Neutrals' Dilemma
From JOHN
LAMBERT
STRASBOURG
atI N the event of a third world war, I don't believe in any neutrality, neither Austrian, for Swedish nor Swiss,' declared the eloquent Belgian Socialist Fernand Dehousse to the European Parliamentary Assembly last week. The 'three neutrals' themselves would probably admit the justice of his remark, but it does little to solve the problem of their relationship with the Common Market. It is a problem which is of direct concern to Britain, if only because her Joining EEC is formally dependent on a satis- factory solution for the EFTA countries. Should the British negotiations be over by the end of JP:1y (and responsible voices on both sides have recently been heard saying that is possible) then all might have to wait upon solutions for the Three. Their negotiations with the Community will probably not start until early April, but the recent debates in Strasbourg revealed the extent of the problems, and the strength of the feelings that will be involved.
The case of Austria is the simplest. , Her neutrality was imposed upon her, and it is generally accepted that the Six should do all in their power to help her. Austria for her part is probably prepared to accept full economic union —which should raise no insuperable problems— under an association agreement formally guar- anteeing her political neutrality.
The Swedish case is less clear-cut. Her neutrality is an ill-defined concept, best summed ttp as a tradition of non-alignment and non- alliance; she is not in NATO and wishes to abstain from a political or military commitment. A political argument which cannot be neglected is that by committing herself she would leave Finland, with whom' her links are strong, in Chilly isolation. From the economic angle, the Swedish Prime Minister has said that Svhden is Prepared to accept a customs union with the Six, With only the exceptions essential to the main- tenance of neutrality; but it is here precisely that the going will be hard, for in the eyes of the Six there cannot be a customs union alone with- out the further-reaching provisions of an economic union. Swedish industrial circles have pointed out, too, that the long-term implications of an association of this kind for-independence of action differ little from those of full membership.
By far the most controversial case is that of Switzerland, where neutrality is an institution, and tends to be thought of almost as a way of life. The argument that there is no such thing as ideological neutrality must impinge on a country whose neutrality was essentially a sur- vival mechanism when her immediate neighbours were at war, and who now sees them united in the same Community. Mr. Maurice Macmillan in the Consultative Assembly gently suggested that the basic conceptions of neutrality might need reviewing in the modern world. Members of the Six were more outspoken. Mr. Kapteyn, a Dutch Socialist, saw Switzerland as the safe deposit of the blood-stained wealth of the world's dictators, and the tax haven for the rich of Western Europe—small wonder then she should refuse the idea of surrendering her financial autonomy; upheavals might result in her eco- nomy, with its special agricultural set-up, depen- dence on cheap raw materials, and limited social services. For the moment, however, the real opposition to a close link with the Common Market is political and psychological: the Swiss are afraid that their carefully built quadrilingual society might fall apart; that their unique system of direct democracy would not survive. In short, they are satisfied with their present situation, and for the moment the economic arguments in favour of a change do not convince them. The reaction of the Six to this is understandable: the alternative to a full association with shared responsibilities, and a balance of advantages and disadvantages, must be straightforward trade agreements and nothing more; as M. Rey of the EEC Commission put it, you do not go into part- nership with your baker just because you lyiy bread from him.
Strangely, the country with most to worry about is not one of the neutrals, but Norway. There seems no doubt that when the present vehement internal debate is over she will choose full membership. In view of her trade links with England, and her crucial interest in Community policy over fishing, aluminium, ferro-alloys and paper, she will want the fullest say in the councils of the enlarged Common Market. But her economy is ill-suited to face a big market and a sudden access of competition. If only the Nordic Customs Union project, dropped at the birth of EFTA, had gone through, she might have managed a gradual adaptation: now the shock of the resultant changes is likely to be sweeping and hard to bear.
The Six, for their part, could better define their policy towards the neutrals if the future political development of their Community were clearer. Instead the latest round in the Fouchet Committee has left things more confused than ever: far from making the concessions expected, the General (for it is still very much his plan and his ideas the French are putting over) has gone back a step towards the Europe des patries sort of scheme which the others cannot accept. Dreams of a political union for the Six before the influx of the new members seem to be fading: to the federalists (the real 'Europeans') this means a great disappointment and a great chance missed. It is now again conceivable that Britain may have her say from the start in the shaping of Europe's political unity.
As the Year of Negotiations begins, everyone is under pressure: the British to get an agree- ment before the wave of opposition at home gets out of hand, and the Danes to get inside EEC before the.common farm policy starts to hit them really hard. Both will be pressing the neutrals to solve their own problems in good time. And the Six would still like to add a political clause to the application form for membership. The whole future of Europe may be decided around the conference tables and dans les couloirs in the next six months.
'1/ only we'd had teleriAion in 1936 it might have been a difierent story. . „'