THE END OF NON-INTERVENTION ?
NOTHING has happened in the past week to supply a clear answer to the question raised in the last issue of The Spectator what Germany's real aims in Spain (and, for that matter, elsewhere) are. Herr Hitler, it is true, has thrown some light on the matter in a week-end speech in which he declared explicitly that Germany wanted General Franco to win in order that she might get iron ore from Spain. If what Herr Hitler wants is to buy ore from Spain—and in the same speech he said that Germany was trying to buy iron ore all over the world—he can do that regardless of what regime exists in Spain provided he is able to pay for it. If something different is meant, then the speech is a naked recognition of the principle of war for raw materials. For there is no question that Herr Hitler is not merely desiring General Franco to win but helping him to win, just as Signor Mussolini, who, also in a week-end utterance, gloried in the fact that Italy had not been neutral, is also helping him to win. The latter admission will not much alter the general estimate of the bona fides of a country which has signed a non- intervention agreement, sat regularly on a non-inter- vention committee and taken part till last week in a naval patrol which exists to enforce neutrality, but it is worth keeping on record.
How far the real aims of Germany and Italy in regard to Spain are identical is a matter for speculation. It may be true that Germany's concern with the conflict is mainly ideological and Italy's mainly strategic. In any case it is clear that both countries mean General Franco to win, and oppose non-intervention in order that they may intervene openly in his favour. It is true that at Tuesday's meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee Herr von Ribbentrop hinted that Germany might propose a new and more comprehensive non- intervention scheme. If she does, and it is prima fade feasible, it will no doubt be given full consideration, but it cannot be allowed to be used as a mere expedient to delay decisions. And that the Germans and Italians contemplate putting forward any genuine non-inter- vention proposals is difficult to believe in the light of the ' Leipzig ' incident and its sequel. That Germany has so far stood by her assurance that she .would take no action beyond withdrawing from the naval patrol is true, and that deserves the recognition which the Prime Minister gave it in the House of Commons last Friday. But it is singular that Herr Hitler, having explained that he is withdrawing from the patrol because he will not expose his ships to danger, should at once send more ships to Spanish waters, and that when Britain and France propose, at considerable sacrifice and some risk, to take over the patrol duties which Germany and Italy have abandoned, Germany and Italy should not merely show no sign of agreeing but show every sign of dis- agreeing.
If that disagreement is definitely announced a new situation will be created, and it is hard to see how the non-intervention policy can survive. Germany and Italy are claiming to divest themselves of responsibility but to retain a right of veto on the decisions of other Powers. That cannot be. If non-intervention is to be ruled out—for it is not practicable for Britain and France to maintain a naval patrol in the face of German and Italian opposition, the more so since Portugal's co, operation is apparently to depend on Germany's and Italy's—then intervention all round, in the sense of the removal of all restrictions on the entry of munitions and volunteers—including " volunteers "—into Spain, must be openly recognised. As a natural sequel both parties in the Spanish conflict will have to be recognised as belligerents, a step which, of course, in no way involves admission of the legitimacy of General Franco's rebellion. There are reasons why that step should not have been taken before ; to take it means giving both sides the right to stop and search British vessels for contraband, but neither side has sufficient naval force to be a serious menace to British trade, and it is doubtful whether either could make a blockade of the other's coasts effec- tive.
In deciding to recognise belligerency a neutral Power consults its own interests alone, and is not concerned with the effect its action may have on either belligerent. In this case it is not certain what effect it would have. Mr. Eden, in the foreign affairs debate last week, took the view that the Madrid Government would still find it hard to import arms in large quantities, and that recognition of belligerency would tell if any- thing in General Franco's favour. That may be, but the question is not relevant. We are not concerned with furthering the cause of either side in Spain, but with taking whatever steps seem most practicable to localise the war and prevent the rest of Europe from being drawn into it. The best way, for which this country has stood resolutely from the first, is general non-intervention. Germany and Italy, and to a lesser. extent Russia, have prevented that from ever being- made fully effective, and now Germany and Italy seem determined to destroy it altogether.
That leaves only two roads open. There must- either be German and Italian intervention on - behalf of Franco, combined with non-intervention on the part of Britain, France and other States, or inter- vention, in the sense of the abolition, of restrictions on the sale of arms to either side, all round. Between these there can be no hesitation. The adoption of the first would be partisanship of the grossest order_ The adoption of the second would be deplorable and dangerous, but it may be inevitable. It would mean feeding the flames instead of extinguishing :them. It would mean protracting the civil war instead of shortening it. It would mean a new influx of Italian and perhaps German troops into the pensinsula. It would seriously increase the danger of European complications at a moment when, as the dictators do not fail AO realise, France is preoccupied with one kind of domestic difficulties and Russia with another. There is the further danger of German or. Italian domination of Spain, but apart from the fact, the value of which may be variously, estimated, that both countrjes have disavowed all territorial designs there is one thing, and perhaps only one, on which both sides in Spain .are agreed—that Spain shall be Spanish. No foreign domination is likely to last long, or to be effective while it does last.
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