One More for the Road?
THE COMMONWEALTH
By MALCOLM RUTHERFORD
THE Commonwealth can survive the next few weeks after all. There is still, on the Rhodesian question, enough room for British double-talk, for political deviousness and pre- varication to bring the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, or at least their representatives, into assembly again at some future date to see how things are going, and possibly again after that. Mr Wilson next week should find the going tough, but there should be no grand finale.
Such statements are based on the simple calcu- lation that those Commonwealth countries which are most vociferous about Rhodesia have more to lose by going than by staying. They are in a unique position of being able to exert a notable influence on what is still a major second- class world power; they are able through membership of the Commonwealth to draw con- siderable attention to themselves; and they have the virtual guarantee of continued British aid. Who now, for instance, cares much about the Sudan? Who would care about a Sierra Leone that had removed itself from the Common- wealth? Beside these points, the arguments about seeking aid elsewhere just don't wash. There would be aid perhaps for some ex- Commonwealth members, but they would be able to exert no comparable influence on the donor in return. They might even find in fact that their own political freedom of action was much diminished. And an African exodus from the Commonwealth would bring the Rhodesia problem no nearer solution.
These are not, of course, points which can be put with much-force by the British government, but they can be and have been put strongly by
the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr Arnold Smith. That they make sense can be demon- strated by Mr Wilson at next week's meetings.
On Rhodesia Britain still has a lot of conces- sions to make to Commonwealth pressure, or at least the appearance of concessions. The Government has even now made a fresh approach to Dr Verwoerd to restrict the flow of oil from South Africa: it is possible that Verwoerd may even comply, if he thinks that this will facilitate a political settlement between Britain and Rhodesia. But even if this avenue fails, this will not become apparent until after the Common- wealth representatives have all gone home. Again, Mr Wilson can give the Prime Ministers and their deputies the first 'frank' (but partial) account of the secret talks about talks. He can stress that at no stage did Britain even begin to consider abandoning the six principles. He may even repeat the vague references he made at Lagos in February to a brief period of direct British rule. He can refer again to those excep- tional circumstances—of which Mr Wilson will be the sole arbiter—in which Britain after all might in theory agree to use force. He can make telling points about how much more could be done if only Britain and Zambia could co- ordinate their sanctions programme. He can no doubt produce a whole host of new statistics, proving once again that the Rhodesian economy is on the verge of ruin. And he may perhaps point out that it is open to anyone to make a further approach to the United Nations, safe in the knowledge that other countries besides Britain are reluctant to apply a boycott to South Africa.
It is perfectly clear that in the way of con- cessions, none of this may amount—or be in- tended to amount—to very much. In the way of solving the Rhodesian question to the satisfac- tion of the African states, it may amount to nothing at all. But at least Mr Wilson would give the appearance of responding to Common- wealth pressure, the impression that he may respond even more next time. And, for the African members, the problem remains: how- ever unsatisfactory it is, they can do more about Rhodesia through their Commonwealth links with Britain than they can by walking out. •
It is not even as if working with Britain meant eschewing the way of violence. Training of guerrillas to enter Rhodesia goes on all the time now under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity. The results are as yet insig- nificant and will probably remain so for some time to come, but in the long run guerrilla activity and sabotage may represent the Africans' only chance. No one is interfering with this pro- gramme now; meanwhile it is best to get what- ever concessions are possible from Britain, in the expectation that outside help will be stepped up eventually from elsewhere.
There are, of course, Commonwealth coun- tries to which this reasoning does not apply. Australia, whose material interest in the Com- monwealth is growing less all the time and who sent only an observer to the meeting at Lagos, is an obvious example, but so long as there is a Queen of England Australians will want to remain her subjects. India, too, is disenchanted, but she no longer really plays in the Common- wealth league. Courted by both the United States and the Soviet Union, each for solid reasons of self interest, India has left the Com- monwealth behind her. She could quit, but it is doubtful whether she would take anyone with her. A different tone now comes from Malaysia as Tun Razak nears the premiership and the rapprochement with Indonesia gets under way, but there is again no reason to suppose that if Malaysia went she would necessarily be accom- panied by others. Nor would the present, for reasons of unfinished business with Britain, be an appropriate time to go.
It is the position of the smaller, African coun- tries that is more interesting and in particular that of Zambia. Dr Kaunda certainly could seek and find aid elsewhere, both from the Americans and the Russians. Any outside power that had the chance would do its best to move into a country so strategically placed and potentially so rich. And Dr Kaunda is a man of principle; he has made his threats and must feel strongly tempted to carry them out. Yet even here, the prob- lem remains : how would a decision to leave the Commonwealth help to topple Ian Smith? The decision is still in the balance, the likelihood being that Dr Kaunda will give Mr Wilson just one more, short-lived chance, with the break post- poned at least until the conference is over. But as for the other African countries, who lack
Zambia's natural advantages, it would be unwise to suppose that, with the exception of Tanzania, they would quickly follow her out.
All this is meant to apply to the circumstances of next week's meeting alone. A short-term tac- tical victory for Mr Wilson is now on, but this does explain how he wins the next conference, or if there is one, the one after that. If the Rhodesian crisis were likely to be satisfactorily solved, next week's hagglings would all be worth- while. But it is not : if it is to be settled at all, it will most probably be done by a deal between Ian Smith and Britain and that would be quite as odious to the African Commonwealth as the pre- sent situation. For all the good reasons why African states keep their close links with Britain, there will come a time when their patience must run out. For all Britain's tactical cleverness, there will come a time when it becomes clear that what Africa wants for Rhodesia and what Britain is prepared to do are fundamentally far apart.
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