WAR, OR PEACE?
THERE is still little or no change in the situation. Fresh rumours are spread every day, and the speculators on the Bourse cause heavy fluctuations almost hourly ; but the essential gravity of the crisis is in no way affected. The British and Russian Governments are still arming in a way which, to the eyes of experts, suggests a foreseen decision ; and the politicians of the Continent have begun at last to speak in despondent tones. The only new facts, however, are the publication by the Russian Government of further telegrams from General Komaroff, reaffirming his statement that the Afghans threatened him ; and the splendid speech by Mr. Gladstone on Monday, when moving the Vote of Credit. This speech, which elicited an unanimous burst of approval in the House of Commons, and produced a profound impression on the Continent, cannot be considered favourable to peace. There are those who say that the Premier, for all his stately language, left himself a loophole for retrogression ; but to us it breathes throughout the tone of a man who, though not desiring war, is resigned to war, and who thinks his enemy's attitude such that war must come. Mr. Gladstone affirmed in lofty language that he and his colleagues would so conduct the diplomatic portion of the struggle that the civilised world should recognise how they had exhausted effort to prevent the war ; but he solemnly warned the House "not to be too sanguine as to a favourable issue ;" he assured it that "the language held and the principles avowed" by the Ameer of Afghanistan "absolutely entitle him to call upon us, acting in concert with him, to protect him in the possession of his just rights ;" and he maintained, for the second time, that the Agreement of March 17th was a "solemn covenant," and that it was followed by the bloody engagement of March 30th. He professed the utmost willingness to abide by the results of full enquiry ; but "we know the attack was a Russian attack ; we know that the Afghans suffered in life, in spirit, and in repute ; we know that a blow was struck at the credit and authority of a Sovereign, our protected ally, who had committed no offence." How those sentences, uttered as they were by a man devoted to peace, can be construed into an expression of readiness to make peace -without obtaining redress for our ally, we are at a loss to conceive. To us they mean, what the language of the Government has throughout meant, that Russia must clear herself of the charge of unprovoked aggression, or must defend that aggression by arms. And this impression is deepened greatly by Mr. Gladstone's fine apology on Thursday for having without premeditation introduced contentious matter into his speech. He regretted that introduction, especially "when he looked back upon the patriotic and forbearing conduct of all sections of the House upon that occasion." Mr. Gladstone is a man rejoicing in controversy, and aware of his terrible strength in conducting it ; and those words would not have been uttered without a deep sense of the supreme gravity of the circumstances amid which he stands.
It is perfectly consistent with this view that Mr. Gladstone, who not only detests war, but is most anxious that the people should see that if he wages it, it is in obedience to necessity, should have proposed as his final offer to submit the conduct of Russia at Penjdeh to the arbitration of any European Sovereign. We do not ourselves wholly like that proposition, because we do not believe that any European Sovereign so appealed to either possesses, or by possibility can possess, the true judicial mind. He will think, he must think, of the future consequences to his people of telling an Empire like Russia publicly and solemnly that she has committed an act of unprovoked aggression ; and if shrinking be possible, he will shrink from incurring by no fault of his own those consequences. But we can well understand that Mr. Gladstone felt impelled, not only by all the facts of his career, but by the impulses of his own conscience, to exhaust even the remotest possibilities of maintaining peace, and to leave the statesmen of Russia one final chance of receding from their assumption that the incident of Pul-i-khisti was an act of self-defence. That they will accept the offer made them we do not believe. They are not Mr. Gladstone's. The whole course of events points to the theory that they have, for internal reasons, resolved on war with Great Britain ; but if that is an exaggeration, they are rulers wielding the strength of a great military autocracy, trained in its principles, and aware of its latent dangers, and they will say that they cannot submit the conduct of a Russian General, and implicitly, therefore, their own conduct, in a military operation, to the censure or to the approval of a foreign Power. To do so would be to admit the possibility that they should order or should tolerate unprovoked aggression. Nevertheless, the offer may in its results prove to have been a wise one. It is needful, before action commences, to convince all Englishmen that it was inevitable ; and there must always be a point in national controversies when the only question of moment is, "Do you mean war or peace ?" That question can be asked in the form said to have been adopted as well as in any other, for the reply must, at least, be fairly distinct. It should be received early next week ; and if it is unfavourable, or if it is an obvious evasion, the next step must be that "sad contingency," as Mr. Gladstone called it, of an avowed " rupture," which is in modem times the usual, though not the invariable, preliminary to war. The struggle is one which must be calamitous, for whatever its result we have to live with the Slav people side by side in Asia for many a long year ; bat it will have been forced upon Great Britain by a policy of aggression which, though it has many excuses, it is her duty, as guardian of India, if not today, then to-morrow, finally to arrest. We have as little joy in the war as any member of the Peace Society ; but the consequences of the shrinking from duty involved in surrender, consequences, not only to the national honour, but to the national character, are too disastrous to be borne.
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