The Soviet bridgehead
Bohdan Nahaylo
For the Soviet Union the Falklands conflict has been a godsend. With inter- national attention diverted from the smouldering Polish crisis, not to mention Afghanistan, and the largest European NATO navy embroiled in the South Atlan- tic with an ally of the United States, Moscow has capitalised on a splendid op- portunity to make long-term political and Propaganda gains in Latin America. The initial Soviet response to the Falklands crisis was to adopt a cautious wait and see' attitude. Within a few days, however, while insisting that the Soviet Position in the conflict was strictly neutral, the Soviet media was supporting the Argen- tinians and denouncing Britain and the United States. The confrontation was Presented as a matter of decolonisation and gentina portrayed as the victim of British colonialist' aggression. It was hardly surprising that on this occa- sion Moscow came out firmly on the side of a right-wing military dictatorship. For years a veritable entente cordiale has existed be- tween the Soviet regime and the Argentine J,_unta. Relations between the two states have been based on a calculated PrPragmatism that has cut across ideological differences. Both states have appalling human rights records and have cooperated to block attempts to have this issue discuss- ed at international forums such as the
United Nations. At the end of last month, Theo van Boven, the Dutchman who for five years had headed the UN Human Rights Division, complained angrily that Argentina took the lead in forcing him out of his post. Five years ago, when President Carter cut military aid to Argentina in order to demonstrate Washington's concern about the scale of human rights violations by the junta, the Soviet Union wasted little time in sending a military delegation to Buenos Aires, to exploit the situation. In 1980 Argentina scuttled the American attempt to punish the Soviet Union for invading Afghanistan by ignoring President Carter's call for a grain embargo.
Soviet-Argentinian trade has grown dramatically over the last decade. From 1972 to 1979 Argentina's exports to the USSR increased by 1200 per cent. Argen- tina has become the Soviet Union's largest trading partner in the Third World and the supplier of vital shipments of grain and meat. Last year, for instance, Moscow 'Don't wash your hands before you eat.' bought $3.4 billion of Argentinian goods including 85 per cent of its grain exports and about 100,000 tonnes of beef, while ex- porting $67 million of heavy machinery and other goods to Argentina. Little wonder, then, that while Moscow condemns the rulers of Chile and Uruguay as 'Fascist' dic- tatorships, the Soviet leader sent General Galtieri a telegram congratulating him upon becoming President of Argentina and ex- pressing confidence that 'relations of mutually advantageous cooperation' bet- ween their two countries would continue.
Even as the members of the European Common Market were moving to ban Argentinian imports because of the Falklands invasion, the Soviet Union was strengthening its ties with Argentina. Agreements were signed establishing joint Soviet-Argentinian fishing companies. On 6 April, moreover, the Soviet Union exchang- ed contracts with Argentina under which it is to supply enriched uranium for a nuclear power station outside Buenos Aires. The United States halted exports of enriched uranium to Argentina after the junta refus- ed to sign the 1978 Non-Proliferation Trea- ty. The Argentinian response was to send a mission to Moscow to discuss nuclear technology.
As the Falklands crisis wore on and it became clear that the United States was backing Britain, Moscow concentrated its efforts on improving its image in Latin America and reducing Washington's stand- ing and influence in the region. Citing ex- amples of US-British military and political cooperation, Pravda on 12 April claimed that the conflict was between 'one of the developing countries of South America' and 'the global strategic interests' of the `imperialist' and 'aggressive' Nato allies. Five days later it accused Washington of seeking the role of 'world policeman' and thereby antagonising the world's 'fighters for freedom, progress and peace'. Another major propaganda theme emerged on 17 April when the newspaper Selskaya Zhizn portrayed the United States as an ally that was 'betraying' a Latin American country at a crucial time despite treaty commitments to come to its aid. On 26 April Valentine Zorin, a political commentator, told televi- sion audiences that Washington and Lon- don 'have joined forces in their efforts to teach the Third World countries a lesson and to restore the policy of the mailed fist'.
Once President Reagan had announced that the United States was supporting the British and imposing sanctions on Argen- tina, the Soviet spokesmen could hardly conceal their delight that Washington's political strategy in Latin America was foundering off the Falklands. Moscow's broadcasts to Latin America insisted that Washington had been revealed as anything but a 'friend of the developing countries'. Its talk of 'inter-American solidarity' had turned out to be empty, and its real policy to consist of 'sanctions, blackmail and threats' against countries 'who refused to submit to neo-colonialist dictators'. For the sake of its 'imperial interests', the United States had 'betrayed' Argentina, exposing the bankruptcy of the Monroe Doctrine. 'US-backed British aggression' against Argentina, the Soviet agency Tass declared on 3 May, once again demonstrated the `true threat' to the sovereignty of nations and peace.
By supporting Argentina and capitalising on the fact that the United States has again let Buenos Aires down, the Soviet Union stands to extend its already considerable in- fluence on the Argentinians. Even if the junta falls as a result of military defeat, Moscow is confident that the Peronist op- position is likely to be even more pro-Soviet than the generals are. The Argentinians are already commercially dependent on the Soviet Union and Moscow knows that, whatever the outcome of the war, it will be in a favourable position to redress in one way or another a trade balance that is weighed heavily in favour of its trading partner. Although Argentina is likely to re- main an anti-communist state, the Soviet leadership is also hoping that the Falklands conflict has effectively torpedoed the Reagan Administration's plans to make Argentina into a bulwark against the spread of left-wing insurgency and communism in Latin America. Significantly, Cuba and Nicaragua have rallied to the support of the Galtieri junta, and Buenos Aires and Havana have again recently exchanged ambassadors.
The Soviet Union's interest in the south of Latin America extends beyond the borders of Argentina. This area is a Balkan- like powder keg where border disputes and competition for natural resources involve Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay. If Washington's influence diminishes as a result of the present crisis, Moscow, in the role of a new-found friend of Latin Americans, may be better placed to play a more important role in the area. Throughout the dispute, moreover, the Soviet media have indicated that Moscow recognises the strategic and economic im- portance of the South Atlantic from the tip of Latin America down to Antarctica. Not only does the area probably contain oil deposits but also the largest known concen- tration of protein-rich krill. The seas around the Falkland Islands have long at- tracted Soviet bloc fishing vessels. When the crisis broke out, for instance, there are reported to have been no less than 42 Polish ships in the area.
So far the Soviet Union has had to do lit- tle more than fire off regular propaganda broadsides against Britain and the United States to benefit from the Falklands con- flict. By casting them in the role of im- perialist bullies it has presented itself as the true champion of developing countries. According to the Washington Post, Soviet sources are already confidently predicting that in five years time the location of the Falkland Islands may be forgotten, but Latin Americans will still remember who sided with them. Whatever the outcome of the war in the South Atlantic, one clear vic- tor has already emerged.
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