Strains Within the Alliance

By LAURENCE MARTIN

ANTI-MISSILE MISSILE-2 TN last week's article it was suggested that even 'the expenditure of well over $32 billion on a Damage Limitation programme based on the anti-missile missile would not reduce American casualties, in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, below seventy-five million at the very lowest.

There is, however, another factor in the anti-missile debate in the United States, and this is the problem of China. The studies revealed by Mr McNamara show that an expenditure be- tween eight and ten billion dollars upon a missile defence system, coupled with some simple civil defence measures, could cut by two-thirds the fifteen million or more casualties that China is expected to be able to inflict upon the United States by 1980, or under some favourable circumstances reduce them to zero even if China struck first. Significantly, it is the newly discovered capacity to use long-range interception in space, and thereby provide a thin defence for large areas, that makes these low figures possible. The US army and other advo- cates of the anti-missile missile therefore argued that the United States should undertake thin deployment against the Chinese and thereby pre- serve the capacity to extend deterrent protection over allies in the Far East at no risk to the American homeland. There is undoubtedly good reason to suspect, however, that this is only the thin end of the wedge, intended to exploit Mr McNamara's known anxieties about China in order to get the United States into the anti- missile business in preparation for an anti- Russian system.

Those who declare that such deployment would, in the words of Jerome Wiesner, 'exacer- bate the United States and Soviet relations with unreal considerations of strategic-advantage or disadvantage,' suggest that it would be 'de- stabilising.' It is clear from a close reading of these criticisms that it is thought that an anti- missile defence system would be destabilis- ing in three distinct senses. In the first place, it is suggested that it would make the advent of war more likely. In the second place, it is suggested that it would stimulate a renewed arms race. In the third place, it is suggested that the deployment of the anti-missile missile would arouse increased tension in strategic matters and thereby worsen diplomatic relations between the sides in the Cold War.

Fears that war might become more likely are apparently based upon the assumption that a country could place itself in what it might regard as a position to make a first strike with relative impunity, or at least in such a favourable first and second strike posture as to encourage a dangerous and adventurous diplomacy. So far as the United States' position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is concerned, it would seem that although an • anti-missile system could considerably reduce casualties, it would still never be possible to regard a nuclear exchange with equanimity. No number of deaths measured in millions can be regarded as very different from even larger casualties so far as the deliberate initiation of an exchange is concerned. It is not so obvious, however, that the modifications of relative Professor Martin's two articles are based on a lecture he gave earlier this year at the London School of Economics. strategic positions that might be brought about by an anti-missile system would not have an effect upon relative sturdiness and style in the management of crisis. The nuclear stalemate, if it exists, encourages what has been called a diplomacy of 'vague threats.' An anti-missile defence system might, as many fear, upset the stalemate by creating a complete technologi- cal breakthrough for one side, but this seems unlikely, given the limitations even of the latest possibilities in development. It is, however, conceivable that if the anti-missile missile cannot completely upset the stalemate, it may neverthe- less greatly affect the context of threats. The greatest danger is not perhaps that one side may be tempted to a first strike, but rather that it may be guilty of overconfidence in brinkmanship.

The situation is different when' we regard the case of America versus China. Here an anti- missile system offers the United States good performance over the medium-term future, and the possibility of preserving extended deter- rence in the Far East is an attractive alternative to undertaking the expensive conventional mili- tary commitments that have proved necessary to sustain credibility in Europe. It is even possible that the United States might put itself in a posi- tion to risk a pre-emptive attack against China. But, in practice, moral considerations and the risk that the conflict might extend and involve the Soviet Union should prevent the adoption of this option. In any case, the capacity of China will before long rise to the point when perfect defence is no longer even theoretically available.

When that time came, anti-missile defence against China would no longer hold out the hope of immunity and would become, as against the Soviet Union, merely another factor in the equation of mutual vulnerability. The weight of American striking force in this equation, how- ever, must so overwhelmingly exceed that of China into the foreseeable future that, with or without the anti-missile missile, the Chinese must proceed with the greatest caution in any policy likely to provoke the United States. Over the next twenty years or so, therefore, Ameri- can adoption of the anti-missile missile is likely neither to encourage reckless action by either side, nor offer America an easy answer to its Asian problems. The best argument for such a step seems to be simply the straightforward pur- pose of limiting damage should a nuclear con- flict with China happen to erupt.

The mechanism whereby the anti-missile mis- sile might prove destabilising in the sense of accelerating the arms race is fairly obvious. Both sides in a confrontation can be defended and both can be deterred by the threat of tremendous destruction. But both sides cannot be both defended and deterred. Thus a race between Assured Destruction and Damage Limitation would create a classic arms race in which the precautions of one become the fears of another.

Although an accelerating and never-ending race of offence against defence is obviously pos- sible, it is not clear that the anti-missile missile need necessarily have this result. The Soviet Union has hitherto been content with relatively limited investments in strategic nuclear weapons and it has been typical of her to acquire a little of each system that technology makes available rather than to plunge heavily in one direction. It is therefore possible that the Soviet anti-missile programme may be. a modest one, requiring no large increase in Western strike forces, and that an equivalent, moderate Ameri- can venture would be regarded in Russia as a routine step in military development rather than as a challenge to accelerated competition.

The third sense in which the anti-missile missile is thought to be destabilising is in its effect on diplomatic relations. The New York Times has said that the deployment of an American anti- missile system would 'play into Chinese hands by thwarting the Soviet-American détente.' No one can be dogmatic about such essentially psychological matters, but it is not proper to ignore the fact that since the Soviet Union is apparently the first to enter into an anti-missile defence system, it would be difficult for her to say or even believe that a similar American move was provocative. The Soviet Union has shown no sign of believing that the mutual de- ployment of an anti-missile system would be a dangerous move and, of course, the Ameri- can approach to the question, in fact, has been highly cautious.

It is obvious that were the United States to deploy the anti-missile missile, this action would have considerable implications for America's European allies. In the first place, such an action would inevitably be scrutinised for its implica- tions as to American intentions towards the defence of Europe. There are those who believe such deployment would indicate a turn by the United States toward the concept of Fortress America, and there are others who believe that it would increase the credibility of American protection for Europe by extended deterrence. Because it is the Soviet Union that threatens Europe and because the anti-missile missile can- not secure American immunity against attack by Russia, the increase in credibility would be small. And, to judge from recent discussions with a considerable number of West European experts and officials, Europeans are not much impressed by the argument that America needs the anti- missile missile against China, for they take the view that existing American forces are a more than adequate deterrent in that respect. Indeed, the argument based on China might do more than any other to undermine the confidence of Europeans who reason that if America is afraid of the Chinese nuclear force she must be para- lysed by the Russian. Thus there seems to be general agreement in Europe that there are no pressing military reasons for America to deploy the anti-missile missile.

Nevertheless, Europeans tend to concede American supremacy in the understanding of nuclear questions—one effect of the anti-missile missile will be to widen the gap still further between the knowledge of America and that of its allies—and, were America to decide that the system was technically necessary, European officials would probably respect that judgment.

The balance of European opinion would there- fore appear to be that so long as possible America should resist being drawn into this costly new technology which might be pursued at the expense of efforts more closely related to Euro- pean security, but that, should she take the plunge, it need not be catastrophic. There would, however, be an obvious opportunity for Gaullist disparagement of American intentions and it would therefore be essential that the American decision were scrupulously divorced from any statements or actions that might reinforce such doubts. An essential ingredient in this respect would be full consultation of European govern- ments. Fortunately, this has already begun.

Whatever the strategic facts may be, there is obvious potential for trouble in an alliance within which the American public enjoys some protection and the Europeans are naked. This would, it is true, be a reversion to what was the case before Russia acquired long-range rockets, but there is a psychological difference between discrimination that is the result of technological possibilities, and that which seems to be the result of policy. It is consequently not surprising to en- counter suggestions of a missile defence system for Europe. It is true that the IRBMs which constitute the chief threat to Europe at present are easier to intercept than ICBMs, but the costs of an anti-missile system are still hopelessly beyond the capacity of Europe to finance, even jointly, on anything analogous to its past and present levels of military expenditure.

Suggestions of this kind have raised problems of control and of German relation to the nuclear parts of a system, but the truth is that all such discussions are academic because the anti- missile missile for Europe makes little sense. Unlike America, Europe is threatened not merely by long-range missiles, but by a vast array of aircraft, cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons. Were some degree of control over nuclear weapons in Europe to become practical politics, the anti-missile missile would have to be examined again. At present, Europe is inde- fensible.

We must also face up to the question of what the effect of the anti-missile missile would be upon the existing French and British deterrents. It is quite clear that many American officials believe that its deployment by the Soviet Union and by the United States would price British and French deterrents out of the small margin of credibility which they still enjoy, because neither is believed to be capable of affording the sophis- ticated penetration aids necessary to by-pass a defence. But because the credibility of these small deterrents depends already upon controversial calculations of the risks that the Soviet Union would be willing to run in particular contin- gencies, it would not seem likely that ballistic missile defence alone could quickly and decisively discourage a would-be nuclear power if on other counts it wished to continue. The possibility always remains, however, that the anti-missile missile and its attendant arguments would be the last straw to tip the scale of an internal political debate upon the future of a national force.

A number of strategic analysts now believe that anti-missile defence is the area in which we must make great efforts to achieve an agreed limitation of armaments. Complete abstention from the anti-missile missile is admittedly the most easily recognisable line and one which it would be most easy to monitor. There have been proposals for a moratorium between the great powers on the anti-missile missile while an agreed formula for abstention is worked out. The diffi- culty with this approach is that so far the United States has in effect been adopting a unilateral moratorium and the Soviet Union has shown no signs of responding with a similar restraint.

When we sum up what seems to be the prob- able rather than the most desirable future for the anti-missile missile, we must accept the fact that it is not possible to halt research and de- velopment in this field. This is because both research and development are always extremely difficult to monitor and because of the fear that some really overwhelming technological break- through might be in the offing. Thus we must resign ourselves to research and development on a big scale, and this, one feels, will create an ever-present pressure to deploy. It seems a fair reading of recent military history to say that much strategic doctrine has been determined by the availability of particular pieces of hardware. The most plausible prediction would, therefore, seem to be that Russian deployment will con- tinue, though perhaps on a limited scale, and that some American system will also be produced eventually as a result of the varied pressures of research, service interest and Russian example. But it seems unlikely that the anti-missile missile will make the super-powers other than nations that could do each other quite unacceptable damage if they so desired. Thus the fundamental bases of mutual deterrence should remain. The newly perceived possibilities of the anti-missile defence are a reminder, however, that tech- nology may not always preserve stalemate. It may be by stirring up debate and compelling us to re-examine our assumptions that the anti- missile missile will exercise its most disturbing effect on the military balance.