RIDDLES OF THE WAR
Fr HERE are many more important questions bearing
on the future of the war than the meaning of Herr Hitler's alleged reference to some new weapon to which Germany may resort. It is much more material, for example, to know what Russia's secret intentions are and how large an area of Europe they may affect ; how Signor Mussolini's speech of last Sunday is to be interpreted in relation to Italian neutrality; whether the common danger will accelerate the formation of a Balkan bloc strong enough to preserve the neutrality of the States concerned and intimidate any who might contemplate aggression ; what the prospects are of an amendment of the American Neutrality Act in the sense desired by President Roosevelt ; how the odds may reasonably be reckoned between the forces facing each other on the Western Front ; what is the real state of morale in Germany and how rapidly the heavy strain on her economic life is increasing. If we could answer most or all of these questions we should be in a better position to estimate the magnitude of the task confronting the Allies.
In fact we can answer none of them. Every neutral country will determine its attitude towards the war mainly, and some of them wholly, in the light of its own interests and the furtherance of any confessed or un- confessed designs it may hope to realise. Of Russia, at war with Poland but a neutral in the greater war be- tween Germany and Poland's allies, nothing can be pre- dicted with any confidence. She is today the great inscrutable. The revolution her blow at Poland has effected in every political conception regarding the future not only of Europe but of Asia defies full comprehension. Till a month ago if anything was certain it was that Hitler's eyes were set, as he revealed them to be in Mein Kampf, on the rich cornlands of the Ukraine and the penetration of the Balkans, and Stalin's mainly on expan- sion in northern Asia. Today Stalin, by suddenly turning west instead of east, has shattered Hitler's plans regard- ing the Ukraine and cut him off completely from the Balkans, unless, indeed, he decides to move through Hungary, in which case the Russians could thwart him whenever they chose, by striking southward at his flank. The result is to drive Hitler west instead of east, to wage the war he has brought on himself by his brigand-stroke at Poland. Germany has surrendered in a week her chosen Lebensraum, Eastern Europe, and Russia has annexed her heritage. It is to Moscow, not Berlin, that the diplomats of Eastern Europe are flocking—and that Herr von Ribbentrop has been summoned. If there was ever reality in German complaints of encirclement this is the moment to redouble them, for with Russia on the Vistula, and Russian armies interposed between Germany and Rumania, Herr Hitler's expansionism is faced with a blank wall.
This may, as is claimed, be in accordance with von Ribbentrop's plans. If so von Ribbentrop is revealed as a strange interpreter of his leader's ambitions. But that is a matter between him and Hitler. It has little bearing on the question of what Russia's next move is. There may be no next move in the military sense. Russia's armies have reached, if they have not already passed, a line of demarcation which brings five-eighths of Poland under Soviet rule. That area will need organisation ideologically, economically and politically.
Dependence is being laid, for the attainment of the first of these aims, on the importation of portraits of Stalin by the million. As regards the second and third, it is certain that the large estates will be broken up for the benefit of the landless peasants, a procedure which may cause some embarrassment to the Germans west of the Vistula, while the creation of local Soviets, in which Jews take their full share in proportion to the number of their citizens, is another pointed challenge to Nazi ideas and practice. Russia's singular and as yet still brief partnership with Germany has worked exclusively to the advantage of the former, and to all appearance Russia has got out of it all there is to be got. If she stands on the line she has occupied in Poland, and con- stitutes herself, as she is now in a position to, protector of the Balkans, it is hard to see what further profit co- operation with Germany can bring her. The test of her good faith—and it may be close at hand—is her decision regarding Bessarabia. If she decides to seize that con- tested province from Rumania the Balkan States will see enthroned at Moscow only one more imperialism to dread. If she recognises the status quo she may become the accepted protector of south-east Europe.
The first clear indication regarding that will be the replies obtained by M. Maisky to the questions which Lord Halifax presumably put to him last week, and the result of the negotiations between M. Molotoff and the Foreign Minister of Turkey, a country whose fidelity to the pledges it has given to Great Britain there is not the smallest reason to doubt. At no point do Turkey's interests and Russia's appear to clash—pro- vided Russia intends no move against Rumania, to which Turkey is closely bound as a member of the Balkan alliance. Russia, no doubt, desires to keep war out of the Black Sea. No one would desire to carry war into those waters except as a means of helping Rumania if she were attacked by Germany. Since Russia has it in her power to prevent any such attack, her declaration of resolve to do so would justify Turkey in agreeing to the closing of the Straits. But no such under- standing could well be reached if Russia decided simul- taneously to take Bessarabia from Rumania, Turkey's ally. There is room for some adjustment of Balkan frontiers, but not in the form of violent annexation.
One fact needs stating with some emphasis. It is neither in Great Britain's interests nor any part of her desires to draw the States of the Balkan peninsula into war. If, as there is every reason to believe, they are intent on preserving their neutrality they will find nothing but support and understanding in Whitehall. Great Britain is fighting this war in resistance to German endeavours to dominate the continent of Europe. If she en- deavoured to dominate the Balkans in particular we should find means to resist her there, and should wel- come co-operation in that enterprise from any of the Balkan peoples. But if the purpose of the Balkan peoples is to stand together and ward off war by the maintenance of a neutrality scrupulously and honourably maintained, then we in Britain can only approve their wisdom, and assure them of the feelings of friendship we entertain for all of them. The extension of naval war to Medithrranean, waters would be a calamity for every nation bordering on that sea or doing business in it. Italy, as the greatest purely Mediterranean Power, displays a prudent consciousness of that fact, and though Signor Mussolini has given no guarantee of perpetual neutrality he may be counted on not to plunge his country in war till he is certain, if he ever can be, that that course would bring her more gain than loss. It must never be forgotten that this war is no more than four weeks old. If today it is confined to three great European States it is far too soon to assume that there will be three belligerents, and no more, when it ends. We may find ourselves with new allies or with new foes. We shall not count on the former ; there is every inducement for every State to keep out of modern war as long as it honourably can, and unless Germany drives some neutral into belligerence in its own defence France and the British Empire will fight the battle for freedom alone. Still less can any neutral be tempted to join Germany If, therefore, Russia has satisfied her terri- torial ambitions, the war may remain—apart from risings in the States Germany has subjected—a Western European conflict.
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