THE NET ROUND VON ARNIM
By STRATEGICUS
FTER some three years of chastening experience in the last A
war, Foch came to describe the outlook as "Long, dur, sir." Such a description might well be applied to the battle for the Tunisian bridgehead, now in its second week. It is only the first adjective whose propriety might be called in question, and this mainly because the second is so eminently justified. There has never been such fighting as this during the war. Always before the armies had some line of retreat. In the present struggle this is impossible. A considerable stretch of sea which is not in one's control is the worst of all walls to have at one's back. It tempts only to betray ; and the very strength of the terrain is also, in the final accounting, itself a delusion. It is a temptation to stake every- thing on the positions, to throw in one's strength in order to hold on at all costs, to squander what in the nature of things can never be replaced.
So the end which is undoubtedly stir must be reached by a path which is dur, in a way that has not hitherto been experienced even by the hard-bitten, splendidly trained Eighth Army. But there have already been cast up by the last week's fighting incidents that suggest the First Army has also reached maturity. ' The secrecy of the most striking transference of the United States Second Corps to the north gives evidence of a quality that augurs well for future battles. Given the former position of this unit, the extraordinary complexity of the manoeuvre of transferring it with all its supplies over extremely rudimentary communications, and the shOrtness of the time in which the job was carried out, this one fact speaks volumes for the excellence of its staff work. It would have been out of keeping with spch a feat for the troops to have achieved an ambiguous success. The success was, in fact, remarkable ; and its brilliance is little dimmed by the reflection that the Americans' entry into battle was well prepared.
It is the prime significance of this battle that it is following a carefully-drawn plan. The Eighth Army first delivered its hammer- blow ; and, even on exceptionally strong positions, Arnim dare not risk anything in face of so strong a unit so skilfully directed. But it is part of Arnim's problem that even this tangle of hills has its weak points, and, recognising that the Allies would inevitably exploit them, he attempted to forestall the attack of the First Army by a heavy blow on the following day. This attack was beaten off with heavy loss, and the First Army struck the next morning. The sector selected for attack lies south-east of Medjez, perhaps the most sensitive point in the whole of the enemy position. It was directed towards the east ; and it is obvious that ground given here might be vital. The linchpin that held the position from Medjez to the gulf of Hammamet was' Pont du Fahs. While it was securely held the Eighth Army had to face an advance against the high hill of Djebel Zaghouan and the only less foibidding Djebel Sidi Zit. These peaks are the sentinels of the Miliane avenue to Tunis ; and, though they might be taken by frontal assault, the task would be hard indeed.
But a threat eastward from -the Goubellat-Bou Arada sector threatens to break into that valley well to the north of Pont du Fahs. It even threatens to turn the resistance north of Pont du Fahs and the whole of the Zaghouan massif. Arnim had to block that fissure, and there is some suggestion that he has thrown in the bulk of his armour. When he was thoroughly embroiled there, and only then, Alexander launched the Second United States Corps astride the Mateur road with the French on their flank. The plan was, therefore, skilfully conceived ; and its various parts began to exercise mutual support at once. The French were able to dear the formidable Djebel Mansour and move in towards Pont du Fahs. Their pressuit began to relieve the left flank of the Eighth Army and the Pont du Fahs "road-block " was -undermined. Under the cumulative pressure the strong positions on the Tabourba road, which had so long seemed a menace to the First Army, were carried, and in every direction advances were made. The position, as this
article is being written, suggests that Pont du Fahs is near its end. But that town does not hold any vital significance in itself. It was while it blocked the entry into the Miliane valley that it was im- portant. As soon as the wadi and road were threatened from the east, Pont du Fahs became not only an irrelevance but even a potential trap. It is, in fine, as part of a system of defence that it was vital, and with the undermining of the system the " road-block " ceased to have value and became a liability.
What is the outlook now? It seems clear that Arnim is at the present fighting with unabated ferocity against the tanks of the First Army in order that the Eighth Army may be controlled, and at the appropriate moment that force will be loosed against the enemy. How soon that event may be expected, and the effect, are secrets of the next few days. Arnim is finding the pressure of the Allies threatening increasingly to shepherd his main force towards the east, and it is obviously not a prospect that pleases him. Once the Eighth Army begins to move, its momentum is likely to be very formidable, and the prospect of being cornered grows. It is not only this that constitutes his problem. It is clear that with every mile of his retirement the attack must concentrate its force. The air- fields must be fewer, and the enemy will begin to experience what the Allies have so long suffered—almost unending bombardment from the air ; for it is the skilful co-operation of every element of the Allies' force that counter-balances the advantage of fighting on positions which, strong by Nature, have been made even more forbidding by art.
Throughout these African battles the Allied air-support has been a very important ingredient of success. But now it appears to be developing an almost intolerable vigour and persistence. The number of sorties carried out in close support of the troops conveys little impression of its potency. Even the number of tons dropped would suggest little more. The fact that on the prepared positions the bombardment can have small effect, even the obvious limitations of that form of attack in general, do not depreciate its part in the cumulative pressure. For just as the plan aims at a series of mutually supporting attacks the various elements of the Allied force are designed to exercise a cumulative effect. It would be a useless pedantry to attempt to assign a particular value to any single element. The artillery bombardment has been making new records ; and if the battle is rightly recognised as an infantry battle in the main, that, in the last analysis, is probably due merely to the common instinct to identify the character of a phase with that of the whole.
Certainly the infantry have had the lion's share of the fighting so far ; but it is a battle of all arms and all resources, and the decisive phase will probably find the tanks replacing the infantry. It is this that gives the value to the destruction of Arnim's tanks in the area west of the Pont du Fahs road. As far as we can estimate his strength and loss, he is fighting with the far from distant prospect of finding himself bereft altogether of that element of his force. So far, the armour of the really veteran Eighth Army has not been engaged, and if the First Army is suffering losses, it is inflicting them on an enemy who cannot replace them. What must be the final result of fighting of such ferocity and such costliness? If Arnim intends to hold Bizcrta, as we must assume he does, he cannot allow himself to lose beyond a certain point before he falls back into that entrenched area Up to that it seems that he is determined to fight to the death. Evacuation seems to become more and more impossible. The sea-ways are closely watched, and when he attempts to use transport-aircraft they are shot out of the sky.
It is clear, then, that the duration of a battle of this character cannot be gauged ; and if we are wise to pitch our expectations at a modest level, there are possibilities that it may not be as long as was thought. The contraction of the area of defence will auto- matically concentrate every element of attack ; and, formidable as the reduction of Bizerta may be, it is difficult to imagine it holding out very long against all the weapons the Allies can bring against it. The battle is opening up, and Bizerta is coming more immediately into the picture. The next few days should give us a better chance of judging how the battle is going.
But there is one point that cannot now be ignored. This battle is taking on a wholly decisive character. By putting into it the best troops and material available, by fighting with such unprecedented ferocity and stubbornness, the enemy is inevitably giving it that character. He is being beaten at his own game. He is even being defeated by the very elements in which he prided himself—the quality of his troops and the efficiency of his non-commissioned and junior officers. The two material elements on which he based his chance of conquering the world—tanks and aircraft—are in Africa deserting to his enemy. The crucial struggle west of the Miliitne highway is being decided by tanks. - The general character of the battle is dominated by the supremacy of the Allied air-power. Even if he gains time immediately by the stubbornness and skill of his resistance, he is losing still more by challenging a decisive struggle on ground of his choice and facing defeat on it. Another " Black Day " for Germany is dawning.
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