THE POWERS AND CHINA.
WE do not wonder at the hesitation manifested, both in Europe and America, at the determined pro- posal of the German Emperor. He may see his way clearly, though we doubt it, and Russia decidedly sees hers, but the remaining Powers, like the remaining peoples, are still a little bewildered. They all desire, like the Germans, to punish the unexampled outrage to which they have been subjected, but they do not see how to secure punishment for the Manchu Princes without a great war, from which they not unnaturally shrink. All the evidence obtainable points to two conclusions,—one, that the Chinese people are in no degree irritated by the conduct of their rulers, but, on the contrary, admire their energy ; and the other, that those rulers, having gathered some idea of the terms to be offered them, have resolved to continue the war. They are not discouraged yet. They think they can break up the Concert, make separate terms with America, Russia, and perhaps Japan. and then defy the remainder of the world. Having left Pekin, they have no dread of personal consequences while their subjects obey ; they think China, as one of their diplomatists recently said, is too big to be conquered ; and they con- ceive that if beaten they can make peace at any moment. The intermediate destruction of life and property makes no impression on their imaginations, and remembering the vastness of their dominion, they cannot conceive of circumstances under which they could not retreat. They in- struct their Ambassadors, therefore, to declare the German terms inadmissible; they order new levies to be raised, and to be concentrated for the defence of Segan ; and they declare that city henceforward the capital of the Empire, Pekin "having been desecrated" by the footsteps of the barbarian. It may be untrue, though it looks true, that a secret Edict has been issued threatening death to any Viceroy who shrinks from continuing the war, and that Li Hung Chang has given up his journey to Pekin because peace has become impossible; but it is almost certainly true that the Empress has assured the " Boxers " of her impartiality between them and the Christians, that Prince Tuan has been placed at the head of the Administration, and that honest negotiations are as far off as ever. Prince Ching talks to Sir Robert Hart, and Li Hung Chang protests, and the Chinese Ambassadors demur and explain and threaten, but of any serious effort to make peace, or even to offer Chinese terms of peace, there is no one sign. There is the usual medley of semi-official statements from Berlin and Washington, of untrustworthy rumours and counsels from Shanghai (where, apparently, everybody thinks himself a statesman), and of useless accounts of military move- ments from Pekin, but the only ascertained facts are these. America will do nothing until November 4th, the day of the Presidential Election, is overpast ; Russia will do nothing at any time, except complete the conquest of Manchuria ; and Germany, Great Britain, France, and perhaps Japan, are at war with China in a just cause.
What, then, are the Allies, thus reduced in number, to do ? Clearly they must either coerce China or go. They cannot go on for ever maintaining armies on the other Bide of the world, or pretending to negotiate with bland plenipotentiaries who never recede an inch, or allowing the safety of European life in China, and therefore the safety of all trade, to be permanently suspended. The statesmen of Europe must act, and how to act perplexes and almost bewilders them. They have not the full support of their people, who in Germany are restless under the idea of new taxes, in France are obliged to think of Russia, and in this country are so imperfectly awake that in most electoral addresses all reference to China is omitted ; they are not quite agreed among themselves as to their objects ; and, above all, they are not clear as to the plan of campaign that best suits the situation. It is possible that Count von Waldersee may have final instructions in his pocket, which he will reveal at Pekin, but at present opinion is distracted between several plans. One is to seize the ports and wait, as we originally suggested; but that seems to excite the jealousy of the Powers, and moreover, though in many respects a most sensible plan, is a doubtful method of coercing a Power which takes no account of time, but would wait with smiling cemplacency half a century to get its own way. Another scheme, by no means so com- pletely out of the question as the public imagines, is to march on Segan itself in two expeditions, of which one wou;Id start from Pekin and march to the south-west, and another. from Hankow and march to the north-west. That plan, if successful, might really make an impression on China, and if partition were resolved on it might be adopted ; but it would be_enormously costly, it involves chances which the most far-sighted Minister cannot fore- see, and it would require a mutual confidence, in the Allies of which Europe appears to be incapable. The third, and probably the most reasonable, is to hold Pekin and the country between it and the sea until the Chinese Court, wearied out, afraid of the permanent loss of North China -- for Manchuria would go, and Korea, and probably. Shantung — and harassed by rebellions in all directions, finally submitted to the terms against which it is now in revolt. Even this plan is by no means an acceptable one. It involves expense, it in- cludes possibilities of discord among the Powers, and if the Manchus are doggedly obstinate it need not inevitably succeed. An octopus is not necessarily killed if a tentacle is cut off, and China is the octopus of Empires.
But, we shall be asked, is there nothing, then, in the American argument that China, as an independent State, must be allowed to negotiate in her own way, and that the punishment of malefactors can be insisted on during the negotiations ? We fear there is very little except retreat. It is clear from the determined resistance now offered that the Manchu group in whose hands are the destinies of China will not punish any one of importance. They are ready to stake the Empire rather than yield on that point, and no amount of -negotiation will render them more amenable to pressure. They might promise to do so, but we know from experience what their promises are worth. The trial of the accused would be a. Dreyfus trial ; if any one were condemned to death a substitute would be found ; and as for degradation, that only means promotion to higher office in a distant province. If it is justice which is sought, the Judges must be Europeans ; and we cannot but 'think that, gloomy as the outlook appears to be, it is better to seek justice first, at least until we know that in the mysterious providence of God it is unattainable by human means. .A dozen paths may open if we are only firm." To yield before. we know that success is hope- less seems to us a desertion of the victims, a derogation of dignity, and a dangerous blow to all safe intercourse with- China. Grand as a shop may be, dealings are difficult if the shopwalker carries a revolver, and is known to be ready to use it without intelligible provocation.
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