, under any circum- stances whatever, would have in any way required her to ally herself with either side in case of her representations being ignored. It is most likely that she made strictly non-com- mittal representations, which were very just and sensible in themselves, but which would have ended where they began in case her advice had been made light of. Mr. Disraeli says that the public convenience will not at present admit of his producing the papers, so, if there be anything of a more defi- nite kind, anything—not, of course, of menace—but of such authority and definiteness of tone as diplomatists would understand to involve further support to the views ex- pressed, in cam. they met with a complete rejection, Mr. Disraeli and Lord Derby cannot as yet get credit for it. We sincerely hope that such a tone may have been adopted. It seems to us the greatest waste of beneficent power that ever was, for England, with all her strength, to sit at home simply intent on not getting involved in the quarrels of her neighbours even though she should see the greatest violence and injustice committed, and moreover, violence and injustice which her authority alone would prevent. But it would clearly be prema- ture, looking to Lord Derby's precedents, to assume anything like serious intervention without clear evidence of it. He has been the most cautious of Foreign Secretaries, and the frankest in explaining that when a verbal guarantee is given, it means nothing. We can scarcely believe that he has suddenly changed his character; and certainly it is no sufficient ground for 80 believing, that he has made "a representation at Berlin" "of a nature to correct misconceptions and ensure peace." Possibly enough he might even hold that a representation which would
cover no intention, however conditional, on the part of this country to take subsequent action in case her representation were ignored, would be no less suitable, or even more suitable to its purpose, than one which was understood to have a practical significance in it. At least, if it should turn out that he does hold this, no one, looking to his previous action at the Foreign Office, would feel any surprise.
But whether "our representation of a nature to correct misconceptions and secure peace" really implied the resolve of the present Government to exert a renewed control over the drift of Continental events, or not, one thing we should never lose sight of,—that whenever any English Government does take that course, if ever it does, the power it can exert will be far beyond that which would at first sight seem to belong to a State with our minute army and isolated position. Indeed, the isolated position is of the very essence of our power. Every European State knows that an impregnable base of operations which it takes no exhausting or even serious effort to keep impregnable, is of the very first importance as regards the tenacity of the Power occupying it,— that is, as regards its ability to go on pegging away for long periods without succumbing to the discouragement of tempo- rary failures and defeats. It is, of course, perfectly true that if England had to ally herself with any Continental Power, the contingent she could at first send would seem utterly insignificant in comparison with the vast armies mobilised in modern warfare. She could hardly send more than a corps d'armie to any ally at first, and probably not more than two or three, without an effort which would be very unpleasantly felt, even after the war machinery had been set fairly agoing. An army of even 90,000 men added to an army of 600,000 men does not seem a very formid- able help at first sight. But the main point is, that England could keep her ninety thousand men well supplied with every- thing, and the gaps in the ranks immediately filled up, for any number of years which the war might last, without being in any way tasked by the effort, and would have plenty of credit besides with which to back her allies in borrowing the sinews of war for themselves. Now this is precisely the sort of help which is particularly useful to modern States, with the vast armies and the vast expenses which feeding and clothing those armies of course involves. On this scale, war is so pain- fully costly, that it must be either waged chiefly at the cost of your antagonist, or must be completely successful within a very short time indeed,—otherwise the sacrifice involved in
keeping it up is too fearful. Germany and France will either of them before long be able to put a million of men into the field, and a good proportion of these at ten days' notice. Such a war, waged even chiefly at an enemy's expense, appears to involve the outlay of upwards of one or two hundred millions in six months, a cost very op- pressive indeed to any people, and almost paralysing to their imagination unless a speedy end to the war is all but certain. Now there is nothing like a nucleus of good troops, kept continually in complete efficiency at the expense of an ally, to ensure a tenacious struggle and all the dread which the expecta- tion of a tenacious struggle at such frightful cost as this will cause the victor. If France had had a body of sixty or ninety thousand good English troops to fall back upon in February, 1871, we may be sure that the disposition of the nation on the question of prolonging the struggle rather than yield the terms actually conceded, would have been very different indeed ; and that, on the other hand, the Germans would have seen at once the enormous importance of offering such terms as might have been accepted even by a still hopeful antagonist. A steady flow of good troops from an impregnable base like England would be an advantage hardly to be exaggerated in improving the armies and the morale of any Continental nation, and the alliance of English credit would be a resource, if possible, of even higher value. What this would really mean to any Continental ally we might have, be it Germany, or France, or Italy, or Spain, or Holland, or Denmark, or Sweden,—in the case of Austria alone, we admit, there would be the greatest possible difficulty in our rendering this aid, for to supply her with it by way of Trieste would be so costly and laborious as to diminish vastly the value of the help rendered,—would be this, that they would have the power of indefinitely pro- tracting the war—if the worst came to the worst—till they could get reasonable terms. Now the power of adequately protracting a war carried • on by armies of such size as the present, is a terrible power,—a power which is quite sufficient to bring any Government, however aggressive, to reason. That Germany or France, with a million of men under conscription,
and reserves constantly called for, could afford to go on fighting for two or three years for any object under the sun except bare existence, is hardly credible. With a nation in arms, the pressure on the people and on productive operations is a torture of the most exquisite kind in itself. If the Germans in the last war had had to fight for another year, even though they were fighting in an enemy's country, and chiefly at that enemy's expense, the cry for peace in Germany would have been so urgent as hardly to be resistible. Anything that gives the defeated country the power of making head and, prolonging resistance would tell most painfully against the victor who fights at such a cost as this,—for the victor can always make peace on moderate terms, and the people know it, and will hardly undergo the highest class of popular sacrifices with such an issue in their own hands. The vanquished, of course, are even more eager for peace, but not on the terms which an absolute conqueror can impose, and to give the inferior power the chance of indefinitely prolonging its struggle, is really to enable it to resist unreasonable terms. If this be true when our alliance is with the weaker nation, it would be still more true if, on grounds of pure justice, we allied ourselves with the intrinsically stronger Power. It would give us in that ease almost the means of absolutely forbidding war. Put the military strength of England at the very lowest point imaginable, as we have put it,—estimate it at a standard which it would really cost the country no overpowering sacri- fice to keep up,—and her alliance would still be a make-weight which would render despair, and the acceptance of terms such as are dictated by despair, impossible to her ally, and would threaten the most victorious of nations with a future such as no nation in arms could contemplate without dismay.
And in this we have said nothing of the Navy, except so far as the Navy commands the communication between the Eng- lish contingent and its base. But as against many adversaries, the Navy would be no contemptible direct addition to our aggressive power. Nations with ships, ports, or colonies would find the British Navy a most formidable danger. In a word, small as our military preparations are, they are even now quite large enough to give any State that leaned on our help something like security against complete or crushing defeat, and a strong reason to believe that by steady persistency, and a sober use of our great resources, in wealth and otherwise, it could, by defen- sive tactics, completely exhaust the patience of a nation wielding machines so oppressive as the armies of modern days. The alliance with England would, of course, be very far indeed from securing an early success. But it would secure a power like that of the rock to break the wave that dashes against it ; and since, in the case supposed, the wave itself is a wave which cannot flow without a very large and constant draft on both money and blood, it is clear that no Power in its senses will make light of the hostility of England, so long as England is sup- posed to be in earnest. Whether we shall ever be in earnest again, is another matter, which depends perhaps much less on the mere disposition of our people, and much more on the willingness of our Governments to lead, than anybody knows. Democracies are not pleasant masters in times of calamity, but they are probably much more dour than most people fancy, when they have leaders whom they trust.
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