A BOOK OF THE MOMENT
THE GREEK POINT OF VIEW
[COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE
New York Times.]
The Greek Point of View. By Maurice Hutton. (Hodder and Stoughton.)
THIS is a fascinating book. It gives a vivid and yet in essen- tials accurate description of the Greek outlook on Politics, on Morals, on Literature and on Language—on, that is, the general Conduct of Life. But, though there is an almost perfect sympathy of comprehension for the Greek point of view, and though the distinguished Professor of Greek in that home of sound learning, Toronto University, writes with a real affection for many of the great men of Greece, his sym- pathy of approbation is reserved whole-heartedly for the standpoint of those who speak the English tongue. His is the Angle-Saxon view as regards the things that matter—the things without which human existence, if not, indeed, the whole universe, becomes a dreary, aimless jest, perpetrated, it would seem, by an unending automatic jester, some aimless, goalless impulse—if a thing without meaning, without hope, without end and without beginning can be called an impulse—something in regard to which the chief wonder is that it did not long ago cancel itself out and become a supreme and all-devouring nonentity.
Professor Hutton begins his book by a brilliant analysis of the Greek City-State. By means of the amplest and most poignant references to Greek history and literature he shows us how the Greek State, which_ Was always in essence a City- State, differed from anything that has ever been known in modern times. Paris has often claimed to be a City-State, but the claim has never been made good for any length of time. A...great deal of Dr. Hutton's criticism and analysis of the Greek State appears to be anti-democratic, but, as a matter of fact, it is only so in name. It affords but another example of how urgent is the need for a more scientific defini- tion of what we mean when we talk about Democracy. If we mean by Democracy something which involves a claim to moral and individual equality, a claim that every unit in the State is of equal importance and value, then, of course, demo- cratic government is nonsense. If, however, it means, as it certainly does to me, that in the last resort the Will of the Majority must prevail in the choice of the administrators of the State and in the making of the laws—that, in fact, Demo- cracy means the Will of the Majority, and therefore the Sovereignty of the Majority—it can be shown to afford the most reasonable and therefore the hest and most effective basis for society. Here is the basis which least involves civic disruption. Under it a man must obey the Will of the Majority lawfully and justly expressed, and must remain obedient thereto till the minority can convert itself into a majority through the process, not of physical force, but of persuasion.
But, though this political chapter is very interesting, still more interesting are the two chapters entitled respect- ively "Virtue is Knowledge" and "Virtue and Art." In the first of these we find the crux of the whole matter. We see also the treinendous superficial strength of the Greek point of view, and also the weakness and narrowness which belonged to it because of its rigid rejection of the mystical element. There are two proofs of the proposition that man is under bond to practise virtue. One is the intuitive proof, that of the Inner Light, the indwelling sense of duty and of the difference between right and wrong. The other is the expediency proof. The first may be said to be founded on the belief that the essential things in regard to human exist- ence are unknown and unknowable, or, at any rate, are unknowable to man with his present powers of observation —with his present powers, that is, of collecting information by the use of his genies. Hergathers certain data by his senses, but while gathering them he knows, or, at any rate, feels,that there are vast numbers of xs and ye entirely outside his observation. That this is so is shown by the fact - that through the media of science man is gradually extending his powers of observation. And who knows what is to come ? In any case when those busy helpers and servers, the senses, - have brought in their reports man can get buy upon them with his cunning little instrument of the syllogism, remember- ing always, however, that there must be an If before every one of its operations. If it can really be proved that such and such a thing exists, and again, if it is of a particular nature,
then certain inferences may be drawn. But—and here comes
the tragedy of the performance—unless the premises., are ' really correct, the splendid accuracy of the little logical instrument must turn the logic game into something analogoul_ to shooting steadily and perfectly with a rifle which has been accurately sighted for two thousand yards though the ta:rget
is only five hundred yards oL It is the dreadful doubt whether the sights of logic have been really . accurately adjusted that makes the attempt, to found the practising of - virtue on a technical operation so ephemeral and so dangerous. In a word, if we trust only to observations and reason, we are assuming as permanent and eternal premises which are only too likely toturn out to be local and temporary. Thus, we come back to the mystical element in spite of ourselves, and are obliged to be content with saying, in the greatest and most important actions in life, that we are doing our duty, that is, depending upon something outside the functions of mere reason. Reason, no doubt, is a noble thing, _ but no man can be sure that it always stands on a firm foundation.
For how long did man think the Laws of Gravity were absolute, and therefore that the inferences built upon them Were also 'absolute ? Yet only a year or two ago we discovered them - to be but relative.
- The curious thing about the Greeks was that, though speak- ing generally, they believed that if you got reports- from your senses reason would do the rest and provide you with sound moral prineiples ; their best philosophers, best poets and best men of science had the intuitive feeling that there was something beyond all this, and something which made the Religion of Reason, though it seehiecl so strong, fundamentally •
uncertaina cardboard fortress: Socrates Was - the: chief
" . . • •
exponenfof this intuitive corieetion of the Religion by Reasbh
through inspiration and of philosophic doubts as to premises of mortality and of the conduct of life. .He showed an inborne
sense of relativity. -On, this -point Professor speaks
. . . • with wonderful poignancy , •
"If a than must he -governed by imderstandink, it will be by the understanding of the lower things of life, for the highest things, pass understanding ; of peace (true .peaCe), of righteousness; Of wisdom, a man has a suspicion, a vision, a gleam; a divination (as Plato says, Rep., VI., 505e), but not yet comprehension ; 'through a glass darkly,' he sees, if at all. And therefore the demand that life be based upon logic, reason and comprehension inevitably sinks into a basing of life on that conanion sense merely which is intolerable without metaphysics ' ; go that horse:sense which is only one degree, I apprehend, removed fromlaCkess-sense ; and on materialism ; hence Greek intellectualism tends to end in a commonplace and rather sordid Positivism and- Utilitarianism ; even as English intellectuals like Grote and Mill fought, desperately for Utilitarianism ; and only succeeded, like EudoNus_in Aristotle's, day, in prompting other men to say that the apostles teemed much liner than their creed (Aristotle, Ethics, X:, 2, 1).
"So in Plato's Republic (X., 604e, d) the wise man in the face of misfortunes preserves his composure, does not give way.to emotion, arranges his conduct to cut his losses and make the best of tile fragments that remain the passage suggestii- the banalitiee of . William Godwin. Calculation;'-- says- Plato, is the mainripring of his action.' .The 'wisdom,' which in a Christian—if any man be a Christian—wonld be-a synonym either of resignation or-forti- tude, appears to Wear the poorer garb of commbn sense and prudence; because prudence to a Greek almost of necessity stands at the he-all of the virtues, being another name for intelligence and intellect; the element of the will is lost to view ; this is the continual refrain of Sophocies' Antigone (lines 1050, 1346, 1353.)"
In a word, Socrates was the greatest of all the Greeks because he was non-Hellenic in his final message to the world. Similarly Aristotle (though in him, even, there were symptoms of a mystic doubt) was a much lesser man than Sae' rat,es, because he dared not give the anti-rationalistic element in him the . rein. For Aristotle the writing of the Apology and the almos,t gay willingness to be Mysticism's first martyr would have been impossible.
In the last resort, Socrates died and gained immortal fame because, like the Quakers, he would far rather die than deny _ the Inner Light, or, as he called it, his Daimon.
But I am only skimming the cream of Dr. Hutton's book. In the book, as a whole, are to be found the most fascinating amplifications of my "abstracts and brief chronicles."
J. ST. LOE STRACLIEY.