AID FOR FINLAND
Si,—The Prime Minister has intimated that it is not in the public interest to disclose the precise nature and extent of Allied co-operation with the Finns. Sir Walter Citrine, speak- ing on Finnish territory, has assured these gallant people that help will be both substantial and expeditious. Signs are not lacking that Germany and Russia have divided Scandinavia and other States in Europe into Nazi and Bolshevist "spheres of influence." At the moment, Finland is challenging this assumption aggressively. Unfortunately, Mr. Winston Churchill's well-intentioned message to the neutrals was ill- timed. The flaw in his case is surely obvious. In effect, he mvited the neutrals—or, at least, those of them immediately threatened by aggression—to adopt a hostile policy towards Russia. I, for one, believe that Mr. Churchill has merely succeeded in exposing our own inconsistency. How can we reasonably and equitably expect Scandinavia to declare war on mighty Russia—backed by an even mightier Germany— while it is still true that our relationships with that country continue to be " diplomatically " friendly? Can we, I ven- ture to ask, much longer postpone a vital decision? If, as seems certain, we must eventually acknowledge Russia as our enemy, are we either wise or morally justified in hesitating now to render to Finland the only kind of material aid which is calculated to sustain and prolong her resistance? She lacks men and the munitions of modern warfare. The Allies possess both.
At the risk of condemnation as an "amateur strategist" I advance the claim that speedy and adequate Allied naval and military initiative in Northern Europe would have even more far-reaching results than the salvation of Finland. It would, I think, checkmate Russia, forestall Germany, consolidate and vitalise anti-Bolshevist and anti-totalitarian opinion among the neutrals, and, above all, shorten the war.—I am, yours faith-
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