POLITICS
Mr Major is taken for a ride on a donkey
NOEL MALCOLM
Although foreign affairs have provided the dominant theme of Mr Major's first one hundred days, there is only one area of British foreign policy where it is possible to point to a new and distinctively Majorite approach, and that is the relationship with Germany. The change of tack has been astonishing — not so much a goodwill offensive as a benevolence blitzkrieg.
Mrs Thatcher's deep mistrust of the Germans was never shared by Mr Major or Mr Hurd, and it is understandable that they should both have wanted to get back to a more normal relationship with an EEC partner. But they are aiming higher than that. The love affair with Germany is an attempt to establish a new kind of 'special relationship' within the EEC. Throughout the Thatcher years, Foreign Office officials were arguing plaintively for a sort of Dale Carnegie policy in Europe: winning friends in order to influence people. Larded with phrases about 'working from within', 'mak- ing a positive contribution', etc, etc, this all sounded very persuasive. It did not per- suade Mrs Thatcher, of course, since she was not prepared to sacrifice her anti- federalist strategy for the sake of a tactical alliance. But as soon as she was gone, the tacticians took over.
The only choice which then needed to be made was: which friend to win and influ- ence, France or Germany? And with un- erring misjudgment the Foreign Office chose Germany. The glamour of German economic power was the main reason, but another part of the rationale was that it would be easier for Mr Major to get on with Dr Kohl, a Christian Democrat, than with M. Mitterrand, a socialist. This over- looked the fact that domestic policies were not at issue; it was policies on the future of Europe. And here it was in fact the French who were coming closer to the British position — until the ill-judged British charm offensive began.
During the final months of 1990, both France and Germany were circulating plans for a more federalist Europe. But while the Germans wanted to give more legislative power to Strasbourg, the French wanted to concentrate power in the hands of the European Council (the EEC heads of government). This was in principle closer to the British view of the gEC as an organisation of co-operating but sovereign states. Again, in the last few days of November, the French finance minister, M. Pierre Beregovoy, was making over- tures to the British on the hard ecu, and emphasising the difference between the French desire for a politically accountable European Monetary Fund and the German wish for an independent Eurofed.
But then Britain's charm offensive on Germany began. It may have done nothing to alter the German position, but it certain- ly had an effect on the French; it made them compete more actively for Ger- many's favour. So they moved away from Britain's position and closer to Germany's. Each phase of our charm campaign has been rewarded by new joint statements of policy; but unfortunately the statements have been Franco-German ones. In De- cember there was a joint statement on political union; in January the French modified their plans for economic union to bring them closer into line with German requirements (accepting, for example, the idea of central 'budget controls' on mem- ber states); and in February a joint Franco- German plan was tabled for putting de- fence policy under EEC control — some- thing which Mr Hurd had only just rejected in a public lecture the day before.
All this might have been enough to convince any observer that Britain had backed the wrong horse. But two other things have happened which suggest an even worse conclusion: the horse we have backed turns out to be not a horse at all, but a donkey wearing a very large pair of blinkers.
One thing which has happened is the Gulf war. The donkeyish aspect of German behaviour here is not so much its decision to make no direct military contribution as its attempt to hide that decision behind bogus claims about references to Nato in the German constitution. (There are no references to Nato in the German constitu- tion.) These claims were exposed by a historian, Dr Alan Sked, in a pamphlet published by the Bruges Group last week; the only sign of new Anglo-German en- tente is that the German embassy has felt entitled to complain to the Foreign Office about this pamphlet, and Foreign Office spokesmen have feebly (though unofficial- ly) apologised.
And the other thing which has happened is that the last vestiges of democratisation and liberalisation in the Soviet Union have withered away. Reformists in Moscow have been sacked, citizens of Vilnius have been shot, and an anti-Western policy on the Iraqi conflict has been revived. Now is obviously the time for a fundamental rethink of our policy towards the Soviet Union; but instead we have hitched ourselves to the Germans, who are the last people in Europe to want to offend Mr Gorbachev. With 350,000 Soviet troops still on German soil, and the German reunification treaty still unratified by Mos- cow, all Germany can think of is winning Mr Gorbachev's favour by paying him more and more money. Perhaps the most chilling thing Mr Major has said so far was after meeting Dr Kohl in Bonn on 11 February: There was a remarkable unity of views on the situation in the Soviet Union and the Baltic Republics where both Germany and Britain are very strong sup- porters of perestroika.' What perestroika?
Critics will say that here at least the Major government is following the Thatch- er line, which was always soft on Mr Gorbachev. But even Mrs Thatcher was changing her views towards the end, as one extraordinary (and, I think, unreported) incident reveals. At the last European Council she attended, a proposal was suddenly made — supported by the Com- mission and the Italian presidency — to help Mr Gorbachev by issuing a statement that the EEC affirmed the present borders of the Soviet Union. Mrs Thatcher was the only head of government to argue strongly against this proposal, which would have overturned decades of Western objections to Soviet rule in the Baltic states.
Would Mr Major dare to speak up under those circumstances? Not if he were hold- ing hands with Helmut under the table, he wouldn't.
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