THE FUTURE SUEZ CANAL.
THhRE are some aspects of the Suez-Canal Question which ave not been sufficiently studied. In the heated dis- cussion which followed the announcement of the Government scheme, it was, perhaps, natural that the practical sides of the matter should be forgotten. Some Englishmen had per- suaded themselves that we ought to have a Canal of our own, made with English money and managed by Eng- lish brains. To such people, anything approaching to an acknowledgment of the vested rights of the French Com- pany was abhorrent, and in the storm which followed, the economic advantages of the proposed loan scarcely received consideration. The idea that there was anything which omnipotent English capital had not a right to carry out was a heresy so profound, that burning, not reasoning, was clearly the proper course to pursue.
It may, of course, be very annoying, but England has to thank herself alone for the exceptional position occupied by 11. de Lesseps. He has carried out his great project in spite of English opposition, and his Company have at least un- disputed ownership of the only existing waterway across the Isthmus. To make a parallel independent Canal, and underbid the Company, would simply mean the ruin of the latter. A new Canal, to be worked in conjunction with the existing Canal, mast be subject to the same Direction, and could not be managed by an independent English Company on principles of its own. Fancy the Great Northern Railway working its own up-line between Edinburgh and London, and leaving its down-line to be worked by the London and North-Western. Let us grant then, if only for the purpose of argument, that M. de Lesseps has a monopoly of water transport across the Isthmus, and endeavour to see what it is that the requirements of English commerce demand. The complaints of shipowners are practically two, —first, that the transit dues are excessive; and, secondly, that the Canal is insufficient for its traffic. As to the first point, it is to be observed that, desirable as it may be for the general interest that the dues should be reduced as much as possible, still, it can hardly be maintained that they are so high as to operate as a check on British commerce. The concentration of the Eastern trade on the Suez route, and the large number of ships built specially for the Canal passage, prove the contrary; while, until recently, no great complaint on this score was raised. On the other hand, the inadequacy of the Canal is a great and growing evil, while there is also an increasing amount of irritation at its management,—a management conducted entirely on French principles. The Englishman abroad is apt to resent some of the railway regulations he has to put up with, but these regulations are at least framed by men who presumably know their own business. The Suez Canal, however, has been managed by civil engineers and financiers guiltless of any knowledge of naval matters, and the British skipper feels aggrieved at having to take on board an expensive French pilot, who is of no earthly use, except to interpret a few perfectly simple signals. On August 20th, last year, a great fleet of transports navigated the Canal with- out pilots and without a hitch of any kind ; and during the few days in which Englishmen held and worked the Canal, every- thing went well, in spite of the crowding. The affair was managed by able Naval officers, who knew perfectly well what they were about. It is, nevertheless, certain that the Canal is now insufficient for its work, if indeed it were ever other- wise. This is not so much the result of an increase in the number of vessels, which only reaches an average of nine per day, as of the great increase of length and tonnage. It is not difficult to understand that the section of a canal should bear some minimum ratio to the section of the vessels which navigate it, and six to one has been the ratio usually prescribed. The Suez Canal has a section of about 3,500 square feet, and ships with 1,000 feet of immersed section use it. In comparison, therefore, the Regent's Park Canal is probably a more capacious waterway, while the North Sea Canal is much better adapted to its require.. ments. The result at Suez is continual grounding, causing delay, annoyance, and uncertainty. The time occupied in the Canal passage is, in fact, a matter of pure luck. Even setting grounding aside, under the present block system, the time does not depend on the number of ships to be passed in the Canal, but merely on the way in which these ships chance to present themselves. Moreover, if a ship sticks fast—a very ordinary occurrence—it is not the Company's interest to get her off rapidly, and their rules even prohibit a following ship from rendering any assistance. Among such trivial regulations as that if a passenger drops an " objet " overboard (say his hat), he must not take any steps to recover it, but must report the matter to the officials of the Company, there is no regulation as to the rudder-power of ships. Some of our great lines provide supplementary rudders to be fitted to their ships for the Canal passage, but such vessels may be preceded by any ill-found " ditcher," which, for want of this simple provision, may take the ground and detain them for a couple of days.
The placing of the control of the navigation in the hands of an English Naval officer, as proposed by the Government and most inadequately appreciated, together with a revision of the pilot- age regulations, would probably do much to allay irritation ; but the fact remains that the present Canal is far too small for its work, and must be very considerably widened, whether a new Canal is constructed or not. Moreover, the new Canal must have a much larger section than the present. Failing this, there will be no advantage whatever in an up and down line for traffic. Ships do not stick fast by jamming in passing each other, but by individually running on shore simply be- cause the channel is not wide enough for navigation. Two Canals each as liable to be blocked as the existing waterway, entailing either a stoppage of all ships proceeding in.one direc- tion, or the disorganisation of the working of the clear Canal by temporarily using it as a double line, would give no advantages at all. The alternative is,therefore, either to give a substantial addi- tion to the present channel, and to construct a new Canal of equal dimensions to the present Canal enlarged, or to convert the existing Canal into a really magnificent waterway. If we can reconcile ourselves to the abandonment of the idea of having a separate Canal all to ourselves, there can be little doubt that the latter of these projects is by far the best. The cost will be considerably less ; the advantages will begin to be felt at once. The difficulties of navigation will disappear, and the speed can be increased, while the working expenses will hardly be greater than at present. It is worth noticing that, accord- ing to the Parliamentary papers, the project of the second Canal was first proposed by the English Directors at a meeting of the Works Committee, and that it was opposed by MM. de Rouville and Dauzats, who were probably better able to form an opinion on the subject than any one present. Should the Government reconsider the Suez-Canal Question, it is to be hoped that they will give full weight to the many arguments which can be brought forward in favour of a single broad Canal, and that they will take the opinion of men who, like the captains of our Indian troopships, are well acquainted with the navigation of the Canal. Their advice, as well as that of the great hydraulic engineers of this country, should be con- sulted, as a healthy corrective to the views of the English Directors, now that England is again free to act. It is of vast importance that the settlement of this question shall be framed with such sagacity and foresight as to command the adhesion and respect of both present and future interests. And it is of some importance that the plan adopted should have the support of the best engineers, as well as of the shipowners, who have had hitherto a monopoly of the discussion.
Previous page
