The Man Who Is France

By LORD

GLADWYN

T.„: President of France has publicly pro- claimed his mortality. Unlikely and unwel- come though the possibility may be, and is, my hook* may therefore be out of date by the time It appears. 'Le garde qui veille a la barriere du Louvre ne dafend point le Roi.' It may not, how- ever, be altogether irrelevant, even in the dis- tressing event of the disappearance of the General from the political scene. For his views on the 1=nropean Idea (which in its supranational form he vigorously oppoSes) are shared by many People, not only in France, but, also, chiefly among the older generation, in Britain and else- \‘'here. They are consequently of abiding interest. nor they may even be applied by lesser men in 'Prance after the great man's departure.

In

considering the problem, therefore, the first thing to remember is that, as we all know and as he himself believes, de Gaulle is France. When he studies the dossier of the European Economic 4.''ommunity he naturally draws on his ancestral memory. at does this tell him? That Europe, that

'ent

„, the rest is the periphery. What is Ger- ...an, Still only partially civilised and 'Chris- thus a danger, if unified; preferably a eolleeti whe sitn on of states rather than a state; happiest the western part turns confidently towards virtues What is Italy? A country with many the hs, but never a nation. Spain? For 300 years 1:AI:5 simply lived on her great memories. A ileterre? Ah, that is a difficulty. Britain is 8reat nation. It cannot be denied that she is also Oh ur European. But only partially. Did not thou:hill himself Jell him tha t, if forced to „_„..e, Britain would prefer the Ocean to .* .4. Gordhis. is the first of two articles in which bunt Glad►tyn, British Ambassador to France Lobject!954 to 1960, will analyse the ideas and Are bces of President de Gaulle. The articles ,.1,4e rsed on a chapter in Lord Gladwyn's book, 11,,,i,juroPean Idea.' shortly to be published by ) 'ilield and Nicolson.

Europe? It follows that this island must give her first loyalty to her Commonwealth and indeed be drawn, if only because of the common language, more closely towards the 'daughter,' America, who after all is now grown up and must live her own life. Perhaps one day Britain will begin to turn in earnest towards the real fount of civilisation. But not now. Surely not now. As for poor hungry Russia: well, she is not really a menace and can therefore safely be used as a counterweight to overcome the irritating reluctance of the Germans to break with America and accept French political and nuclear supremacy. When, however, they do, Europe can once again resume her essential world 'civilising mission,' and the centre of Europe is naturally France.

It will be seen 'hat under this conception Paris is not only the centre of Europe, it is also the centre of the world. There are even many cita- tions from the General's speeches which could be used as evidence for his belief that it is the centre of the universe. What is certain is that there can be no question of France's becoming something other than France. Hence the General's constant preoccupation with the possible loss of 'national identity.' For if France is in any way cr to any degree merged in a greater whole, even in a greater European whole, the kernel of the nut is as it were softened and the whole fruit is therefore likely to rot. Thus gallo-centrism, or gaullo-centrism (for since de Gaulle is France, the two expressions are identical), is not, as some might think, an endearing quirk in the make-up of a great personality: it is part and parcel of the man. But it is more than that. It is that very philosophy of a nationalism which cannot accept what, in our modern jargon, we call 'an element of supranat.ionality.' If Europe is to come closer together, and the General is no doubt perfectly sincere in wishing that it should, it can only be on the basis of ,a co-operation between nation-states. of which France will be the most ancient, the most distinguished and, if possible. the most powerful. It is true that France may 'die' as zat entity. As he himself told me during his period in the 'wilderness, she very nearly did so during the last war : but if France does 'die,' then there is no hope for Europe. A vague collection of international bureaucrats --a ariali-malo,' in his own memorable phrase- will attempt to govern the ancient nations of Europe and such an attempt is bound to fail. Since there can be no common patriotism, there will be no directing force or will. After a confused period of parlia- mentary wrangling among the politicians of the old type, an impossible situation will arise. As in the Paulskirche in 1848, force of some kind would no doubt be applied by somebody. If France fell out, perhaps it might even be applied one day (dreadful thought) by Germany. All these considerations seem, on the face of it, to be present in the General's mind. Great man as he is, he does not conceal his fundamental convic- tions and objectives. Only his tactics necessarily

remain obscure. The end, by his own confession in fact, is constant.

These convictions are not negligible: they must be taken very seriously. For they are views firmly rooted in the unstated assumptions not only of France, but, ',aafis mutatulis, in those of other great nations. It is the nation-state talking. And from the end of the sixteenth century until 1958 no limitation on the nation-state's absolute authority in Europe was ever voluntarily accepted. If, as Aristotle 'said. 'infinite time is the maker of states,' it is arguable that about twenty years is too short a period for the construction of a super-state. All this will not necessarily con- vince, but it may suffice to show that it is not so much the exaggerations, the idiosyncrasies of the General's approach that matter, it is the appeal to ancient and powerful instincts which exist in all our European lands and are by no means dead yet. De Gaulle could not be still where he is if his nationalist foreign policy did not have strong support in France. An inspired leader with an 'anglocentric' philosophy might well have similar support , in Britain, or his counterpart (horrible thought!) in the Fatherland.

For it must be admitted that the leader well knows the mentality of his own country. Indeed, since he is himself France, this is in no way surprising. One very marked feature of this great nation is what is called la mafiance'; that is to say, a fundamental mistrust and a refusal to take anything for granted. An aspect of this is a tendency to search for hidden motives in any proposal made, more particularly proposals coming from foreigners. There is a story of the French representative at an international con- ference after the Napoleonic wars who was par- ticularly suspicious of his Russian colleague. Bag after bag contained accounts of the dubious manoeuvres and dark designs of this able diplo- matist. Finally, a dispatch arrived at the Quai d'Orsay which began as follows: 'The Russian Ambassador died today. I ask myself what was his motive?'

Coupled with such suspicion is a tremendous realistic toughness. The motto of Frenchmen

is faut se dafendre; you must look out for yourself or other people will do you in. All this is a source of great inner strength, though it does often result in the French being difficult partners. But it also means that if the French really can be harnessed to an idea (and it must be their own idea) they will do their magnificent best to support it. In their present Gaullist mood they may not accept the European Idea. But if Britain were really converted to it that would affect them profoundly—provided it was a genuine conversion and not just another trick of 'perfidious Albion.'

Looked at from a not very different angle, de Gaulle is in many ways the embodiment of Machiavelli's 'Prince.' The object of the Prince was to keep himself in power and he was, in his relations with other princes, not influenced in any way by the 'ought to be.' but only by the 'is.' De Gaulle's early work Le Fil de !'Epee is evidence that he had absorbed many of the essential precepts of Machiavelli. Thus he is secret and devious: he is ruthless: and he knows at the same time when to placate a difficult oppo- sition by playing it off against another school of thought. Perhaps the original Prince might have thought the General's mystical ideas about the role of his own nation-state a little un- realistic, if not dangerous, but basically the lessons have been very well applied.

In any case, if it is generally acceptable, my de- scription of de Gaulle's attitude solves many riddles. Whether something or other is in the

SPECTATOR. OCTOBER 29, 1965 apparent interest of France from a material point of view is an entirely secondary consideration. The criterion by which it is judged is whether it increases France's status in the world--her `rang'—and hence, by extension, the status of the General, who is the embodiment of France herself. In the light of his 'historic nationalism,' the famous passage in his Memoirs in which he contemplated forming a Third Force in Western Europe and associating this now with America

I and now with Russia, which seemed so fantastic at the time, is at least explicable. So is his intense dislike of NATO, not because (as some think) he did not devise it himself, but simply because France does not occupy therein a central or commanding position. Under this interpretation of his attitude, all his gestures fit into place: the original attempt in 1960 to enter the Western Great Power Club, even though France had not then exploded a nuclear device; the subsequent effort, after toying with the idea of a Franco- German-British combination, to become the sole valid ally of a divided (and therefore satellite) Germany; the spectacular French nuclear policy; the veto; the generous aid programme; the courting of Latin America; the flirtation with the Soviet Union; the recognition of China; the call for a neutralisation of Vietnam; the call for some new `balance' in the world. All these gestures, sensible though some of them may have been, were primarily designed to make an impression and to put France on the map. All could be effected without infuriating the allies too much. The French themselves got nothing very tangible out of them, only a certain pleasure In seeing the allies disconcerted; but in a mystical way the stock of 'France' certainly went 9P. The real triumph of the General in the foreign field was the 'liberation' of Algeria and the old French Empire. And this, admirable though it was, came about in a way entirely con- trary to his original declared intention.

In a more general way, the thing to remember about de Gaulle's policies is that though the aim —namely. the greater glory of France—remains Constant, there is no consistent long-term policy for attaining that end. There is, to be just, one refrain that has been heard for a long time in the General's speeches, even though it has only lately been promoted to the status of a major Political objective fitting in with the pro-Russian mood of the hour. It is really part of the 'Third Force' plan. This is the conception of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.' So far as one can make out this slogan embodies the idea that Christendom' is, not only geographically, but also historically and, as it were, spiritually. more akin to Russia than America. It therefore fits in very well with spontaneous anti- American sentiment in France which has such obvious present political advantage. But if it s to be taken seriously, it must perforce intPly that some kind of European Association .

eventually be constructtd which will include the Russians. What a strange notion this would °_ if it ever were really put into effect! But 4gain, if the phrase is to be taken literally, it can °,...°!1/ mean that, while Russia is to be included, Britain is to be kept out. (At the very least, the General has never said, when elaborating on the Plan, that he wants Britain to be inside rather than outside.) Thus the idea would presumably to try to organise Europe on the basis of s„ttl tZe Franco-Soviet deal providing, no doubt, for reunification of Germany, after the departure 0l' 7 to the Americans. but only on lines agreeable ob.both parties. If this is not so, then the real ,,t"ct should be stated. I myself queried the ,, Ole conception in a speech at Lyons on March- 8. 1965, and my theme was not, I think, repudi- ated in any serious French non-Gaullist organ. if indeed it means anything—which is perhaps doubtful—the phrase is highly sinister.

But how, even in theory, do the non-French, whether allies or not, fit into a Gaullocentric system? This has never been clear. What would happen if other members of the Western alliance --including the Germans—applied to themselves the same sort of historical criteria as the General applies to his own nation? Nobody knows. The only possible (Gaullist) answer is that they would not be entitled to do so because, objectively con- sidered, France, by reason of her history, is different from, and indeed superior to, her friends and neighbours. The non-French ought to recog- nise that France from the time of Clovis has been singled out, perhaps divinely, for a very special civilising mission.

Can, therefore, this special people contemplate entering into any European association which depends for its successful operation on some limited form of majority voting and on paying some respect in certain distinct spheres to the decisions of a democratically elected Parliament? The extraordinary thing is that anyone should have imagined that the General •would ever admit that it could. For so long as Gaullist principles are maintained, France cannot and will not carry out the plain letter of the Treaty of Rome. Probably, therefore, when the legal necessity of accepting the system of majority voting arises, the General will seize on some excuse for holding it up, or at least continue on the assumption that the system could never apply to France. which could not endure the humiliation of ever being placed in a minority. The idea, apparently, is that the Community can somehow, as it were, be put into cold storage and not allowed to develop beyond a certain point. But if this does not work, then the General will have no hesita lion in drawing the legitimate consequences. France's allies will have failed to see the light, France will therefore rightly re-assume her entire freedom of action. We shall all start again from scratch and then 'par la force merne des choses' a new European system will arise in which the other Europeans will agree that France, having now really recovered her ancient 'grandeur,' is the natural and undisputed leader of the Con- tinent.

There is no need to be astonished at such a conclusion. For it is one which must be reached by any one of the larger European states if it really adopts a nationalistic policy. An equally good case could be made out for British or German leadership of Western Europe. It prob- ably only needs a statesman or a demagogue of genius to persuade either nation that this is so. In no case, if Gaullist principles are themselves applied, could either Germany or Britain accept French leadership. The British principle, stoutly maintained between 1945 and 1961, that all co- operation is desirable short of any kind of supra- nationality, would have to be reverted to, and all efforts to unify the Continent by consent would have to be abandoned. Whether it would even- tually be unified by force applied from within or without would be left to the future to determine. More, likely it would be unified by pressure from without. More likely still it could remain permanently divided and thus under the influence of the one super-power and the other.

This can hardly be the conclusion reached by General de Gaulle. He must presumably believe that he has a real chance of establishing what he calls a 'Europe des Etats' (preferably without Britain, at any rate for many years); in other words, of establishing what would actually be a sort of 'Greater France.' It is quite true that this structure, if it could be achieved, and more especially if it were joined by Austria and Den- mark and were in association with Spain, would be an imposing one of some 235,000,000 people, greater therefore than either the US or the Soviet Union. But in order to exert its strength, whether economically or politically, in the foreign field it would have to speak with one voice: and if there were no machinery for arriving at collective decisions other than complete unanimity, this voice could only be that of the leader, France. No doubt the able French diplo- mats and specialists would often be able to arrive at some sort of consensus. The final decisions would, however, always be taken in Paris. More. particularly this •would be true in the nuclear field and indeed in foreign policy generally. There is no other conceivable way in which such a system could work. The paradox is that whereas de Gaulle indignantly rejects an Atlantic system in which one state, America, has a leading role by virtue of her possession of great nuclear and indeed economic superiori'y, he proposes, for Europe, a similar system in which one nation— namely, France--has a leading role, and this in spite of the fact that she is less important both economically and numerically than either Western Germany or Britain, or indeed (if numbers only should count) even Italy, and only posses4es an embryonic nuclear force, deprived of any early warning apparatus, which by itself is quite unlikely to terrify either the US or the Soviet Union. Even in ten years' time, when and if it is largely under-water, it is 'hard to believe that it will be of any great importance as a deterrent.

(To be concluded)