ITALY AND THE WAR.
[TO T. EMT. or T " Sescrivoa."] Sia,—In view of the interesting articles which have appeared in the Spectator on Italy's attitude towards the war, I dare say a short account of the Italian point of view, as observed by one who has been resident in Italy ever since the outbreak of hostilities, may prove an interesting sequel.
At the beginning of August Italy was totally unprepared for war. Even her Fleet, excellent in men and material, was deficient in supplies and unexercised in the difficult game of manoeuvring as a single unit. Her Army lacked equipment of all kinds, and the new "Deport" field gun bad not yet been introduced. She was particularly weak in heavy artillery. This unpreparedness, together with a sensitive desire to play a patently straightforward game, were the chief reasons why she refused to declare war against her former allies ; and of course—aa Signor Giolitti's remarkable revelation has now abundantly proved—there was never any question of her aiding and abetting the Austro-German aggression.
Since August the situation has materially changed. Italy's Army and Navy are now in fine fettle. I say this not without having made very careful inquiries on the subject through various official and unofficial sources. By the end of February all the necessary preparations down to the last button will be completed, and if the country goes to war in the spring the Army and Navy should give a remarkably good account of themselves. Moreover, Turkey's entry into the war has furnished Italy with very excellent reasons for intervening, as the preaching of the "Holy" War, in spite of Turkey's avowed reservations in respect to Italy, has already had severe repercussions in Libya. Why, then, does
Italy still hang back P The defeat of Austria and Germany is certainly Italy's interest. The reasons may be summed up as follows, and they may be said to reflect the vast body of sound middle public opinion as voiced in the strong and loyal Government of Signor Salandra. Italy is not in a position economically to bear the brunt of a long and trying campaign. She is still a young nation, and the Libyan War has shown, with all its success, that Italy has not yet acquired real stamina. There is a genuine feeling that it would be both base and disloyal to make war on her old allies without a new cause of difference arising between her and them. Her national aspirations in regard to Trent and Istria are not considered by the majority of her people as matters of vital importance. The task of liberating these provinces is not considered worth great sacrifices. Only in the event of a seemingly inevitable break-up of Austria will Italy intervene on their account, and although the intervention would be directed against Austria, its object would rather be to pre- vent their falling into the hands at the end of the war of either Germany or Serbia, and would probably end with their "peaceful occupation" Italy hopes to establish her undis- puted predominance in the Adriatic, and this is assured by her retention of Vslona, to which the Powers of the Triple Entente proffer no objection, in the event of her being unable to acquire Pola. There are no signs at present that Germany and Austria are in any way likely to prove victorious- A deadlock would in all material considerations suit Italy's book almost as well as a victory for the Liberal alliance ; and this seems to be as much as the Central Empires can now hope for. The question, therefore, does not arise whether or not it be Italy's vital interest to make war on Austria and Germany. The only question which is really preoccupying Italian statesmen is the Turkish question. Italy does not wish to see France strengthening herself in the Eastern Medi- terranean if she herself is to go away empty-handed in any eventual partition of Turkey. At the same time, she ardently desires a firm friendship with England, and would be glad to earn England's gratitude. It is possible, therefore, if Turkey furnishes her with an undisputably just cause, that she will agree to cooperate with England in Egypt and Syria some time in the near future; but it is doubtful whether she will allow the quarrel to spread to hostilities in Europe. Events only will prove whether this will be so or not, and in any case Italy's policy depends largely on the progress of events. There is no doubt, however, that whatever happens Italy will not flinch from making war the moment war becomes absolutely neces- sary in defence of her own vital interests; and there is no doubt that in every circumstance her Government is deter- mined to pursue a, clean and honourable policy.—I am, Sir,
Byfteet.
J. S. BARNE&
[No one here desires that Italy should act otherwise than in defence of her own vital interests.—En. Spectator.]
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