THE AMERICAN PROTEST.
rr7action taken by the United States Government in 3resenting a friendly Note of protest against the British treatment of neutral trade will certainly not provoke any unfriendly comment in this country. We perfectly recognize that the interests of neutrals are very different from the interests of belligerents in this as in all wars, and it would be extremely unfair if we objected in any way to neutrals frankly stating their point of view. Again, we are fully aware that it is a much easier job to be a belligerent than a neutral. Moreover, looking ahead, it is just as well that we should take account of the possibility that in some future war England may herself be a neutral State, and as anxious to uphold the rights of neutrals as America now is. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in most of the discussions which took place in connexion with the Hague Conference of 1907 the assumption generally made was that England was more likely to be a neutral than a belligerent State in future wars. But though we have every desire to be just to the Americans, we must also be just to our- selves. We are engaged in the very greatest war the world has ever known. It is involving us in a terrific toll of life and money, and we are justified in using all recognized methods of warfare to abridge this toll and bring the war to an eud. It may be added that in doing so we are benefiting America, less indeed than ourselves, but still to a very considerable extent, for the trouble from which American trade suffers at the present time is not primarily due, as the American Note implies, to the interference of the British Fleet with American shipping, but to the general disturbance which the fact of war causes to trade throughout the world. The sooner peace is restored the better will it be for American trade, and if we can by means of naval pressure prevent our enemies from receiving supplies from neutrals we clearly shall be advancing the date at which peace will become possible. There is no necessity to insist upon this point, for we may be quite sure that the enormous majority of Americans would prefer that the war should be ended by this humane form of pressure rather than protracted at the cost of greater loss of life.
On another point Englishmen may be sure that the main volume of American sentiment will concur with the general sentiment here. It is unfortunate that the American Government, acting admittedly under a purely commercial pressure, should have protested against the action of the British Fleet, and said not a word about the conduct of the German Army. In many important instances the German military forces have violated Conventions which were drawn up at the Hague by representatives of all the Powers of the world, including the representatives of the United States. As the greatest and most powerful of all neutral States in the present war, America was under a peculiar obligation to do all that she could to insist upon the sanctity of the Hague Conventions. We do not suggest for a moment that America should have gone to war, though even that step would have been justified according to the code of ethics which prevails among individuals in every civilized country. A bystander is, in this country at any rate, and we fancy in most countries, under a distinct legal obligation to interfere to prevent crime. Judged by the Hague code, crimes have been committed by Germany and the American Government have not interfered ; they have not even protested. There can be little doubt that the mass of the American people, as well as people on this side of the Atlantic, would have attached even greater importance to President Wilson's present protest against British naval action if that protest bad been preceded or accompanied by an equally strong protest against Germany's breaches of the Hague Convention.
Let us now see precisely what it is that the Americans complain of. They complain that their trade has suffered by the war. Of course it has. All trade suffers from war, and especially from war on a scale like the present. In particular, American trade has probably suffered a good deal from the disappearance of the German mercantile marine, for, in the absence of German tonnage, freights have risen enormously, to the injury both of the American producer and of his customers, and also, of course, of the British people as a whole. In this connexion it is important to ask why there has been so much delay in dealing with the German ships which have been captured, and are now under detention in British harbours. If these ships were sold, immediate work would be found for them, and their competition would help to bring down the very high freights which British shipowners are now charging.
As regards the American cotton trade, which is one of the trades most depressed at the present moment, the trouble dates back to a pre-war period, and is still affected by pre-war conditions. There would have been a serious slump in the American cotton trade, and probably also in many other American trades, even if there had been no war. Nor have the cotton people of the United States any ground of complaint against Great Britain. On the contrary, our Government have gone out of their way to meet American difficulties. We might, quite excusably, have taken the extreme view that, as cotton is an element in the manufacture of one of the most powerful of explosives, we
were justified in putting cotton on the list of contraband. We did not take that view, and we permit all cotton to pass freely to neutral States on its way to Germany. As regards other articles which have been placed on the list of contraband there is apparently no challenge from the United States. President Wilson and his advisers agree that our list is a fair one, so that here again there is no special grievance. The difficulty that arises is that, in order to enforce our prohibition of contraband trade with the United States, we exercise our undoubted right of naval search. Of course the exercise of that right is inconvenient to American shipowners and shippers ; but it has yet to be explained how, except by carefully searching ships on their way to neutral countries contiguous to Germany, we can prevent the Germans being supplied with materials required by the German Army. That American traders are now engaged in providing such supplies is notorious. The Times gives a very instructive comparison between the shipments of American copper in September and October, 1913, as compared with the corre- sponding months of 1914. The figures are best set out in tabular form :- EXPORTS 01 Coerce FROM THE 'UNITED Braves.
To Sept and Oct., 1913.
lb. Sept and Oct., 1914.
lb.
Italy... 6,800,003 ... ... 25,000,000 Netherlands ... 1,300,000 ... 12,200,030 Norway ... ... none ... 8,200,000 Sweden ... 2,800,000 ... 6,700,000
These figures have only one explanation. They prove that the American copper magnates, acting through agents in neutral countries, are supplying Germany with copper, which the American Government admit is properly declared by us to be contraband of war. Does President Wilson, and do the American people, really expect this country to look on unmoved while our enemies are thus supplied with the means of killing our soldiers, and also our women and children ? The non-combatants who were killed or wounded in the East Coast raid were all struck by projectiles in which copper was an essential part. The profits of the trade are admittedly enormous. The copper magnates are said to calculate that if they can succeed in getting through only thirty per cent. of their shipments of copper intended for Germany they will make a sufficiently satisfactory profit. Every kind of artifice is used to get the goods through. In particular, as the American Govern- ment admit, a cotton cargo is used to conceal copper. As President Wilson somewhat plaintively remarks, it is diffi- cult for him to deal confidently in the matter of contra- band when trickery of this kind is carried on. It is equally difficult—indeed, it is impossible—for us to accept American manifests as long as there is any chance of their being used to conceal contraband. One possible alterna- tive to our exercise of the right of search at sea is the establishment of s body of British officials at American ports to watch and inspect the loading of ships destined for such neutrals as Italy, Holland, and the three Scandinavian countries. If this solution of the matter were acceptable to the United States Government, doubtless the British Government would be willing to act upon it.
Already, indeed, our Government have shown themselves willing to meet the convenience of American shippers by accepting, as far as possible, the assurances of neutral States contiguous to Germany that contraband would not be allowed to pass into German possession. These assur- ances have been voluntarily given by the States concerned in the interests of their own trade. But they are not in all cases sufficient. For example, Sweden may give assurances that she will not allow certain classes of goods to be transmitted to Germany ; but that will not prevent her traders from sending the goods to Denmark, who may not be able to prevent them passing on to Germany. In the same way we should accept, and indeed have gladly accepted, the very explicit assurances given by Italy that she will not allow contraband to find its way into Germany ; but wo find that smuggling of contra- band from Italy to Germany has taken place on an extensive scale. The truth is that when such enor- mous profits can be realized as are now open to neutral shippers who can get contraband through to Germany, every kind of device will be employed to maintain the trade. We are therefore compelled to utilize that power which the command of the sea gives us to stop the trade.
Incidentally, as we have pointed out, by stopping the trade we are bringing the war nearer to an end. The loss inflicted upon neutrals is not an absolute loss, it is a relative loss. If American " copper kings " or any other American traders wish to dispose of their goods, they can sell them to us or to our allies or to all neutral countries excepting those immediately contiguous to our enemies, and they can sell at prima quite as high as, if not higher than, those pre- vailing before the war. What they cannot do is sell to our enemies at the inflated prices which military necessities compel Germany to pay. In effect, what these traders demand is, not that they shall be permitted to continue their trade as if there were no war, but that they shall be allowed the liberty of making extravagant profits out of the war. In other words, we are to abandon our use of sea power, thus prolonging the war and forcing our soldiers and the soldiers of our allies further to sacrifice their lives, for the sake of the abnormal profits of a small group of American traders. When it is understood in the United States that this is the real issue involved, there can be no doubt what the verdict of the American people will be. When they realize the true nature of the case, we do not believe that the American people as a whole will endorse the demands of the traders in copper. They will remember bow they acted in the Civil War. At that time our traders, regardless also whether the rebels would or would not be helped, claimed commercial rights which in fact, if not in name, were rights of supplying the enemies of the United States with goods needed by those enemies to con- tinue the war. The North sternly refused to recognize any such rights in a neutral Power. Will any Americans now stand forth and declare that their fathers were in the wrong ? If they will not, how can they blame us for following their example.
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