The Last Twelve Months
The Second World War. First Phase. By Duff Cooper. (Cape. los. 6d.)
From Munich to Danzig. By R. W. Seton-Watson. (Methuen. 6s.)
FOR most of us, at just this moment, it seems unprofitable to go back over the political differences of the last twelve or fifteen months, since all are agreed now upon the main policy that this country ought to adopt, and our present unity is a source of strength. None the less, history remains and its records cannot be burnt, and it would be unfair to Mr. Duff Cooper and Professor Seton-Watson to consign their books to the bonfire because they are concerned with facts some of which at present we are not in the mood to discuss. Much of what they have written had already appeared in print before their point of view and the Prime Minister's had become reconciled, when there could be no question of saying, "I told you so." The first edition of Professor Seton-Watson's book was published early in March. In this, the third edition, he brings his brilliant critical narrative of events since Munich down to Danzig and the German-Russian Agreement—an event which leaves him speculating, but frankly mystified. Mr. Duff Cooper's book consists of articles which have been appearing in the Evening Standard since his resignation and some of his speeches. He has not altered them. They are a record of the opinions he expressed at various stages in the developing crisis.
In point of time the central event in both of these books is Hitler's flagrant breach of the Munich Agreement by his annexation of Bohemia last March. That, as both of them note, was the action that led to the complete reversal of Britain's foreign policy and changed it in the course of a few days from " appeasement " to the policy which led to the guarantee of Poland. 'Both are in agreement with the main objects of British policy since the change. It will remain a matter of dispute whether it was the changed situation created by Hitler in March which demanded a new policy, or whether all the conditions which would have justified it existed before Munich.
Mr. Duff Cooper's conviction that they did exist led to his resignation. He explained in the speech after his resignation (here republished) that he was convinced that Hitler would not understand the language of " sweet reasonableness "; that he should be clearly told before he had too far committed himself that we were prepared to fight ; and that if we were forced to fight it would not be for Czecho-Slovakia primarily, but to prevent the domination of the Continent by brutal force. He goes on to explain that the breaking-point for him came when the Munich terms were found to include some of the worst elements of the Godesberg ultimatum, including not merely the surrender of the Sudetenland but invasion by armed forces and the handing over to them of the Czech guns.
In this series of articles appearing at frequent intervals Mr. Duff Cooper writes as the candid critic speaking with special knowledge of public life but a little aloof from it. He has not the weight or the Demosthenic fire of Mr. Churchill, but there is good sense and cogency in his approach to critical pro- blems. He tells us that when he had been at the War Office and Mr. Chamberlain was still Chancellor of the Exchequer, he drew up a memorandum for the preparation of an army capable of giving important assistance in a Continental war. The conditions then, it will be remembered, were quite different from what they had become twelve months ago ; there is more force in his appeal for conscription shortly after Munich. When the question of a National Register arose he urged that it should be upon a compulsory basis. Discussing the excessive size of the Cabinet, he suggested that just as the system of Cabinet government proved inadequate to the crisis of 1914 to 1918, so it was in September, 1938, and that a Committee of Public Safety should be set up consisting of the Prime Minister and the holders of three sinecure offices. In another article his critical attention is turned to the Diplomatic Service, its immunity from criticism, and the haphazard way in which new appointments are made or good men superannuated.
Mr. Duff Cooper is not in the least unwilling to give credit where he thinks that credit is due. Severe as are his stric- tures on Munich, he often pays tribute to the qualities he admires in the Prime Minister. He praises the efforts which have been directed to putting the fighting services in good trim since 1935, and on this point he flatly denies that it was our unpreparedness for war which made Munich necessary.
It is still asserted by those who are insufficiently acquainted with the facts that the policy which culminated at Munich was dictated by the lack of preparedness for war, that the country could not possibly have gone to war owing to deficiency of armaments. Had this been true it would have constituted a fearful indictment of the Government. But it was not true. No Minister had any doubt, so far as I am aware, as to the ability of Great Britain to win the war that was threatened in 5938. Owing to a shortage of anti-aircraft precautions, much damage and suffering might have been sustained in the early stages, but there was no reason to fear the ultimate result.
These two books may well be read together, Professor Seton-Watson's for its authoritative narrative of events and searching criticism, Mr. Duff Cooper's for the side-lights thrown on the situation by an observer who had so recently
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