A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL POLICY.*
IN The Great Alternative, Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, whose name has come to be so well and so honourably known for his able and patriotic efforts to draw attention to the want of preparation in our naval forces, makes a plea for a national policy,—i.e., for a policy in regard to external affairs and to the Empire which shall be worthy of the genius, the past traditions, and the future possibilities of the English people. This is a great and a practical aim, and though we find a good deal to differ from in Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's book, we have nothing but praise for his attempt to get the people of this country "to give their heart its rights,"—to give proper development, that is, to the instinct for rule, expansion, and leadership which is inborn in them. We have no sympathy with the people, if such there be, who consider that we have no mission in the world and no ideals to pursue. Again, we are in the heartiest sympathy with Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's demand that we should assure to ourselves the command of the sea, and that to secure this, we should create an invincible Navy. Cost what it will, and be our ultimate policy one of non-intervention pure and simple, or of holding the balance between the States of Europe, no sane man can doubt that we should be in a position to hold the sea against all comers, and to secure the free circulation of the blood in the body commercial. Lastly, we agree with Mr. Spenser Wilkinson that we ought to consider, as a nation, what our national needs are, and where they lead us, and to base on that a clear and definite national policy,—a policy which shall let the world know what things we consider vital to our existence, and what line we mean to take in the various problems with which the community of nations are confronted. But though we agree with Mr.
• The Great Alternative ; -a Plea for a National Policy. By Spenser Wilkinson. London : Swan Sonnenschein and Co.
Spenser Wilkinson that the British nation should be governed by high ideals, should secure its independence and its present high position by continuing to hold the sovereignty of the seas, and should clearly realise what is the policy it means to pursue, we are by no means inclined to agree with what Mr. Spenser Wilkinson suggests as the proper policy for these islands to pursue. Though he specifically repudiates the notion of laying down a pro- gramme, the general drift of his book is clear enough. His able and incisive statement of the European situation, and the principles which he proclaims, point to but one practical course of action,—namely, that we should join our forces to those of the Triple Alliance, and so secure both our own position and the peace of Europe. Now, we are quite prepared to admit that the French might carry their hostility to such a point that we should have no alternative but to join the Triple Alliance. If France became actively hostile, and not
merely troublesome and unfriendly, in Colonial matters, we must, of course, ally ourselves with every enemy of France. But Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, as we understand him, does not urge us to join ourselves to the Triple Alliance on these grounds; but rather in order to maintain the status quo, and so keep Europe stable. But to join the Triple Alliance for these reasons means, in the last resort, as Mr. Spenser Wilkinson sees well enough, keeping Russia out of Con- stantinople. That is the cardinal point of the policy he advocates when it is stripped of all that is accidental and adventitious. Now, we would ask, is it worth our while to keep the Russians out of Constantinople F—for mark, if we join the Triple Alliance, it is we and no other who will pre. vent the cross being raised on the dome of St. Sophia. Mr. Spenser Wilkinson clearly believes it is worth our while to do so, and states his reasons as follows :— " The situation of Constantinople is such that any vigorous power in possession of the city must very shortly have the maritime command of the Black Sea, and the military command of the two peninsulas which are separated by the Straits. In the hands of a civilised Power, Constantinople is necessarily the capital of an empire embracing Asia Minor and the Balkan coun- tries. To give this position to Russia would be to make her un- assailable. The Black Sea would immediately become for military purposes a Russian lake, even though the commercial navigation of its waters were unimpeded. The independence of Roumania and Bulgaria would be impossible ; they would at once become Russian provinces. The greater part of Asia Minor would share the same fate. The power of closing the Straits would secure Russia against attack by the maritime states. Austria, at present no match for her powerful neighbour, would be at her mercy, even though she were compensated by the annexation of Serbia and of the country to the south of it as far as Salonica and the northern border of Greece. The Mediterranean States would be confronted by a new rival, endowed with the peculiar advantage of the possession of an inaccessible inland sea as a refuge for her fleet in case of need. Such a Power would perpetually overshadow the independence of Italy. Its existence would compel Great Britain, unless she is to abandon her command of the sea, to increase indefinitely her naval forces and in particular her Mediterranean fleet. Russia, secure on her southern frontier in Europe, would be at liberty to pursue at her leisure a programme of aggression in Asia. There is, in short, no Power that can con- template with satisfaction the possibility of Russia at Constanti- nople; and the history of the Eastern question abundantly proves that however much the temporary needs of one Power or another may be served by temporary abstention from resistance to the Russian design, the policy of every great Power, and still more of every small Power, is in the long run opposed to it. That this is the case has been explicitly recognised by the Russian Govern- ment."
Of course there is a great deal to be said for this view. Mr. Spenser Wilkinson would not have adopted it if it were not so. We will grant that having Russia in the Mediterranean might be unpleasant for us, though we do not see why the possibility of Russia being able to retire her fleet into the Black Sea is a more terrific fact than France being able to retire hers into the harbour at Biserta or into the Port of Toulon, for the matter of that. The Black Sea is, after all, only a gigantic harbour when considered as a place of retirement for the Russian fleet. Besides, Russia a great Mediterranean Power would be far more unpleasant for France than for us,—a fact which Lamartine saw in 1848, when he advocated a Russian alliance with a port on the Mediterranean barred. Still, let us assume that Russia in the Mediterranean would be an injury to us. But this does not settle the problem. The question still remains, Would it not be a leas evil than keeping Russia out of Con-
stantinople ?—our policy in the past and the policy which is attributed to us for the future. Let us see what comes of keeping Russia out of Constantinople. In the first place, it
makes Russia our deadly enemy, and encourages her to threaten and injure us in the one place where we are as a nation very vulnerable. If Russia were friendly, India. would be invulnerable to the lords of the sea. But
as long as Russia is having her chief political aspiration thwarted by us in Europe she will never be friendly. Russia does not threaten India because she wants it. Persia and great slices of China could be got very much cheaper, and would snit her far better. She worries us on the Afghan frontier, as a man treads on the toes of a burly person who persistently blocks his way. But this is not all. The blocking of the way to Constantinople further urges Russia to join hands with France, the Power which was and is, and must ever be, our rival, though we may hope not our enemy. Hence, by adopting a line of policy which hinges on the keeping of Russia out of Constantinople, we obtain two results,—India in peril, and France encouraged and aided to defy us. At present we are confronted by Russia and France, and should be still more so if we joined the Triple Alliance. Given this situation, would not the tree National policy be to say,—We will disembarrass ourselves of the enmity of one of these Powers ; and since Russia is far less essentially hostile to our aims and interests than France, that Power shall be Russia We will frankly and finally abandon our policy of blocking the way to the Mediter- ranean—safeguarding, of course, as we could do, the rights of Greece and the Balkan States—and obtain in exchange the abandonment of Russia's threats against India. We cannot doubt that Russia, knowing that we had abandoned our blockade, would concentrate all her energies on her southern frontiers, and give up the policy of appearing to desire the invasion of India. That done, we should find little or no difficulty in placing our relations with France on a more satisfactory footing, and regaining our right of free action in Africa and elsewhere. When France saw that she confronted us alone, she would, we may be sure, prove far more ready to be ruled by reason and good feeling than she is just now.
We have practically been obliged to confine our notice of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's most interesting book to the main point on which we disagree with him. His book, however, is quite full of excellent things. Historically it is, as a rule, exceedingly strong, and one or two of the chapters can only be described as masterly. Particularly good is the résumé of Egyptian affairs. "The Secret of the Sea" is again a perfect masterpiece of suggestive writing. We have noticed one or two little slips, or what appear to us to be slips, but they are hardly worth mentioning. For example, he speaks as if General Baird had marched down the Nile to Cairo, whereas, if we are not mistaken, he collected a flotilla of Nile-boats and sailed down. Again, he speaks as if Baird's force had assisted in forcing the capitulation of the French, whereas Baird did not arrive at Cairo till a week or two after all was over. Is he right, too, in saying that the French kept their antiquities ? It is generally stated, though possibly wrongly, that they were seized and sold, and the money divided in the usual way among our troops. A more modern instance is the statement that Lord Granville in 1880 confirmed Lord Salisbury's spoken declaration made to M. Waddington in 1878, "Do at Tunis what you think proper." As a matter of fact, though Lord Granville could not free himself from the effects of Lord Salisbury's precipitate offer, he in a despatch dated June 17th, 1880, did his beet to minimise that offer and to limit its application. These, how- ever, are very minute matters. The striking thing about the details of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's book, is their fullness and accuracy, and the perception everywhere displayed of the realities which underlie the seeming facts of a situation. We gladly acknowledge the work to be a real contribution to political science, though, as we have shown, we are bound to differ from many of its conclusions.
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