LAVAL AND HIS MASTERS
By DAVID THOMSON
THE first six weeks of Laval's Government have produced results very far removed from the intentions of those who took part in its formation. The Germans hoped from his reinstatement greater security on their beleaguered western front, and more comprehensive collaboration both in propaganda and economic production. Vichy hoped for relief from Nazi pressure, which had been intensified during the preceding weeks by the dual threat of total occupation and starvation. Laval himself hoped—as he said on April 14th when his return was first made known—to steer a middle-course of friendly relations with both Germany and the U.S.A. In each respect pre- cisely the opposite has happened, and the return of Laval has proved a liability rather than an asset to his promoters. It is important for the future to see how this has come to pass: for at any moment his promoters may decide to cut their losses in the costly experiment and transfer their support to a less " guilt-edged " investment.
The clue to the whole situation is that by the middle of March the turbid and muddy pond of Vichy politics had settled down to relative calm and stability. Despite occasional outbursts of Nazi savagery in the shooting of hostages, the men of Vichy were con- solidating their position in relation to Germany and the French Empire. They were even learning how, by stubborn persistence, they could defy Nazi pressure—as they blatantly did over the conduct of the Mom trials. The empire was held together by its own weight, by slender bonds of confidence in Marshal Petain, and by American complacence and restraint in accepting the given situation faute de mieux. Negotiations were even being reopened for the shipment of American foodstuffs to the North African colonies. This develop- ment was not too pleasing to either the Germans or the Paris Fascists, who from time to time had tried to force a breach between Vichy and Washington. So into the too-placid pond they flung the toad Laval, hoping that eventually they might fish in the troubled waters.
It is unlikely that the Germans expected Laval to bring France into the war actively on the side of the Axis ; his whole reputation is pacifist and defeatist. If this had been their aim they would have turned to Dear and Doriot and the Paris Fascists, who were making the active defence of the empire, and even the re-conquest of lost territories, a main plank in their platform. But they cer- tainly did not expect the stern reaction of the Allies, which has materialised in the British occupation of Madagascar and the American precautionary measures against New Caledonia and Martinique. No doubt Laval himself, with his narrow, provincial, materialistic outlook, set little store by these distant possessions save as possible pawns in his game of bargaining ; but he has no wish to see them splintered off from the French Empire with no return for them at all, except the maintenance of his now slender contact with America through Mr. Tuck in Vichy and M. Henry-Haye in Washington.
But more serious still is the stimulus given to Italian demands for Corsica, Nice and Tunis by the return of the alleged collaborator. These hoary claims, which have haunted relations between Italy and France for seventy years and always come to the front in any moment of crisis, arc now Mussolini's last hope of any compensation for his ill-timed entry into the war on June loth, 1940. In two years he has lost his East African Empire, held Libya only with German Farmers, squandered thousands of Italian lives on the Russian Front and in Yugoslavia, and virtually surrendered his own control of
Italy to the Gestapo. Now, with pressing demands for yet sacrifices and for more troops for the Russian battles, he inev asks why defeated France should not be made to pay some pensation to offset all this. Italian propaganda, even more fie than German, has denounced Vichy's propensity to run with hare and hunt with the hounds so far as Europe and Americ concerned. In fact, Vichy enjoys a few of the fruits of neu which Italy herself might have enjoyed had the Duce been hasty in 1940, and it serves as an irritating reminder of his mistakes. Thus, although the agitation for Corsica, Tunis and was soft-pedalled for a short time when Laval first came into po no doubt at Germany's request—it has now been renewed clamorously than ever. No occasion is missed—either in the broadcasting or at such moments as the opening of the Me Pavilion at the Milan Fair—to raise the time-honoured cry, u with appropriate references to Garibaldi. There are some indica that Mussolini has tried to link up the supply of Italian troo the East with the cession of Nice and Corsica ; but Hitler scarcely agree to making one contingent on the other, thoug need for troops and his impatience with Laval may prevent from restraining Mussolini very firmly.
The Germans' policy towards their own protégé has, indeed, very inconsistent. They could have made things as easy as pos for him, letting him consolidate his power and making some ge of concessions which would have enabled him to pose as the who could get better terms from the Germans. Or they openly terrorise France into submission by starvation and even occupation. The logical result of their manoeuvres to get hi instated was that they should make his regime as successf possible, extracting the maximum economic advantage from pacification of the country. But they have not made up their which line to follow, and in practice have tried to combine pac Lion with terrorism. Rundstedt was followed by Heydrich. executions of hostages have occurred almost daily since Laval into power. German diplomacy has traditionally displayed a s facility for trying to make friends with a man by slapping h the face ; so this inconsistency may be either deliberate or simP expression of that divergence of views between Himmler and which showed itself during the last weeks of March. From the set the Laval regime has been experimental from the Germans' of view, and they have always treated it with scepticism and re If it has failed, it is at least partly their own fault.
But it is not only in colonial and external relations that the r of Laval has shattered the former position of France. The di and hatred which all Frenchmen feel for Laval, combined WI new wave of Nazi savagery, have intensified rather than In the restiveness of French opinion in both zones. Despite his Oa tion of the police-system there is no sign that he will effec crush Gaullisme in France of deter Frenchmen from sabotage subterranean propaganda, however ferocious the " reprisals innocent hostages. So not only is Hitler's western front less than ever, but the prestige of the Vichy Government itself is b into jeopardy. The Right-wing Press of the Unoccupied Zone. as the Action Francaise and Temps, try to preserve a very distinction between Marshal Petain and Laval, insisting that the power of the Chef du Gouvernement, as distinct from the d'Etat, is only a delegation and not a surrender of power by P Men like Charles /Maurras remain intensely nationalist. On April 17th Maurras wrote: "Love of Germany, love for England, neutrality between either love—we don't even know what this means and we don't care. We are concerned only with the life of our country. " He is equally opposea to the " pro-British " Republicans and Gaullists and to the " pro-German " Fascists of Paris.
The Left-wing Paris Press reacts to this outlook by condemning Vichy atientisme and maladministration, and demanding total collaboration with Germany, the reorganisation of internal adminis- tration, the purge of all non-collaborationists, and the establishment of a real single-party State. Dia, Doriot and Luchaire pose as the apostles of a radical social revolution, cutting adrift from all relics of the Third Republic. So they, too, are only lukewarm towards Laval, and mean to " wait and see." His policy towards America has cast doubt on how far he accepti their main thesis—that " France must warm herself at the fire of the European community." Even
inside France itself he is caught between two fires and remain suspect by both sides. He remains in power chiefly because the Germans are reluctant to admit the failure of their experiment and because Laval himself is so enigmatic that each side still hopes that, in the last resort, he may be used for its own ends. In some ways it is perhaps a position that is almost congenial to this fertik. plotter. He may contrive to use the very conflict of forces to keep his-own head above water. The mysterious figure of General Giraud is still in the offing, and it is difficult to believe that it was beyond the ingenuity of Laval to dispose of him had he really wanted to. A new popularity and respectability are what the Laval Government needs above all else. Is it perhaps possible that the arch-intriguer sees a use for Giraud in his administration in the near future? The only certainty is that no stable arrangement has yet been reached, and that French politics have not lost their capacity for sensationalism whatever the form of the regime.
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