SPAIN AND CUBA.
WHUthe military operations of the Madrid Govern- nt against the Carlists are so languid that the adherents of the Pretender after every disaster are given time to recover their breath and to begin the struggle anew, it would be idle to look for vigour in the conduct of the war in Cuba. From time to time we hear that troops have been shipped in transports at Santander or Cartagena for ser- vice in the Antilles, and recently more than one such rein- foreiment has been paraded before Europe as a proof of its energy by the Ministry of General Jovellar. But these forces, which have a certain use for the reception of Carlist deserters or of soldiers suspected of revolutionary heresies, fall far short of the means that the Spanish inhabitants of Cuba demand for the suppression of the rebellion. Indeed, an explicit pledge was given several months ago, and "for valuable consideration," by the Captain-General Valmaseda to the loyal Spaniards of the island, which the Madrid Government have, apparently, neither the will nor the ability to perform. Soon after the proclamation of the restored Monarchy, while the Ministry of Senor Canovas del Castillo was making desperate efforts to display at all events an appearance of activity against Carlism the Minister for the Colonies, Senor Ayala, sent an urgent telegraphic message to Captain-General Valmaseda demanding a sum of £400,000 to pay the Army of the North, then irritated and doubtful in its loyalty to the new order of things. The Captain-General telegraphed back that the money could be obtained from the Spanish Bank at Havana, if a promise were given that 20,000 men would at once be despatched to reinforce the Army in Cuba. The promise, of course, was sent in exchange for the cash, but after months of waiting, the Spanish party in Cuba must now per- ceive that they have once more been gulled. All the rein- forcements sent from Spain since the beginning of the summer would scarcely, we have reason to believe, make up the tenth part of the force which Valmaseda had promised, and probably will not do more than fill up the gaps left in the ranks of the "Loyalist" troops by losses in the field or by disease. This game has been played over and over again ; the Spanish Cubans have even contributed directly for the levying of regiments by heavy bounties in Spain, and for the transport of the troops so raised ; yet these very resources have been often diverted to other purposes by the intrigues or necessities of politicians at Madrid. Loans raised for the service of the island have in the same way been applied, as the Spaniards in Cuba complain, to nearer objects. Yet the loyalty of these rich colonists does not appear to be seriously moved by ill-treatment that might spur more patient natures to disaffection. What is the secret of this long- suffering?
The eiplanation must be founded on conjecture, for since the outbreak of the insurrection the Madrid Government has suppressed all information in detail about Cuban affairs, over which it could, directly or indirectly, exercise any control. A remarkable financial statement, however, has been published by a New York journal, which enables us to make a shrewd guess why the Cuban planters and other partisans of Spain in the island are so tolerant of disappointments and chicanery on the part of the Home Government. The statement is founded on the admissions of the last candid Budget of the Spanish Monarchy, that of 1866-1867. In that year the yield of taxes in Cuba was estimated at more than £6,570,000, an enormous increase over the revenues of 1851, when Concha became Captain-General, the total income from taxation being then no more than one million sterling. But under the new system introduced by Concha and perfected by his successor, Cuba was treated as-no other province or colony of Spain was treated.
In the first place, enormous charges which there w'as no excuse, or next to none, for dealing with as exclusively colonial, were heaped upon her. A sum of £2,400,000 was abstracted from her revenues for the departments of "War," "Navy," and "State," the mother-country being thus relieved from the cost of the army maintained in the island, of the fleet invariably kept in West-Indian waters and of the salaries of all diplomatic and consular officers in American countries. What is even . more amazing, is that a charge of more than £50,000 a year was made against Cuba for the expense of ad- ministering the colony of Fernando Po, on the west coast of Africa, an exaction for which we can See no shadow of an ex- cuse, except perhaps that some liberated Cuban slaves have been settled on this African island. The immense advantages of the relief gained by the mother-country in the maintenance of her military, naval, consular, and colonial services by the forced contributions of Cuba are obvious. But in addition, Cuba sent to Spain as a direct tribute a sum estimated in 1866 at £1,470,000. We have only to add together the special charges above enumerated and the amount of the tribute, making in all £3,870,000, to calculate the amount of the spoils divided among the Spanish Cubans. The total yield of taxa- tion being computed at £6,570,000, it follows that a sum of two millions and three-quarters sterling was annually absorbed by the functionaries who collected the taxes and governed the island. It must not, however, be supposed that this modest profit sufficed to satisfy the harpies, native-born or exported from Spain, who fattened upon the natural riches of "the Pearl of the Antilles." The expenditure on the Army, the Navy, and the State Department was everywhere burrowed into by fraudu- lent officials. In the Army, especially, there was room for im- mense illegitimate profits. The pay-rolls charged upon the island a standing force of 25,000, but it is probable that a reckoning of 15,000 would have been in excess of the actual numbers. The surplus was devoured by a "Government Ring" at Havana, backed, it is asserted, by a powerful political club in Madrid. Another device was more easily accessible to subordinates. It is stated that "in time of peace at least one-half of the men were allowed by their commanding officers to accept places as porters, house-servants, or other assistants, from which they earned from $30 to $40 per month, with board and lodging. The pay and rations of these men were drawn by the officers and divided among themselves." And it is of course likely enough that the same practices are found equally lucrative in the naval service and the Civil Departments.
It is plain, from this statement, that the Madrid Government, apart from the immense direct contributions it drew from the revenues of Cuba, was able to make Cuban administration a pasture-land, in which persons whose political support or acquiescence was valuable could be turned out to make their fortunes. But if we look at the system from the point of view of all Spanish Cubans, except the " Rings " in Havana and elsewhere who have shared in the profits of the system above described, the planters of the island must have been almost crushed by the burden of taxation. The taxes had been increased in amount six-fold since Concha's time ; and as, according to the Census returns, the population of the island was only 1,359,000 in 1867, of whom 368,000 were slaves, and 225,000 penniless freedmen without any assessable property, the entire load fell exclusively upon the whites, who numbered about 760,000, and who therefore contributed not far from £9 a head to the Colonial Exchequer. The fact that this taxation was endured—nay, that the planters have shown themselves ready to make immense sacrifices for the support of a system under which extortion of the kind was possible,—may give an indication how gainful was the institution of slavery to the slave-owners, where it was favoured by a soil and a climate like those of Cuba. The cost of the war, however, has been astounding ; the Madrid Ministry have confessed to an expen- diture of £30,000,000 in the island, and the destruction of private fortunes by the burning of plantations and machinery is out of all comparison greater than the outlay controlled by Government. It is, therefore, more than doubtful whether the advantages for which the planters and their allies are now con- tending have not dwindled to a shadow. The island is per- manently impoverished, and neither the Government of the mother-country, nor the carpet-baggers from Madrid, nor the slaveholding interest, will ever again draw from it the vast revenues that tempted them to sacrifice almost everything else, if only they might retain their grasp upon such a splendid prize.
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