Regionalism in Kenya

By ROBERT A. MANNERS* Antr■si a background of mounting political slander and an alarming increase in inter- tribal hostility, Mr. Reginald Maudling will meet on February 14 with Kenya's political leaders in an attempt' to work out a constitution and a timetable for independence. When the Colonial Secretary left Kenya after his November get- acquainted visit, he remarked cautiously that the gap which separated the two major African parties, Kenya, African Democratic Union (KADU) and Kenya African National Union (KANU), appeared far narrower than he had been led to believe. Gently but solemnly he cautioned against magnifying those differences that did exist. While he could not discount the possibilities of violence CI think tribalism is more immediately explosive than racialism. . . . I am quite certain that there is a danger of serious tribal clashes in this country unless a solution can be found'), it would be a tragic irony if it should arise from the very minor policy distinc- tion which (it appeared to him) separated the government party (KADU) from the KANU opposition.

The response of the party leaders lent sub- stance to Mr. Maudling's observations. Both im- mediately announced that they had been pleased by his understanding of their problems. And three weeks later Mr. Maudling's sober but hope- ful appraisal got another apparent boost with the release of Sir James Robertson's Report on the Coastal Strip, which recommended that the 1895 Agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar be abrogated and that 'the Coastal Strip should be integrated administratively with Kenya before self-government and independence takes place.' Sir James's proposals, said KADU, implied a triumph for the principle of regionalism. Sir James's recommendations, said KANU leader Jomo Kenyatta, -.mark a defeat for regional government now being advocated by KADU leaders.'

Among the many experts who have tried heroically during the past few months to sort out the differences between KADU and KANU is Mr. David Cole, Kenya Coalition Party Mem- ber of Legislative Council. In a newspaper interview dated December 31, 1961, Mr. Cole exposed the results of his analysis. 'There must be a strong central unitary authority. But I think both the. KANU and KADU proposals for government in Kenya are suitable for it. Some powers must be allowed for regional areas, but there will be a unitary government too.' (My italics.) All of which suggests not only that there may he few grave differences between Kenya's two major parties, but that these differences, like those of opposing parties in many of the ancient independencies, are often inflated in the heat of battle for political power. KANU stands for a strongly centralised or unitary government and for regidnal devolution of certain administrative and policy matters. KADU stands for 'strong * Professor of Anthropology at Branders Uni- versity, Mass., who has been engaged on a research project in Kenya. regional government' with a central government ip control of defence, foreign relations, cur- rency, higher education, etc. KADU emphasises what it calls regional 'sovereignty over certain matters,' and cites Switzerland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and several other countries as examples of the 'federalism' to- wards which it aims. It does not, it says, want Kenya to be 'another Ghana or another Congo' (.sic). KANU's leaders hint strongly that they find Tanganyika's strong central government and 'one-party' democracy an interest- ing East African development. In short, both parties recognise the need for a central govern- ment apparatus to give unity to the tribes and regions which make up Kenya; and both parties agree that the governing of a new nation, like that of an old one, requires the reservation of certain functions and powers to communities of the whole.

The edifice of passion and----so far. largely' latent—violence which seems to have been erected on these poorly defined differences in political approach is impressive and, to many observers, alarming in its dimensions. Yet it is not surprising. Long before the official split occurred, the African members of the Legisla- tive Council had grouped themselves roughly along tribal lines. A temporary truce between the factions was arranged just prior to the Lan- caster House talks in LondOn in February, 1960; but when the delegates to the conference re- turned to Kenya, the breach had widened, and the lines of affiliation 'began to emerge more clearly, until in August, 1960, both parties were formally registered and the dispute became public property. At the time no issues of sub- stance or policy separated the two parties. Both declared for immediate self-government and tandem independence. Both demanded the im- mediate release of Jomo Kenyatta. There was no discussion of post-independence regionalism or anything of the kind. KADU stated simply that they had been 'forced' to create their party because African leaders like Mboya and Odinga (Luo) and Kiano and Gichuru (Kikuyu) gave every sign that they would overlook the needs of the 'minority tribes' in the interests of their own land-hungry tribespeople.

. . and this one is lined with lead. sir.'

The elections of February, 1961, returned nineteen KANU and fourteen KADU to the Legislative Council. Both parties still insisted on the Immediated.release' of Kenyatta and on 'im- mediate' self-government and independence. KADU asserted that its 6nly purpose was to defeat domination of the other tribes in the community by Kikuyu, Luo and Wakamba. KANU replied that it had no intention of im- posing such domination, that, in fact, such con- trol would be impossible in an independent Kenya. As the majority party, KANU were entitled to form the government, but they re- fused to do so unless Kenyatta were first released from detention. The Governor turned next to KADU, who accepted the invitation to form a government without making any stipulations about Kenyatta. However, both groups, the party of the government and its opposition, con- tinued their efforts to have him released; and when he was released, on August 15, 1961'. mem- bers of both, parties played an active part in the festivities. the rallies and the celebrations that followed.

It seemed more incongruous than ever that the political strength of the African community should be dissipated by fears of Kikuyu (pri- marily) domination when `Mr. Kikuyu' himself was being feted by all Africans as the rightful leader of the independence movement. More- over, both groups had met with Kenyatta while he was still at Maralal and had agreed on a time- table for uhttru and on most other matters of government organisation pending complete inde- pendence. After their return from the joint talks with Kenyatta, the leaders of both parties held conferences in Nairobi; and in September, Sir Patrick Renison invited the participants to con- tinue their discussions more formally and under his chairmanship at Government House. Both KANU and KADU accepted and the so-called constitutional talks got under way.

To those on the outside it began to look as if the last impediment to independence and Afri- can political unity had been .removed. But sud- denly the talks broke down on the issue of a division of ministries in the interim government. KANU asked for half the total. KADU agreed only to grant them half of those ministries re- served for Africans. This, replied KANU, was manifestly unfair, not only because they were the majority party, but because the division pro- posed by KADU would automatically ensure a • majority in the Council of Ministers to KADU. The European ministers, KANU said, could be counted upon to align themselves with KADU. No one disputed the prediction: It was now quite clear--if there had formerly been any doubt— that KADU were more inclined to link them- selves with the Europeans in the Legislative Council than with those Africans who were iden- tified with KANU.

In a final effort to save the talks before the representatives walked out, Sir Patrick urged James Gichuru for KANU and Ronald Ngala for KADU to seek out a compromise in private. It was during the two-man conversations that . followed that Ngala dropped the regionalism bombshell which Gichuru promptly reported to the press. Ngala accused him of betraying a con- fidence. Charges of 'bad faith' were flung back and forth, and KANU, announcing that it saw no future for the talks under these circum- stances, walked out. Within a couple of days KADU released its Plan for National Unity.

Not many of the announced aims and prin- ciples of the Plan could have met with violent KANU opposition, since all proposals were either general or rather vaguely defined. The determination in favour of a regional type of organisation is defended by a statement to the effect that KADU's 'aims and principles are attained through the recognition in the Con- stitution for Internal Self-Government and In- dependence of the basic fact that Kenya is inhabited by varied and virile peoples. The loyalty of the individual to the State must be secured through loyalty to and confidence in his Region, which is the source and origin of his personal freedom.'

Paragraph V of the two-page document (the only official statement of KADU's constitutional plans to be issued to date) may be cited in full, for it lists the only substantive issues which can form a basis for disagreement with the 'unitary government' position of KANU. It reads as follows:

The subjects over which the Regions would have control as reflected in the written Con- stitution, would include (1) Land (2) A definite number of essential services such as education to Secondary level, etc. (Higher education would probably be a Central Government service) (3) The appointment of Public Servants in the Regions (4) Definite Regional representation in the Central Legislature based on equality of representation of each Region (5) Amendments to the Constitution to be effected only by a large majority of the people in each Region.

Item (3) is vague, but implies a kind of re- striction of choice which would penalise edu- cationally retarded areas. This is a plank to which KANU would probably. object. Item (4) could mean equality of representation based on population. As it stands, however, it means equality without reference to population, and KANU will undoubtedly object. KADU will probably modify this plank when they get to London. I would guess that they will propose a bicameral legislature in which the 'upper' cham- ber, like the United States Senate. will be selected on a regional basis and have powers at least equal to those of the 'lower' house, whose mem- bers will be chosen on the basis of population. As it stands, item (5) not only requires regional majorities for constitutional amendments, but the consent of majorities in all regions. KANU, or any constitutional expert who is not in fact aiming for complete regional autonomy (read selective independence) or federal constitutional paralysis, would have to reject such a proposal. It is likely that KADU will fight hard for reten- tion of this plank, or something very much like it, at the forthcoming conference. With it, their regionalism does not resemble those of some of the nations they cite as models of 'successful democratic federation.' Without it—or with the acceptance of some modification that would make the amendment procedure like that of the United States with its 'ratification by three- fourths of the States'--they will have weakened the kind of regional 'independence' they seem tc. have in mind. But it is possible that KADU will finally agree to a compromise of this issue.

It is on item (1), however, that much of the present crisis turns. It is on the subject of land, its control and disposition that the leaders of KADU have taken their strongest stand. Land is the symbol and the apparent source of tribal anxieties. Several of KADU's top hierarchy have used the land issue to alarm their constituents, telling them that a strong central government under Kikuyu and Luo domination will use force to move their crowded poulations on to the lands of tribes more fortunately endowed. KANU say that these threats are a cynical fabrication, that KADU's leaders know beyond doubt that no central government could pos- sibly put through such a programme against the massed resistance of the Kalenjin, Masai and other 'minority' tribes. They charge that the doctrine of regionalism is an afterthought, a shameless and potentially explosive political ex- pedient that has been wedded to the sensitive question of land in order to produce KADU's only viable propaganda instrument. They say that KADU are using this instrument to alarm. their own constituencies and, in this manner, to protect their personal interests and political future. For, one KANU leader told me, 'they know that they are, for the most part, second- rate men who would be dumped on the dust pile in truly democratic national elections.' Then he added : 'Like Tshombe in the Congo, they hope to destroy Kenya before she is even an in- dependent country.' (Like Tshombe, it may be added, they sometimes do not seem to care if their intransigence were to lead to bloodshed and tribal wars.) At a rally in Kapkatet on December 30, 1961, Peter Okondo, organising secretary for KADU and Parliamentary Secretary for Finance, told an audience of about 7,000: 'If not regionalism, then death.' Sustained cheering and blowing of horns greeted this challenge. At a public rally in the Kericho District early last October, KADU speakers warned all of the Luo (some 8,000 or more) living and working as labourers on the European estates and farms (and on the farms of prosperous Kipsigis in the District) that they had better soon leave peacefully or they would be driven out of this and other Kalenjin areas. A few days later the Kipsigis war-cry, which hadn't been heard since 1936—and then in only a limited area near Sondu—went rocketing seventy miles from one end of the Reserve to the other in a matter of several hours. Ten thousand Kipsigis warriors, carrying spears, bows and arrows, clubs and knives, rushed to the tracks and roads of the Reserve, thinking Der Tag had come and waiting only for their war leaders to tell them where to begin the slaughter.

But the whole thing had turned out to be a mistake and the men were told to go home. The Luo and the Kikuyu had not come to seize their lands at all. What had happened was that a European farmer had fired a gun at some alleged trespasser and the man, a Kipsigis, had been slightly wounded or scratched by barbed wire in his attempt to get away. A couple of friends who were with him reported the incident, and in today's politically charged atmosphere it was misunderstood. Somehow or other a woman was instructed to start the war-cry. Only a few Kipsigis knew what had triggered the call. The many thousands who came out had no idea of the alleged shooting. They had been primed to believe that other tribes were planning to take over their lands. Thus, when the cry came, they were ready in a matter of moments to resist the 'invading tribes.' Three more times since then 'irrelevant' stimuli have provoked the ancient war-cry and the massing of warriors who had tb be told each time that this was not 'the day.'

After the first incident an alarmed Administra- tion held a series of barazas in various parts of the Reserve exhorting the Kipsigis to calmness. nut, as they know, their pleas and admonitions have had no effect. There has been a revival of arrow-making among the Kalenjin peoples: the old men are now turning them out by the thousand, for they have been told that their people must be prepared. Arap Murgor of KADU has warned that KANU members should not plan political speeches in his area. He told his audience that Jomo Kenyatta would 'be inviting war [if he attempted] to spread KANU in our area.' John Seroney of KADU has threatened the British Colonial Secretary that if power were given to KANU then England should 'make sure that it has sufficient forces in the country because we will resist.' And John Konchellah of KADU has made his contribu- tion to the defence of democratic procedures and freedom of speech by telling a rally audi- ence: 'If you see anyone opposing our policy cf regionalism you should remove him from the area.' At the Kapkatet rally a KADU mem- ber of the Legislative Council said : 'If we don't get regionalism at the London conference in February we will send you a telegram telling you to get your spears and poisoned arrows ready.' Cheers, applause and a wild blowing of horns greeted this challenge. At the same meet- ing, the obvious KADU candidate for Prime Minister after independence, Ronald Ngala, Leader of the Legislative Council. summed up the fears behind this and many similar threats and incitements to tribal warfare when he remarked that 'The land of the Kipsigis does not belong to Africans but to the Kipsigis.' Then, after the cheers had subsided, Mr. Ngala, a Giriama from Africa Club on 'Regionalism or Unitary Govern- the Coastal Province, repeated the remark twice ment,' it quickly became clear to audience and more to make sure its meaning had sunk in. debaters alike that a strong central government II had. would be essential after uhuru and that certain KADU insists it is not provoking tribalism, administrative functions and powers would have but regionalism. Whatever its intentions, how- to be left to the regions. KANU have empha- ever, a fierce 'tribal xenophobia' has been sised repeatedly that this lack of a genuine dis- aroused and continues to be nourished, not only tinction on the structure of a post-independence by leaders of KADU, but by Coastal and Kenya is evidence of the improvisatory nature Northern Province autonomists, who appear to of their opponents' regionalism or violence' have taken their lead from the politicians of campaign. One is tempted to agree. For, on the the government party. In an open letter to the one hand, KADU leadership continually stresses Minister of Defence, the Coast African Poli- regionalism v. strong central government as the tical Union on January 2 warned that if the real issue separating the African parties. On British Government leans towards KANU's the other hand, this same leadership occasion- demands for unitary government during the ally slips into political sobriety and reveals that February meetings violence will follow. the 'regional autonomy' they talk about would In a recent debate sponsored by the Kericho be an administrative absurdity for an indepen- dent Kenya. The split personality is old hat among politicos. But it is no help to the. Kalen- jin, Masai and Abaluhya followers of KADU to hear their organising secretary offer 'regionalism or death' on December 3J, and then, on January 5, publish an article in the East African Standard which includes the following paragraph --syntactically blurred, but substantively pretty clear: 'The KADU plan for a federal govern- ment is the best vehicle for the purpose [blend- ing the varied tribal communities 'into one Kenya nation'], for it visualises a strong central government capable of effective co-ordination, but flanked with constitutional spheres as to prove obvious deterrents to a would-be dictator at the centre.'

It is not very likely that KANU would pub- licly oppbse `constitutional spheres . . . to [deter] a would-be dictator.' What has happened to the issue for which KADU's followers are asked to face death?

While KADU continues to attack KANU and to assert not only that its leaders are in the pay of Russia, China and the United States, but that they will lead the country into a bloody dictatorship and will confiscate the tribal lands of those groups which do not follow their lead, KANU is having internal difficulties. Defecting leaders charge others with conspiracy, murder plots, foreign domination and a. generally ruth- less struggle for control of the party. The shadow of Mau Mau and periodic revelations of new oaths hang over Kenyatta and KANU's other Kikuyu leaders. Violence, and sounds of violence from within KANU seem to match the tribally orientated violence aroused by KADU. Observers who fear the consequences of the new tribalism unleashed by KADU are hardly any easier over the rumours of assassination and other 'forceful' personnel 'replacements said to be projected for KANU.

The political climate in Kenya—no matter how one ,views it---is, in some respects, hardly more promising than that of the Congo in June, 1960. The combination of tribalism and the threat of a bloody struggle for power in the party that opposes inflammatory appeals to tribal loyalties is alarming, In the long run, the public airing of KANU's internal difficulties may have a salutary effect on the party. While it may result in some defections to KADU, or even in the launching of another African party, what re- mains of KANU should be able in the future to act with greater speed and decision in crucial matters than it has in the past few months. For the present, however, KANU's unquestioned in- ternal difficulties have given a freer field to their opponents in their campaign for 'regionalism.'

Not only has KANU's intra-party vendetta given .KADU a handy stick with which to beat their opponents, to impugn the intelligence, propriety and honesty of their position on all issues, but it has diverted KANU'S energies from the struggle they had not yet fully launched against the resurgence of KADU-inspired tri- balism.

It looks now as if Mr. Maudling will need plenty of tact and perhaps a touch of genius if he is to produce a constitution that will make a nation out of independent Kenya and avert a conflagration in that, country during the next few months.