2 APRIL 1983, Page 7

Mitterrand's unsteady course

Sam White

When it came, the expected split in the French Left did not develop along the ru,rie of fracture between Socialists and "oMmunists, but within the Socialist Party „tself. The most notable feature of the new 'lauroy government is the exclusion from it °C Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Minister of ,State and Minister of Research and In- "niLstrY in the old one. It is as though Tony 'enn, to whom M. Chevenement bears a striking ideological resemblance, had been dr°13Ped from a Labour government. Whether he resigned, as in fact he did over a Month ago, or was pushed out is really im- Material: as he himself explains, he found himself oPposed both to the policy and the Illethods of the government. M. Chevenement's importance in the ki -alist Party is considerable: he was until recently spoken of as a potential prime ninninilter, he is the author of the programme Which Mitterrand stood for the presiden- cY, Whichand he is, finally, the pioneer of the with the Communists. In short, he is formidable figure to be driven into op- Position. It is interesting at this point to 4.te a distinctive feature of M. itterrand's presidency. It is that he was elected head of state while being head of a „PartY. Neither de Gaulle nor Pompidou r, to a lesser extent, Giscard had this ulsadvantage. Each could impose without a sberious risk of being deposed. It remains to we, seen, as Raymond Aron points out, r "ether M. Mitterrand can detach himself Clhis majority, or impose his will on it. p 'early, no one is more aware of the re early,

dilemma in this respect than his c'tinmunist allies. They have rushed in

Left 0 rill the gap on M. Mitterrand's lion created by M. Chevenement's defec- mIon. The reasoning seems to be that the °I..e deserters there are among the Ialists the more Mitterrand and his new- 4ZeaPPointed Prime Minister will have C":(1 of them. Their calculations seem to lolve worked out, for after some fairly heir negotiations they are back, despite riluir losses in the municipal elections, in rne,,"ell file same strength in the new govern- .t, with two senior and two junior Inisterial posts. Gone were their objec- 4!:ans to devaluation, forgotten their railings rne inst the EMS, and forgiven the govern- or,new austerity measures. They seized casta line in Mitterrand's television broad- '. sPlashed it as a headline in D1,4/flan/le and made 1985 their excuse for Th'e nt g.![-ig renewed support for the President. ilne was to the effect that the govern- in", was right in 1981 to increase purchas- er in an effort to stimulate the rl'prnY. Never mind that the policy now

was sharply to reduce purchasing power -- that was simply a temporary hitch before the old policy was resumed with renewed vigour.

It all suggests that the politbureau of the French Communist Party has been re- reading Lenin's treatise Left Wing Com- munism — An Infantile Disease, with its famous line about the necessity of suppor- ting socialist governments 'like a hangman's rope supports the condemned in retaining the Communists and M. Mauroy was retained as Prime Minister. He was the one most acceptable to the Com- munists and to the Socialist Party as a whole. The dominant factor, however, both in retaining the communists and M. Mauroy must have been the threat the trade unions might have posed to the new austeri- ty measures. Here the government has met with an instant reward, for only the Coip- munist trade union federation has given these measures qualified support. The rest have shown unqualified hostility. What is most feared is that the cut in purchasing power, which includes a ten per cent forced loan affecting even modest incomes, will result in a slump and a sharp rise in unemployment of anything between two and three hundred thousand by the end of this year.

Even before that time, the increases in fares, gas and electricity and other public service charges will really begin to bite, without even the prospect of a compen- satory indexing of wages if inflation is to be held in check. The outlook is for a stormy autumn.

It is in the autumn, too, that the annual Socialist party conference is scheduled to be held, and M. Mauroy, among his other preoccupations, is now desperately trying to have it held earlier. One can see his point — the earlier it is held, the less formidable will be M. Chevenement's assault on the government. Whenever it is held the Com- munists will look upon it with considerable pleasure. It was not they, after all, who first deserted the President. That pioneering role was left to one of his fellow-socialists. If later they should choose to follow that ex- ample, time will have made it a respectable one.

To revert, however, to M. Mauroy. He may be the least divisive of prime ministers that the President can choose at the mo- ment, but that only applies to his own party and to its Communist allies. Nationally, and at a time when the President is appeal- ing for a great national effort, he is precise- ly the opposite. It was only three weeks ago that he said he would not be a party to a third devaluation, and only a little less recently that he declared that the worst of

France's economic difficulties were behind her. It is taking public opinion very lightly indeed not to consider these words a grave handicap to leadership in the present cir- cumstances. It is especially divisive in a na- tional sense when one recalls thai the recent municipal elections revealed the Left alliance to be now in a 47 to 53 per cent minority in the country.

The damage done to M. Mauroy's reputation by recent events has inevitably affected that of the President too. He did nothing to redeem it with his recent televi- sion appearance, in which, as all the critics noted, he tried to strike a 'Gaullean note' which reached no higher an inspirational level than an appeal to buy French 'and travel French'. He did not bother even to give a brief outline of the government's new economic measures, leaving that to lesser lips, but he did attempt indirectly to clear M. Mauroy of the charge of having deceiv- ed the country during the municipal elec- tion campaign by denying that the govern- ment was planning to embark 'on some kind of austerity programme'.

It was not merely a bad performance, it was a disturbing one. It indicated that he was both unsure of himself and unsure of his majority.