THE ARMS-EMBARGO BATTLE
By ERWIN D. CANHAM
Washington, September r9th.
AS the special session of Congress entrenches itself for a long struggle over American foreign policy, the chances of repealing the arms-embargo appear to be con- siderably better than ever. Statements of Congressional leaders would indicate that unless President Roosevelt badly mismanages his campaign, the embargo is likely to be repealed by a two to one vote. Of course, the isolationists are loud in their arguments, and have called themselves the " Peace Bloc," charging that the President is trying to lead the nation into war.
Now, as in the months before war broke out, American opinion in general is at once anti-Hitler and anti-war. The contradiction between these views has been in no sense resolved. Even the isolationists declare themselves to be anti-Hitler. The President's task is to convince national opinion that removal of the embargo does not mean involvement, is not an " act of war," as isolationist Senator Gerald P. Nye fantastically declared it to be.
Indeed, the isolationists are perhaps producing a great deal of misunderstanding by exaggerating the importance of repeal of the embargo. They claim that it is not only an intervention on the side of the Allies, but also a step toward the re-election of President Roosevelt for a third term. Of course, it is nothing of the sort, as they would be the first to proclaim the day after repeal was voted.
Actually, the dominant sentiment of American public opinion is still the desire to stay out of war. And if the isolationists can persuade the man in the street that repeal of the embargo imperils this aim, they have a strong and effective case. The Administration, however, is on its strongest ground when it points out that the embargo itself is unneutral and its repeal is a return to impartiality, which may be the best recipe for non-involvement. They cogently argue that the embargo is an intervention by domestic legislation in the natural conditions under which the war would be fought, that it cancels some of the advantages of sea-power held by Britain and France, and enhances the land-power held by Germany.
The forces for repealing the embargo are various and powerful. They include the President, State Department, and all his Administration, plus the larger part of the Democratic majority in Congress. Conservative Democratic Senators, who in July were opposing the President for domestic political reasons, are now supporting him on the arms-embargo issue, for most of them are Wilsonian in their viewpoint. Elder statesmen of the Republican Party, like former Secretary of State Stimson and Nicholas Murray Butler, are also endorsing the President's stand. And many big industrialists and business leaders, who provide most of the financial sinews of the Republican Party, likewise favour the Roosevelt foreign policy. On the other side are the inveterate isolationists, who are more powerful parliamentary fighters than the President's allies, but they are in a small minority. Their arguments, keyed to the anti-war theme, make an impression on general public opinion. Various demagogic leaders, like the Rev. Mr. Coughlin, are campaigning over the radio against the President, and they can still turn on an abundant tide of letters and telegrams to members of Congress at will. But unless the Administration plays its cards very badly, or events in Europe make repeal of the embargo seem dangerous or unnecessary, it would seem that the resources of the American aircraft factories will soon again be at the disposal of the Allies.
That may mean a good deal. Planes held up by the embargo will be released for delivery, and when the embargo is lifted orders may be expected to pyramid. The American aircraft-industry could probably build planes for export at the rate of t,000 a month without increasing its present capacity, and the figure might be doubled if war exigencies demanded. The aircraft would probably have to be paid for in " cash "—that is, on ordinary commercial credit terms —and transported by other than American ships.
It is probable that Congress will leave a cash-and-carry law in place of the repealed arms-embargo. With the actual and potential credit resources of Britain and France, and the possibility of more barter on the basis of the cotton-for- rubber exchange, there should be no difficulty in the Allies securing their t,000 planes a month or more. And their transport surely is a problem that the British and French navies can manage in another few weeks' time. Therefore the cash-and-carry restrictions are not in the same category of handicap as the arms-embargo.
It is possible, no doubt, that cash-and-carry will be left optional with the President, or not enacted at all, and there may be simply a clean sweep of American neutrality laws off the statute books, replaced by what is called a " return to international law." In that case, the only restrictions will be those imposed by the President on his own authority. These, already in effect, concern chiefly travel of Americans on belligerent vessels and in war zones, and do not greatly hamper the flow of commodities.
It is, of course, a historic debate that is being waged in the United States on these issues. The arms-embargo question is but a symbol, and that erroneously, for a policy of aid and assistance to the Allies. But it is a good platform on which President Roosevelt has taken his stand. He urges repeal of the embargo because it is prejudicial and unneutral in its application ; he insists that he is as anxious as anybody to keep the United States out of war ; he recognises the anti- Hitler feeling by reminding the nation of what is obvious-- that nobody can control their thoughts and sympathies. But the nation continues, as Lincoln said it could not continue, " half slave and half free." It is half for peace and half against Hitler. The threat to small European neutrals, contained in latest European events, only increases American anti-Hitler sentiments. The difficulties of the Allies, now that Poland is gone, apparently work on public opinion much as the dark events of 1916 and 1917 worked. Yet no one can with confidence forecast American action beyond the arms-embargo stage; no one can hold out real hope to Britain and France that the United States is " inevitably " coming to their aid as a belligerent. The American people, one says over and over, are about where the British were a year ago—profoundly anxious to avoid war.
In small ways, the United States is helpful. Our Far Eastern policy strengthens. Our inter-American policy freezes out German incursions here. But, apart from the probable arms-embargo repeal, there is no sign of other major activity, and there is a profound desire for peace.
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