PARTIES OR STATESMEN.
Snt—I must apologize for troubling you with another letter so soon after the insertion of my last one on the Scandinavian Alliance : but there is an important subject on which I wish to say a few words before the opening of Parliament imposes silence on amateur contributors. There is a very remarkable article in the last number of the North Br- fish Review, headed "Government by Parties or by Statesmen," which, I dare say, many of your readers have seen. I have myself read it with a Peculiar interest, as I found therein to a great extent a powerful expression of ideas Which had been for a long time running in my own head. The author very clearly points out the evils which arise from the supposed ne- cessity of unanimity in Cabinets. The question which I wish to start, and which I am far from feeling decided about, is, whether these evils admit of any remedy under our present system or whether they are not necessary disadvantages, to be set against the manifest advantages which it presents. Ina letter which you printed long ago,* when France was a republic and when England was at peace with Russia, I endeavoured to point out one msaifest advantage and one manifest disadvantage of our system of Cabinet government. I argued that it was preferable to any Republican form be- cause it allowed the actual ruler to be retained indefinitely, or to be 'dis- missed at a moment's notice% without any breach of law or any sort of pub- lic disturbance. AAign-st this I set what I still hold to be a disadvantage, that, with such- a system, Parliament does not really legislate, but only says yea or nay to Ministerial propositions, and that too often with a view to keeping Ministers in or turning them out. Some persons whose opinions I value hold that this last iS the ideal func- tion of a Parliament, and would even legally confine the initiative to the %a-biters of the Crown. To this I cannot at all agree; but such a notion stones brings into still greater prominence the question raised by the North See Spectator, 20th December 1851, Those who make the reference will do Well to look at the opposite page. British Reviewer. Is this initiative to belong to each Minister in his own department ? or is the Cabinet, which now only exists conventionally, to be legally recognized ? If legally recognized, is the necessity of unanimity to remain ? or may it, like all other assemblies but juries, decide measuree by a Majority ? The great evil of our system is well worked out in the Review. It hin- ders us from having " the right man in the right place." At the present moment it is palpably so. '1 o admirers of the war Lord Palmerston may reasonably appear the best man—to be the general director of affairs. But probably no one would maintain that each member of the present Cabinet is individually the fittest man in the country for the particular office he holds. No one would deny_ that greater administrative talent might be found in other parts of the House. Surely Gladstone and Co., Bright and Co., even Disraeli and Co., could supply better men for many offices than those who at present hold them. - In a pure despotism or a pure democracy it is possible to appoint absolutely the best man to every office. Why ? because there is no necessity for agree- ment among the officers. The sovereign, personal or multitudinous, himself decides on each measure ; ministers arc mere administrators in their several departments, and advisers whose advice may or may not be taken. A despot or a popular assembly might employ Palmerston, Gladstone, Bright, and Disraeli, all at once. 'Demos might hear Palmerston argue for war and Glad- stone for peace ; he might decide in favour of war, but he might still in- trust to Gladstone the administration of his finances, while Pahnerston directed operations against the enemy. Indeed, old Demos of the Pnyx often commanded Nieins to carry out the very measures against which he had argued. So might the Grand Turk, if he could find anybody capable of ad- ministering finances or directing operations. In either case the Sovereign may fill up offices with no regard to anything but fitness for those offices. The.opinions of their holders on other points are of no importance, because the Sovereign himself, Despot or Demos, ultimately decides.
But with us, in constructing a Cabinet, its authors must set to work in quite another way. Certain offices are to be filled, not by absolutely the best men, not even by the best men in a given party, n
but by the best me among those of that party who have at once seats in Parliament and a cer- tain Parliamentary position. Certain offices must be filled ; certain men must have offices. Among those men may be two or three qualified 'for place A; not one qualified for place B from which the fittest man in the n universe may have just bee ejected. Just now—at least up to these new conferences—it is ruled that no man can be Minister who is not for war. But the ablest men in Parliament are all against war; consequently the offices have to be filled with such inferior holders as the War party can supply.
Is this, or is this not a necessary evil in our existing system ? Probably no Englishman really looks to changing our present constitution into either a despotism or a republic. We all probably think that, on the whole, the disadvantages of our present system are more than counterbaliumed by its advantages. The question is, are these disadvantages inherent evils Under which we must sit down ; or can we alleviate them, within the limits at least of the present written law or even of the present recognized constitution?
The Reviewer, as I understand him would not do away with the Cabinet altogether ; he would have it meet and consult, in order that each Minister may have the advantage of all his colleagues' advice ; but each Minister singly, and not the Cabinet collectively, s to be responsible to Parliament for the management of his own department. I speak of course not of that legal responsibility which might issue in impeachment, but of that con- ventional responsibility by which a Ministry in a decided and hopeless mi- nority,is bound to retire.
Now, if Parliamentary control, in such a case, is still to be of the seine indirect character which it is at present, there seems to be this great ob- jection to the scheme, that it would be vesting an enormous power in indi- viduals. As things are now Parliament can neither compel nor hinder a line of policy ; it can only censure after the fact. Surely it would be going too far to intrust one individual with the power, for instance et war and peace. Such a power, under the proposed scheme, some one Minister would have, with no check but the necessity of listening to the advice of colleagues which he need not take and the fear of having to resign office when the country is already coniniftted to his policy. •
Again, a Ministry in a minority need not now always resign at once. It has the alternative of an "appeal to the country.'.' How would this be under the proposed system ? Suppose a Minister in a minority in the Cabinet and in Parliament too. Shall each Minister be able to dissolve ? or must U112- 'Amity, or at least a majority, be required on this particular point ? My own belief is that our present purely conventional system cannot last; and that either the Crown or the Parliament will, before long, acquire a more direct power over public affitirs than at present. As Mr. tirote hunted years back, an able and ambitious King, who knew how to identify himself with popular sentiments, might easily recover much of the extensive power vested in him by law, and denied only by our conventional constitution. Or it may be found necessary to give the Legislature, in some shape or other1. a direct instead of an indirect voice in public affairs. I remember a writer in the Westminster Review suggesting for this purpose a re- modelled House of Lords, to be invested with something like the functions of the American Senate. In the United States, executive acts emanate from the President, but must be approved by the Senate. Such a necessity might seem undignified for a King ; but he would thereby enjoy far more personal power than at present. Anyhow, I do trust that secret diplomacy may come to an end, and that the greatest concerns of nations may some day be freely and openly dis- cussed, not, as now, when it is too late but when the discussion could still have a practical effect. Of course this might even now be effected by an address of the House of Commons • but it seems to be deemed quite irregu- lar to vote an address during pending negotiations. That is, the Legisla- ture is invested only with the highly practical function of shutting the stable-door when the steed is stolen. At the risk of being charged with classical or medimval dreaming, I will make two remarks. 1st. Our Plantagenet Kings often directly consulted Parliament about treaties and the like. 2d. In the old Greek Republics, both oligarchic and democratic, the pow- er of peace and war was invariably vested in the most numerous body which the constitution recognized. Foreign relations were the point of all others on which publicity was thought desirable. I have been rather throwing out hints than anything else, as the question is one which ought to be well weighed and discussed. Whether the remedy proposed by the North British Reviewer be feasible or not, all political thinkers ought to thank him for his clear and forcible exposition of a great existing evil. I am, Sir, your obedient servant, E. A. F.
Previous page
