TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE PROBABILITIES OF WAR.
TEE conviction that a general war is approaching gains ground in the European mind. Kings with exhausted treasuries may continue to hope against hope ; and diplomatists, hardened to alarms by half a century of peace, may fancy the questions at issue still within the resources of their craft. But the judgment of statesmen and the instinct of the populace are for once in ac- cord, and from Odessa to the Orkneys, Europe is in arms. Of the -five Powers who, since 1815, have claimed the right to enforce tranquillity in the world, there is not one which is not openly pre- paring for a war. France, it is true, "never arms," but hernavy is increased at menacing speed, and her army is already at its highest level. Austria has risked or incurred bankruptcy rather than reduce her active force. Prussia demands the military con- trol of Germany, and her King calls on his people for " sacrifices, to reinvigorate her military strength. Russia has three armies in motion as we write. Finally England, detesting war, and hankering always for economy, is raising her navy up to fighting point, and levying taxes for national defence. When shells cost 51. a piece, nations do not arm without a reason, and only fanatics will pronounce the general consensus of Europe a caprice. With Europe openly in preparation, with the Revolutiol foot to foot with its antagonists, with the new " idea " of nationalities seething in every corner, the probability of war admits of little speculation. The problem to be resolved is rather the time for which it can be postponed. There are sanguine minds who still believe that 1861 may be a year of armed truce rather than hostilities, and we pro- pose to examine the grounds of their conclusion. They have some substantial grounds for their pleasing expecta- tion. The immediate provocation to an outbreak, the projected attack of Italy on Venetia, may possibly be averted. The result of the Italian elections has replaced the initiative in the hands of Count Cavoiir, and the Italian Premier is believed to be in favour of another year of preparation. The artillery of Piedmont is not yet equal to an attack on the Quadrilateral, and the Army of the South has to be restored from the beginning. Garibaldi, how- ever hostile to delay, may bow to the united voice of the repre- sentatives of Italy. The Hungarians, utterly discontented as they are, may still prefer to wait rather than peril the certainty of success. The quarrel for Schleswig-Holstein may be resumed at any moment, and the Germans must soon be aware of the risk of precipitation. France, though immensely powerful, has still some preparations to complete. The fregates blindees are not yet off the stocks, and only a portion of the army is provided with weapons of precision. It may be doubted, too, despite her enor- mous expenditure, whether the materiel yet collected is adequate to the incredible requirements of modern campaigning, on the scale involved by a European war. Three of the Great Powers have the keenest interest in the maintenance- of peace. The Govern- ment of St. Petersburg, with its finances in disorder„ its army unpaid, its serfs expectant of their freedom, will scarcely risk war for any object less dear than the tranquillity of'Po- land. The Emperor of Austria has the gravest reason to believe that the first shock of conflict will call the Hungarians -to arms, and for objects other than the safety of his throne. Tie Cabinet of Vienna, too, though it still finds money for materiel, is well aware that its credit is exhausted, that war must be sup- ported by means as fatal as revolution. England, with her cot- ton trade in danger, new trades opening in the far East, her fleet scarcely manned, and nothing to gain by any conceivable Conti- " nental contest, must throw her powerful weight into the scale of peace. Above all, the whole tendency of events for forty years has been to make a general disturbance the most terrible of cala-
mities. War is no longer a game which kings can play at. There is not a State in Europe, save England, which two years of war on the scale predicted would not reduce to bankruptcy. There is not a State in Europe without a powerful class passion- ately interested in the maintenance of peace. War, if it does break out, will be waged in defiance of the wishes of the Kings, the interests of commerce, and of the advice of that civilized million who are supposed throughout Europe ultimately to rule. The hope of a postponement of the conflict, we have said, is not
without foundation, but yet we fear the balance of evidence is upon the other side. If the caprice of kings has ceased to be a cause of war, the passions of nations have become infinitely more dangerous. The King of Prussia may be convinced that Schles- wig can wait, but who is to convince the North Germans ? Count Cavour may be willing to organize Naples before he strives for Venetia, and even Garibaldi may concede the time essential to secure artillery. But who is to restrain tha Hungarians, smart- ing with the sense at once of oppression and disappointment? They may, as we have said, wait, but the probabilities are all on the other side. Austria can scarcely be weaker than she now is. Russia, their ultimate adversary, repairs her strength with every day's delay. The people are at last united, and their leaders are pushing the Kaiser on to measures which will at once compel and Justify insurrection. Even the moderate Hungarians may well be- lieve that it is in their power to precipitate a crisis ; that war once declared, Louis Napoleon dare not, and the Italians will not, abstain from taking advantage of their long-sought opportunity. Any spark in the magazine will, it is admitted, produce an explosion, and in Schleswig-Holstein, in Hungary, and in Italy, there are sparks it may be impossible to tread out. Nor are the in-
terests of the Powers in peace so strong as sanguine reasoners
affirm. The state of armed preparation now maintained is financially as fatal as a war. Even England is paying taxes on a war budget. It may be doubted whether Austria would not be actually relieved by a war which would enable her statesmen to east moderation to the winds, levy money wherever money can be obtained, and abandon the harassing effort to seem to Europe solvent. Austria is not governed by financiers, and soldiers are not likely to forget that victory would terminate this among other embarrassments. One great victory in Italy, and the Hungarians must postpone once more the termination of their " contest of a thousand years." Russia may want no war, but any rising of the nationalities involves the one point for which Russia will encounter any risk. Even in France, there is a murmur at taxation which may hurry the Emperor into action. He would be stronger next year, but he is strong enough even now to give him a fair chance of success in any continental cam- paign. Though patient, he can spring suddenly, and his oppor- tunities are not often missed. Any armed movement in Europe against Denmark, or Venetia, or Hungary, must, unless he would resign his position as moderator of the revolution, bring him into the field ; and we need scarcely say, France cannot move on any pretext into Germany, without producing an European war. If the general situation is unfavourable to prolonged peace, the facts of the day, and the rumours which are only half un- derstood facts, are still more ominous of war. The King of a great military State openly expects a war, involving its inde- pendence. All armaments in France are directed towards a definite date, early in the coming spring. The reaction in Austria suggests promises of active support from Germany, while the Emperor of the French, it is affirmed and denied, has declared that assistance will be his casus belli. There are signs, too, that the great moderating force at the Tuileries, the influence of England, has not been exerted to avert a war. The French force in China has not been withdrawn. The army of occupation in Syria is neither rein- forced. nor recalled. The French squadrons all over the world show no sign of concentration. There are no signal purchases of coal for the East—all signs which must precede by months an open rupture with a power whose dominion, as Pozzo di Borgo wrote, "has the whole earth for its basis." If these indications are cor- rectly interpreted, the Emperor is ready, for it is only against England that further preparation is required. Finally, there is apparent in men's minds a sense of expectation, a feverish restless- ness, which always precedes explosion. Men will bear anything sooner than protracted suspense, and influential classes are not wanting who will rush on any fate, rather than endure the pro- tracted agony to which they are exposed. It is but a balance of probabilities, but the balance, we submit, declines perceptibly to the side of immediate war.
How far an European struggle must involve Great Britain, must ba the subject of a future consideration.
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