TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ITALIAN CRISIS.
THE progress of events in Italy during the week has been . almost unintelligible. It is only by looking steadily through the rain of manipulated telegrams, rumours put forth as feelers, circulars intended to deceive, and boasts designed only to hide failure, that we can see how the series of sensa- tional occurrences has any connected relation at all ; and if we venture to offer an explanation of their course, it is with the reserve that it is only the one among many which seems to us most probable. The key to the action of Napoleon has been the desire to dominate Italy without fighting her ; the key to Victor Emanuel's is the desire to save his throne without a war with France. We left Cialdini last week trying to form a Ministry which should at once crush the Revolution, occupy Rome, and resist the interference of France, a brave and states- manlike design. He proposed, it is believed, if Napoleon would not give way, to pour the Army of Italy at once on Rome, sup- press the Garibaldians, absorb the Temporal Power, and then, with Italy united, await the possible vengeance of France. It was in obedience to this policy, which he communicated to the French Envoy,—doubtless in the hope that Napoleon would shrink back—that he declined, though Florence was almost in a state of siege and the Pitti hemmed in by troops, to make any effort to seize Garibaldi, just escaped from Cap- rera, and haranguing Florence like a secular Pope. Why should he arrest his own avant-courier ? The King hesi- tated to accept a policy so decided, and summoned General Menabrea, while Garibaldi posted by special train to the Roman frontier, crossed it, gathered up the Volunteers, defeated a body of Papal Zouaves, and after a brief journey, during which he was hidden from Europe by a mist of lies, reappeared with the Red Shirts within three miles of the walls of Rome. General Menabrea accepted the order to form a Ministry, and formed a very good one upon the following basis :—If Napoleon abstained from interference, he would put down the Revolution, and leave Rome to ripen ; but if the French troops landed at Civita Vecchia he would hold the Convention at an end; flood the Patrimony with troops, and if Napoleon attacked him outside the city repel force by force. He hoped, however, that the French Emperor, rather than fight Italy, would permit of the "joint occupation" which he incessantly urged upon his mind. Napoleon, it would seem, hesitated with more than his customary indecision. The instant he heard of Cialdini's counsel, he ordered the disembarked expedition at Toulon to embark again, and began ordering up supports, but even when the fleet had started it lingered about the Isle of Hyeres as if fresh commands were still expected from the Tuileries, losing more than twenty-four hours. There are many explanations of that hesitation, but we believe the most probable is this. Slowly, throughout this strange drama, the armed figure of Count von Bismarck, shadowy but distinct, has been advancing, like a stage phantom, to the front, not changing its outline, but only solidifying as it comes out of the gauze and the gloom. Napoleon glances incessantly at its approach, knowing well that although Prussia will not attack the Pope, or him for protecting the Pope, she will not suffer her Southern outpost against both Austria and France to be destroyed. Before Italy can be subjugated Berlin must be occupied by French troops, and not even Napoleon can tell at what point Bismarck may hold subjugation to have begun. At last the Imperial mind was made up. It was possible to avoid a conflict with Italy, if only Italy would aid, and at all events it was better to risk a European war than to be visibly braved by an inferior power. The expedition was let loose ; on the 29th Civita Vecchia was occupied ; on the 30th the ifoniteur announced that the "French flag was flying above the walls" of an Italian city, and on the same day General Menabrea kept his word, and Cialdini, conqueror of the Romagna, at the head of the whole Italian Army, marched across the frontier upon Rome. Garibaldi has been summoned to retire behind the Royal troops, but the news of their advance will probably provoke an irresistible outburst in the city, and so .precipitate the end.
What that end is to be depends altogether upon Napoleon, who is still, it may be for the last time in his strange career, master of the European situation. He is arming at full speed, increasing his force in Italy every hour, urging troops southward and eastward as if he already contemplated Euro- pean war; but his policy, we suspect, is not that, but rather, if it be only possible, to save Rome to the Pope, without loss. of honour, and without what for him is the terrible risk or subjugating Italy. In this hope he retains his corps d arnte'e at Civita ecchia when it ought to be at Rome, in this hope he receives General la Marmora, in this hope he urges. incessantly in the Moniteur, through his diplomatists, and in the- Press of England and Germany, the assemblage of a Conference, of the Five Powers to decide on the fate of Rome. Should they condemn the Pope to the sovereignty of St. Peter's. Church alone, Napoleon could retire with honour. Should, they give Rome to the Pope, Italy must recede. It is his. favourite plan this of a Congress, but it will, we believe, for the third time break down. The Papacy neither can nor will: submit a claim which it believes to be of spiritual importance, to the decision of a Conference in which out of five members, three are confirmed heretics and one a disbeliever. If; 011 the other hand, the Pope's assent is not indispensable, how. can England, which considers the Temporal Power an evil, or Italy, which holds it to be an insult, or Prussia, which believes it worthless, guarantee an unwilling city to a Govern- ment it detests ? What have Greeks and Lutherans, English. Churchmen or French Voltairians to do with Rome, that they should pay taxes in order that her Bishop should also. be her absolute King ? That scheme, we venture to predict,. will break down, and we question seriously whether even the Emperor, astute and patient as he is, can emerge.- from the situation without a war. The European house is filled with gunpowder, and rifles must be discharged amidst it. One unlucky shot, and the world will be on fire, and it is the interest alike of Pio Nono and Garibaldi,, of the High Priest of the Catholic Church and the High Priest of the Revolution, that the shot should be fired.. If Garibaldi is shot what will hold Italy and how keep him from getting shot if he believes his death advantageous to. the- world ? Remember—we are ashamed to write words apparently so superstitious, but our habitual readers at least will under-. stand them—that " luck " has deserted Louis Napoleon ; that. the current of events, that current which is the expression, and result at once of his own mistakes and others' successes; has for two years set in steadily against him ; that if an acci- dent can mar his plans, the broad probability is the accident. will occur. It is useless, and worse, to predict, but it is im- possible to avoid a fear that if the worst comes to the' worst, if Rome cannot be saved without war on Italy,. Napoleon, old conspirator, old gamester, old Carbonaro; vvhs loves Italy, detests the Papacy, and understands France, has been arming for twelve months,' and who in supienie- moments can stake all, will leave Rome and Italy to them- selves, announce to his people that Bismarck's hand• is on his throat, and hazard dynasty, country, and Europe on ono terrible throw for the Rhine. There is no question, if Prtissia, really has interfered, that France would respond, and it is not when he is calling the nation to arms that Napoleon need embarrass himself about priests, or will care to leave behind him a hostile population in Paris. He may win still in Italy, for the Papacy may give way ; but he also may not, and if he does not, then 'we half believe the hour so long predicted will have arrived at last, and FraileS and Germany will settle ones for all which is to lead the World.
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