THE ALLIED TERMS. T HERE is something rather absurd about all
the fuss and finesse which is being shown in regard to the terms of peace, alike by the Germans and by the Allies. Both sides talk about them, and President Wilson calls loudly for their disclosure, and yet at the moment public opinion in the Allied countries seems to assume that they are secrets which it would never do to impart to mankind at large. Yet if Socrates were to revisit the glimpses of the moon, one could well imagine him saying to his disciples that as a matter of fact people in general already knew the terms of peace. If they would only take the trouble to think a little, they would soon find that they need not bother the statesmen to set them forth. Socrates would probably begin by saying that the German peace terms would be those usually adopted by robbers—to keep as much of their plunder as they can and to give up as little. What would interest him would be to elicit from his interlocutors by the Socratic method the terms of the Allies, and to point out that these had already been stated when the Allies declared, as they have done so clearly and so emphatically, that they must insist upon Reparation for the past and Security for the future. A very little exercise of the process of ratiocina- tion will in truth give us in considerable detail the terms which the Allies must demand, and are in fact demanding. Though we need not trouble our readers with the leisurely suavity of the Socratic dialogue, we can easily put down on paper the conclusions at which it would arrive.—" Then, by the Dog of Egypt, you knew all the time, 0 Charicles, the peace terms of the Allies."
Reparation must, in the first place, mean the restoration of the status quo ante bellum. The Germans must evacuate the whole of Northern France, the whole of Belgium and Luxem- burg, and they and their ;Ries must also give up all they have taken from Russia, Rumania, and Serbia. Happily there are no portions of what was Italian soil before the war now in the occupation of Austria. But such territorial reparation is not enough. ' Germany must also make reparation for those seizures of territory which occurred before the war, but which undoubtedly helped to bring it about. In the past they violently broke down and denied those principles of nationality and democracy upon which the permanent peace of the world can alone be maintained. Alsace-Lorraine must be restored to France, the Danish portion of Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, and Posen and the rest of Polish Prussia to the new sub-king- dom of Poland which Russia has pledged herself to create. But territorial reparation is not all. As far as it is possible—alas ! in many cases it is not possible—Germany must make material reparation for the innocent blood she has shed during her barbarian conquests, for the women violated, for the buildings destroyed, for the homes given to the flames, and for the rest of the ruin that she has wrought in Belgium and France, is Serbia and Montenegro. The money indemnity required in respect of Germany's crimes we cannot calculate ; but it is calculable as far as money goes, and must be left to a joint Commission of the Allies sitting for that purpose. Next, Germany must make reparation, not in money but in kind, for all the ships of commerce belonging to the Allies which she has destroyed—ton for ton, as far as the shipping in her ports or in neutral ports lasts. Naturally the Allies, who have borne the brunt of her attacks, will have the first call on this form of compensation. The normal procedure would be to leave the neutral Powers their right to proceed against Germany when the war is over, and demand satisfaction from her for her breaches of international law. Considering, however, that most of the neutrals are so much weaker than Germany, and that the world does not want to have fresh quarrels started after peace is made, we might very well make it part of the peace terms that out of the remains of the German commercial shipping, if any, the losses of neutrals should be made good. And here comes a practical point which deserves immediate consideration. The Allies, in our opinion, should lose no time in notifying to the world at large that they will pay no attention to the transfer of ships owned by German individ.uals to neutrals since the beginning of the war. If bond-fide transfers have however taken place, they will make it one of the clauses of the peace terms that the Germans shall give money -compensation to the citizens of neutral countries who would otherwise be damnified by the determination of the Allies not to recognize any transfers of actual ships or to allow specific performance of such contracts made during the war. The ships the Allies must have, but they must also see that the Germans do not use this determination to deprive individuals of their rights. This, however, would only apply to transferences before the notice thus given to the world. Trans- fers afterwards should be considered unrecognizable.
We must make every effort to render it impossible for the Germans to continue to menace the peace of the world as they menaced it in the years before 1914. That is what the Allies mean when they demand Security. The chief way to attain that security is the recognition of the rights of true nationalities to self-government. The ultimate cause of the war, and in a sense its immediate cause, was the oppression of the Slav nationalities which form so large a part of the Austrian Empire by the Germans and Hungarians. If the Austrian Empire were on the conclusion of peace to be left as it is, we should have no security whatever against new wars. Therefore the oppressed South Slays, not only of Serbia, but of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, and the other provinces peopled by the Southern Slays, must be erected into a Jugo-Slav kingdom. Unless such an independent nation is founded, there can be no security for peace. In the same way and for the same reasons, Bohemia must become an independent State, while the Polish provinces of Austria must be added to the new sub-kingdom of Poland. Next, the Rumanians of Transylvania must be allowed to join their fellow-Rumanians in the Rumanian Kingdom. Finally, the whole of Italian Tirol plus Trieste and the road there, plus also such portions of Istria, the islands, and the coast as are Italian in blood and feeling, must be joined to the kingdom of Italy. Thera must be no unredeemed Italian soil, and Italy must be given the place of predominance on the Adriatic. But while Austria, which may be described as the negation of the principle of nationality erected into a system, must thus be broken up, we must take care that the system which succeeds it does not create new oppressions of nationalities. We must remember that the Ulster problems of the world can no more be solved on the Continent than in these islands by pretending that they do not exist. Though the German and the Magyar must no longer be allowed to oppress the Slav, we must resolutely refuse any temptation to reverse the process and let those nationalities be oppressed in turn. Unless physical facts forbid (geographical considerations occasionally make ex- ceptions inevitable), the will of the local majority must prevail. Turkey must be treated as drastically as Austria in order to attain security. The world must no longer be at the mercy of the Ottoman clan entrenched in Europe. As long as that band of select barbarians holds Constantinople and the entrances to the Black Sea, there can be no security for peace. Therefore Constantinople and the Straits must be given to the Power most deeply interested in the Black Sea—Russia- free passage in time of peace being guaranteed by the new and Christian Emperor of Byzantium. The process of freeing nationalities from oppression must be applied organically to the Turkish Empire. The Armenians, or what remains of the race whose agonized calls for help and mercy have been heard even through the din of the present war, will probably have to be placed under the tutelage of Russia. They could not stand alone among the Kurds. The Arabs must be freed from Ottoman control and left to their natural function of guarding the Holy Places of the Moslem faith ; while care must be taken that Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia shall obtain under external protection that tranquillity which they deserve, but which has never been theirs since the appearance of the Ottoman Turk among them. But to say that the Empire of the Horde must pass away is not to say that no Moslem State except Arabia is to remain to mark where Turkey once stood. In carrying out their policy of security in regard to Turkey the Allies will not only be willing but anxious to create such a State or States, where and when it shall prove possible. The Allies want not to injure but to strengthen and improve all the best elements in the Moslem world.
The future of the German colonies is involved in the question of Security. Theoretically one would like to let the Germans still bear some part of the white man's burden and help in the work of bringing Africa into cultivation. But though ideal considerations point in this direction, those that are practical point exactly in the opposite. The Germans have proved not only such bad colonizers—they oppress and enslave the natives—but such bad neighbours that no one will tolerate them in Africa. The self-governing Dominion of the South African Union will not hear of them being re-established in South-West Africa, and who can wonder at such a decision I The central aim of the Union is the establishment of a firm South African State within the Empire, and they do not wish to be toujours en vedette with a perfidious enemy on their border. They would be mad to allow the German thorn in their flesh to continue. When they took over South-West Africa they learnt too much about the ghouls at their gate to feel fraternal towards them. In East Africa it is the same story. Though there is no immediate neighbour so powerful as the Union of South Africa to state and insist on the case for annexation, we trust and believe that the reign of Kultur is over there also. That the Belgians in the Congo and the French in Cameroon will tolerate the restoration of German colonies is far from likely ; though here, if the French would like the Germans back, we should of course not attempt to exercise any veto. But the French, we feel sure, will not like to see them back. No one wants them in Africa because no one can trust them.
Another matter which concerns security rather than repara- tion is the German Imperial Navy. Germany has made too evil a use of her ships of war and of her submarines to render their continued existence in her hands compatible with security. Therefore the German Navy must be handed over and distributed amongst the Allies. It might be wise to bind Germany not to create another navy, but we know from experience that such treaties are useless. We can, however, and ought to take over the existing ships. In the same way security demands that the Essen Power House of Kultur should be destroyed.
Previous page
