Herr Hitler's Opportunity
IIERR HITLER'S speech in the Reichstag on Tuesday, and the publication of the new British disarma- ment proposals on Wednesday have sensibly modified the international situation. But before either of those events another had taken place which equally deserves mention, the conclusion of a ten-years' non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland. The importance of this step is great. Formally the agreement does not go beyond the comprehensive undertaking embodied in the Kellogg Pact, of which both countries are signatories, to renounce the use of force for the settlement of any disputes be- tween them, except that it contains various practical provisions for the peaceful solution of difficulties. But the significance of the agreement lies in the fact that it has been voluntarily contracted by two States between whom a condition of serious tension existed, and that so long as it is honoured it creates security and confidence instead of apprehension and suspicion in the most notorious danger-zone in Europe. Full recognition must be given to Herr Hitler for the service he has done to the whole continent in thus proclaiming in effect that for the next ten years at any rate Germany will make no attempt to satisfy her claims on the so-called Polish Corridor by force. And it must be acknowledged further that only a politi- cian with the unique authority the Chancellor at present wields could have secured acceptance for an accord which involves something very like a renunciation of the ambi- tions of the whole German people.
The atmosphere thus created is on the whole preserved by the references to foreign policy in the Chancellor's Reichstag speech. He spoke with cordiality of France, and returned to his proposals for an agreed settlement of the Saar problem—not easy to achieve, but eminently to be desired—between Germany and France. What the Reichstag statement, taken in conjunction with the German-Polish agreement, amounts to, is that Germany formally accepts her frontiers in both West and East, the latter for the next ten years at any rate, the former permanently. Even though the Chancellor was pointedly equivocal regarding Austria the net result of his speech and his acts is undoubtedly to improve the prospects of peace in Europe.
But the touchstone as regards peace in Europe is more than ever disarmament. If nations which proclaim their desire for peace, and sign pacts of non-aggression whether bilateral or collective, still refuse to reduce the instru- ments of that force which they have formally renounced, they publicly proclaim their mistrust of all pledges, and create thereby a permanent atmosphere of war—the very war they have so elaborately forsworn. The test, therefore, of the improvement in the international outlook which Herr Hitler's words seem to betoken is the success or failure of the new disarmament discussions to which the British memorandinn of Wedneiday opens the way. The document is issued at an opportune moment. The Government has waited far too long, but the moment when it has finally acted is not the moment for criticizing its failure to act earlier. The recent Franco-German conversations have led nowhere and no renewal of them in the same form is likely to yield results. - The British memorandum enables them to be resumed on new and more hopeful lines. To that extent at least it must be -cordially welcomed.
There is nothing heroic about the British plan. It is sternly realistic. It starts from the reluctant conclusion that the simple solution consisting of the abandonment by all nations of the armaments forbidden to Germany Under the Treaty of Versailles must be abandoned as impracticable, because nations whose concurrence is essential refuse flatly to concur. In certain respects the plan plainly invites criticism. It actually Contemplates a limited measure of rearmament—the acquisition by Germany of 155 mm. guns instead of the 115 mm. to which she is limited by treaty—and it extends from five years to ten the period in which even the limited amount of disarmament contemplated shall be effected. In defence of that it can only be urged that almost any disarmament agreement is better than none and that the British proposals, avowed compromise as they are, provide the best basis discoverable for any agreement at all.
The defence may be accepted. What is essential in disarmament is that a downward -movement shall begin. The pace and extent of .-the movement are important, but secondary. And it is clear that if the British proposals were adopted an inconsiderable increase in German armaments would be far more than set-off by the collective decrease in the armaments of other States. The proposals stand or fall as a whole. There are three principles to observe. There must be a general reduction of amiaments. Germany must be given equality. And there must be some guarantee of security to induce the heavily armed nations to disarm. The memorandum moves a hesitant step forward as regards security, laying it down that there shall be consultation between the signatories of the Disarmament Convention "as to the steps to be taken "—a phrase worth remarking—in the event not merely of a threat to the Kellogg Pact but of a threatened violation of the Disarmament Convention itself. That is something, if not much. As to actual disarmament the ten-year period is based on the ten- year non-aggression pacts favoured by Herr Hitler. By fixed dates within that period various types of aggressive weapons are to be destroyed. Germany is pressed to accept a short-service army of 200,000 instead of the 300,000 she demands, and she is to be allowed to equip it—not, be it noted, to equip the existing long- service Reichswehr—with anti-aircraft guns, 155 mm. mobile guns, and the 6-ton tanks which is all that she asks for, the other Powers meanwhile gradually reducing down to 16 tons and at the same time carrying out an enquiry into the whole question of tanks—which opens up at least the possibility of their total abolition.
But the real test is air disarmament. It is through the air that this country in particular is most vulnerable. It is the air peril that is keeping Europe racked with nerves. The only safe solution is the total abolition of military aviation, which is necessarily conditional on some form of control of civil aircraft. On that solution the British memorandum concentrates. It invites Germany to allow two years for an inquiry into the possibility of abolition to be carried out. If at the end of that period total abolition has not been accepted, then Germany must be conceded full equality in the air at whatever standard may be agreed on. It is not unreasonable to ask Herr Hitler to assent to that, for it is in the spirit of his speech of last May, which he confirmed on Tuesday. Its chief defect is that it postpones any decision for two years, but since there is no prospect of States deciding to abandon military aircraft till some agreement has been reached about civil flying that, no doubt- is inevitable.
The British proposals must be regarded as a minimum. They need to be strengthened, not weakened. Their fate is, of Course, in the hands of France and Germany. Both -those countries have given recent evidence of good faith, France by her offer to give up half her-bombing aeroplanes and heavy artillery, and Germany by the conclusion of the treaty with Poland and the assurances embodied in the Chancellor's Reichstag speech. The decision rests far more with Herr Hitler than with any other 'man. If he really stands for peace he will agree to discuss the British proposals, and if he agrees no nation can refuse. The estimate the world will hold of him must depend largely - on this choice. Many who have criticized the German - Chancellor most relentlessly will be ready to revise many of their judgements if he shows himself ready to grasp the proffered opportunity now,
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