THE BACKBONE OF GERMANY
Slit,—It was not my ambition " to exhaust the problem of mod administration," nor had my article anything to do with " a progr for breaking the power of German generals, Junkers and big busin which, in any case, cannot be achieved by administrative reform. It not a piece of propaganda for this or that political ideology, but invitation to -planners to study the elements of stability in Germ instead of starting from the erroneous assumption that everything have to be " destroyed and wholly recast." I pointed out two impon facts (which Mr. Strauss qualifies as " opinions "): (t) The Ge Civil Service is not thoro.ighly nazified, though still effectively contra by the Nazis, and (2) an Allied Reconstruction Commission cannot provise an administrative machine for Germany, but must, and safely use the existing one.
Mr. Strauss admits the first point, but he says that the German servants support " the Nazi programme of world conquest, i.e., that of the Nazi programme which is directly in the interest of German business, Junkers and generals." Has he made a private Gallup which revealed this striking unanimity of the German bureaucracy? is apt to forget that the personnel of the German administrative mac does not consist entirely of higher civil servants or of people who on intimate terms with the " scions of Prussian aristocracy." Vast gro have a lower standard of living than many skilled workers. Incred as it seems to Mr. Strauss, the administrative machine is really a tech instrument without a will of its own, though that does not mean its personnel is socially and politically neutral. It is not, but neith it uniformly reactionary. In a properly supervised administration political bias of individual civil servants whose views differ from tho the government cannot make itself felt or is, in a great many sphe entirely irrelevant. Mr. Strauss makes some individuals the spokes of a mystical " will of the German bureaucracy," just as he calls judges, who made a travesty of justice and were not restrained by Weimar governments, "the German judiciary."
The best refutation of the second point would have been to sho more satisfactory alternative. To say that one must " destroy this bul of reactionary power " is not enough. Such a slogan !nay be used considerable success at a popular meeting, but it is not very helpful serious discussion on post-war possibilities, unless one says exactly one means by that and how one wants to replace it. Mr. Strauss for his description of the German bureaucracy almost the same W which Engels used for his definition of the State. Engels said that ' State is always the State of the ruling class and in all cases essenti. I machine to hold down the subjugated, exploited class." There s room here to refute that in detail. It has been admirably done. instance, by the Socialist Hermann Heller. The absurdity of description becomes at once clear, if one thinks of the various fun of the administration and studies its history.
Mr. Strauss has an unfortunate liking for sweeping statements. us only examine one more which illustrates his " accuracy." He " As far as the officers of the German Army are concerned, even names show that they are today, no less than a hundred years ago scions of the Prussian aristocracy." There was no German hundred years ago. Scharnhorst, who reorganised the Prussian was neither a Prussian nor an aristocrat. Some of the best-known Pru officers of that time were not Prussians ; for instance, Blucher, started his career in the Swedish Army, and Gneisenau, whose fought against the Prussians in the Seven-Years' War. And today? Supreme War Lord is the Austrian Hitler. Fieldmarshal Died is Aus von Leeb Bavarian, Sperrle Suabian. These examples could be rfl plied ; but Mr. Strauss asserts that the officers of the German Arm.
the scions of the Prussian aristocracy.—Yours, &c., W. WEsn'
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