RUSSIAN MISCALCULATION.

[TRANSLATED FROM TRE PREESSISCHES WOCHENBLATT.1

From that first project of the Vienna note, which the French Cabinet sent to St. Petersburg in June 1853, to the last preliminaries of peace agreed on between the Allies of the December treaty, the unconditional acceptance of which Russia has just announced, has Russia, caught in a policy of strong self-delusion, step by step contributed to render harder the conditions for the solution of the Eastern difficulty, and placed her- self in the position of seeing the restoration of peace bound up with ever- greater sacrifices of her own influence and power, and with a change of the status quo ante continually more injurious to herself. When in the summer of the year 1853 this attempt at mediation was made on the part of France at St. Petersburg, things still stood so favourably for the Russian Cabinet that it saw even the Western Powers inclined, in order to secure peace, to procure it satisfaction and enhanced influence at the cost of the Porte. The Emperor Napoleon, to whom at that time the English Cabinet seemed willing to lend only a very doubt- ful support, was striving after a friendly solution of his differences with Russia ; the English Cabinet was as conciliatory and confidential towards the Emperor Nicholas as possible ; and the German Powers were filled with the most peaceful and friendly sentiments. The Russian Cabinet had only one check to impose upon itself; and that was not to demand that the great Powers, and especially the West- ern Powers as allies of the Porte, should express an actual acknowledg- ment of the Russian requisitions, and compel the Porte to such an actual' acknowldgment, after it had staked its honour in not admitting them.

The Porte would have been in danger, in spite of its first refusal, of being obliged to accept the Vienna note, if Russia had apprehended the position of the great Powers and shown any feeling for their honour.

Russia, however, believed that the Powers were eager for peace under any conditions, and that she could force from them a direct acknowledg- ment of her demands.

The commentary on the Vienna note was intended to effect this. That composition, so regardless of the honour of the great Powers, had for its result, that the great Powers, and especially England and France, now' more than ever, in order to avoid participation in any sort of acknow- ledgment of Russia's demands, held admissible only a mediation under a strict maintenance of the status quo of Russia's treaty-rights.

Russia thought, meanwhile, through the strong position she had taken up in the Danubian Principalities, to exercise a pressure which, at the negotiations for peace, would bring the Powers to larger conces- sions.

When, therefore, the Vienna protocol of 13th January 1854 had, upon the principle of the status quo ante, established a basis to which the as- sent of the Porte had been beforehand secured, the St. Petersburg Cabi- net opposed to this basis another, which contained again the original de- mands of Russia. The occupation of the Principalities did, however, exercise a strong pressure upon the Powers, but on another side from what the Russian Cabinet had expected. The expectation started from the preconception that England and France would not unite for an offen- sive alliance, that Austria would not join the Western Powers, but much rather that the German Powers united against the Western Powers would throughout maintain a Russianized neutrality. But the pressure which Russia exercised through her position in the Danubian Principalities, straightway drove the Western Powers on their part to send their naval force into the waters of the Porte, made Austria more and more anxious about the position in the East, united the four Powers more closely than before for the thorough carrying out of the principle of the integrity of Turkey, and above all in insisting upon the evacuation of the Principalities as one of the essential conditions of the balance of power. Russia wished by a great stroke to alarm her united opponents, to arouse still greater anxieties about her power, and thereby compel the Porte and its allies to give way. But the attack at Sinope showed the Western Powers the danger which might grow upon them from further delay ; it took the Western Powers as masters into the Black Sea, and first indicated the necessity, in order to secure the Porte from the Russian fleet, of rendering this latter harmless.

The rejection by Russia of the ultimatum of the Western Powers led finally to war with the Western Powers ; the eventuality which the St. Petersburg Cabinet itself, and the friends of Russia everywhere, had thought as good as impossible.

Russia hoped even yet for a feeble war on the part of the Western Powers, whose alliance seemed to her untenable, and was by all Russian organs proclaimed untenable ; she depended moreover on being safe from attack on the side of Germany, and on seeing the recent unanimity be- tween the German and the -Western Powers dissolve at the breaking oat of the war.

But the protocol of the 8th April confirmed this unanimity, instead of ita being dissolved. That protocol already looked for the eventuality of peace farther than the simple restoration of the status quo, while it raised the question of the guarantees for the security of Turkey, and was followed by the league between Austria and Prussia, which contained a more or less proximate threat of war even on the side of the German Powers. It must have been plain to Russia from this moment, that the position in the Principalities was untenable, and that the immediate evacuation in consequence of the Prusso-Austrian summons in the then situation might put an end to the entanglement, without Russia being compelled to make actual sacrifices. Russia, however, went on building on empty prospects of a favourable change. She reckoned on differences between Austria and Prussia; on the reluctance of the latter power to any energetic step ; on the isolation of Austria, which without Prussia would not dare to go forward nor enter into a league with the Western Powers ; and still more on the fact that the Western Powers, if they saw themselves alone opposed to Russia, would lose courage. These motives led the Russian Cabinet again to meet the protocol of April 8, partly with its old demands, and for the evacuation of the Principalities to demand guarantees. It was soon ehown that Russia had calculated falsely and to her own great detriment. Austria provided herself through a treaty with Turkey an overwhelm- ing position against Russia in the Principalities ; and the four guarantee- points were on August 8 formulated by Austria, England, and France. Of what good was it now to Russia, that, too late, on August 7, she re- solved upon declaring that for strategical reasons she would evacuate the Principalities ? The step remained without effect. The Principalities were actually occupied by Austria, and thereby the strongest barrier erected against the Russians ; while, on the other hand, peace was no longer to be had but by essential sacrifices of Russia's influence and power as a result of the guarantee-points.

The general character of the four points would, had they been at once accepted, have all the more certainly secured Russia against heavy sacri- fices and against the practical interpretation which they have since re- ceived, as the Western Powers could not yet boast of any great military results of the war a& their sacrifices had been as yet small, and Austria's strongly moderating influence was certain.

Russia, however, rejected everything, relying on the strength of her defences, believing herself sure of Prussia, and not crediting Austria with courage for further offensive steps being at the same time emboldened through the inactivity and anything but good condition of the Allied armies.

The Petersburg Cabinet began at the same time the very rash pro- ceeding of binding up in some manner the question of the four points with the question of its honour and dignity, which most oppressively tied up its hands, made not the slightest impression on the feelings of Austria; brought no profit whatever, and necessarily made every future sacrifice more humiliating.

The immediate effect of Russia's refusal of the four points was, that the Allied armies carried the war into the Russian territory, and Austria conceived the notion of forming an active alliance with the Western Powers, while she sought to force Germany at the same time to more energetic measures.

Russia saw that the ties she had wished to loosen were only drawn the tighter. She determined on fresh concessions ; but they started from the false principle of aiming not at the solution of the difficulty, but at winning better chances for the maintenance of her position in the East, which was opposed and dangerous to European interests, and especially of her European prestige. The Petersburg Cabinet sought therefore to operate with the four points as instruments to this end.

To sway Germany and Prussia beforehand, it declared first in No- vember 1854 its adhesion to the four points, but it gave them an inter- pretation which turned them into guarantees of Russia rather than of Europe against Russia. The consequence of this was actually prejudicial to Russia. Austria would not accept this general assent to the four points ; and, on the other band, it showed to Austria and the Western Powers the necessity, in order to something certain to depend on, of demanding from Russia the acceptance of the four points with a definite and concrete interpretation as the preliminary of peace.

When thereupon Russia, on November 27, 1854, after perceiving the effect of her proceeding, accepted the four points in their formulation of August 8th unconditionally as a basis of negotiation, yet could not this prevent the treaty of December 2d; and Russia was obliged, III order to

obtain negotiations, now to accept also the interpretations of the three Powers.

The Conferences followed.

The man whom the protocols of the Conferences do not convince that Russia's aim and object was not the attainment of peace, is incapable of being convinced by anything. They demonstrate that, so soon as Rus- sia siw that Austria would not go to war for the sake of the Western interpretation of the third point, she had no longer any earnest intentions towards peace.

The plan which Russia built on the rupture of the negotiations had good prospects at first, but we see how it has teen disappointed. Russia wished to keep back Germany, and especially Austria, by private assurances ; Austria appeared weak and irresolute, was sure to be held in check by Germany, while, at the same time, her relations with the Western Powers had through her position at the Con- ferences been damaged, and a strong mistrust had taken root between the parties to the December treaty. Then there was the mournful con- dition of the Allied army in the Crimea, while Russia had gained time to send to the Crimea powerful reinforcements ; and finally, there remained the hope of the growing difference of opinion and desire for peace in England and France.

But again for the year 1855 had the political and military calculations of Russia been falsely made.

The Allied armies gained a great success by land, and the Russian fleet was practically reduced to nothing in the Black Sea ; the movements of the Allies have acquired an unexpected extension, and the warlike en- thusiasm has increased. And while Austria again, as before, sides with the Western Powers, and towards Russia maintains a more decided, more pressing, and more threatening attitude than before,—whilst the Allies of the December treaty, on the ground of the military results obtained, pro- pose to Russia incomparably heavier terms than last year,—at the same time the supports on which Russian policy might reckon give way more and more everywhere among the states of Europe, and the extent, the power, and the aim of the European coalition against Russia become ever mightier and wider.

It was under these circumstances to be expected that Russia would leave nothing untried to withdraw herself from her perils. The uncondi- tional acceptance of the latest preliminaries of peace is a decisive step to this end. If the prospects of peace are more hopeful than on previous occasions, it lies in the conditions themselves, which with referenee to the Conferences of last year the three Powers have already attempted to formulate with a definiteness which must make it as hard as possible for Russia to avoid the actual sacrifices which the conditions by the will of the Allies are intended to impose, and to engage only in a sham negotia. tion. Whether Russia has this time too only this latter object in view,— whether it is only from a politic calculation of dividing opponents, of holding off Austria, and keeping Mat the wavering states on her own side or in neutrality, of collecting and organizing her forces by the gain of time, of perfecting her acfences more and more, that she has condescended to concessions,—the near future will show. We are certain that such a calculation -will now again as before turn out wrong, and only swell to a larger dimension the sacrifices which Europe demands of Russia for peace.