MARGINAL COMMENT
NICOLSON By HAROLD Messrs. Constable this week have published a small booklet entitled "Pitain-Laval. The Conspiracy," which has been admirably translated by Mr. Michael Sadleir. The author of this pamphlet remains anonymous, but in the foreword we are assured by Lord Cecil that "he is a man of probity and honour, with great knowledge of his subject." It is evident indeed that the book has been written by someone in close touch with governmental circles in France and possessing special acquaintance with the sad events of 1940. The main contention is that "at the very moment when the French armies were reeling under the Gelman attack, a handful of intriguers in the rear were busy contriving a breakdown in the machinery of national resistance." The leaders of this conspiracy are defined as Laval and the Marshal himself. Of Laval's guilt there can be little question. He is the type of man who floats to the top of any septic tank owing to his own extreme putrescence. When he hurriedly left Clermont Ferrand for Bordeaux on the night of June 14th it was with the sure instinct of the black buzzard speeding towards its carrion. It was he who engineered the resignation of Paul Reynaud and it was he who devised the trick by which, on June rsoth, Mandel and other potential Gembettas were induced to board the Massilia, and were shipped across to Morocco, not, as they believed, for the purpose of continued resistance, but in order that they might be quietly interned. All this is both despicable and true. Yet the Marshal's own part in this conspiracy remains for m- a mystery, nor am I convinced by this pamphlet that his com- plicity is proven.
* * * * We may agree that Marshal Petain is a defeatist by nature. In fact, I heard Clemenceau in 1919 refer to him angrily, and much to my astonishment, as "that inveterate defeatist." We may agree also that he was bitterly opposed to the existing republican system, that he maintained close relations with reactionary elements in France and that he may even have aspired to- some form of dictator- ship. We may agree that he shared Weygand's fatal theory that the soul of France could only be purified by humiliation and that even military defeat was preferable to the triumph of the Popular Front. And we may agree that when the catastrophe occurred he never imagined !hat Britain could still hold out or that our solitary resistance would assure the eventual defeat of Germany. We may
WE have reached a phase in the war when at any moment the relations of the Vichy Government with both Germany and Great Britain may be subjected to strain. The Germans may come tc, the conclusion that the unpopularity of Laval is more dis- advantageous to them than his subservience is useful. They may denounce the armistice and the Montoire understandings and may send their armies to Toulon and Marseilles. Or they may seek to maintain the fiction of collaboration by imposing upon unoccupied France a quisling armed with dictatorial powers and directly sup- ported by German batteries and troops. In either event the position of Marshal Petain will become one of delicacy. If he consents to remain as figurehead and to accept all violations of the armistice, then he will be finally discredited both in his own country and in the world. If he resigns in protest, then his action will have a galvanic effect upon many millions of Frenchmen at home and overseas. It thus becomes of interest for us once again to examine the Petain riddle and to seek to discover the motives which have guided his action during the last two years. Are we to regard him as a dutiful if misguided veteran, who was convinced that all hope must be abandoned and who sought only to save something of the honour and dignity of France? Are we to assume that he was a vain and ambitious soldier seeking to profit by his country's catastrophe in order to acquire supreme power for himself? Or are we to accept the theory that he was a mystic patriot who believed with religious fervour that only through suffering could his beloved country be reborn?
believe these things and we may well regard them as gigantic faults of character and judgement; but they are not crimes, and it is of deliberate, carefully plotted crime that in this pamphlet the Marshal is indicted. The anonymous author contends that the Marshal had not only foreseen, but actually worked for, the defeat of his own country: that even before the war he had been active in organising a fifth column ; that while Ambassador in Madrid, even after the declaration of war, he maintained through Monsieur Chatain close contact with his German colleague von Stohrer ; and that he knew in advance the actual date of Hitler's offensive and prepared his plans accordingly. These are formidable accusations. They may be true. Yet I do not feel that they are substantiated by the evidence which the anonymous author adduces. I do not, for instance, regard anything which M. de Monzie may say or write as any evidence.
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It is possible, of course, to simplify the problem by contending that all Frenchmen who join de Gaulle are good Frenchmen and that all Frenchmen who do not join de Gaulle are bad Frenchmen. The issue, quite certainly, is not as simple as that. I have a French friend whom I have known for over thirty years ; he is a man of intelligence and probity ; during those dreadful weeks of 194o he happened to be in a central position and he behaved until the very last moment with courage and energy. Yet after the armistice had been signed he accepted service under the Vichy Government. I received this week the first communication that I have had from him since 1940. It might be supposed, of course, that he has now seen which way the tide is turning and that he is seeking to reinsure himself with his English friends. He is not, however, that sort of man. I am convinced that he adhered to Marshal Petain from purely patriotic motives, much as I, in similarly horrible circum- stances, might have adhered to Lord Roberts. Yet in his message, which is as cryptic as all messages smuggled through Switzerland, he varit, "I did not believe it possible that one could feel such bitterness." Bitterness against whom? Not against us assuredly for having held the breach and assured victory. Not even, perhaps, against Petain, Laval or their German masters. But bitterness against himself for having missed so great an opportunity and for having committed so appalling a mistake. And bitterness against the cursed spite which landed him in such a false position.
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How difficult it may become for us, during the next months, to understand or handle this deep if ill-defined "amertume" by which all decent Frenchmen are obsessed! Among the many great benefits which de Gaulle has accorded to his country perhaps the greatest is that he has created a solvent by which this bitterness can be diluted if not dispersed. Yet for those who, like my own friend, have been unable or unwilling to join de Gaulle this bitterness has accumulated undischarged. We may hope that when the next crisis occurs it will be discharged against Vichy and our enemies ; yet if things go very wrong it might be discharged against ourselves. It is the swelling of this deep psychological abscess within the body of France which gives to Marshal Petain's decisions at this moment an importance which they might not otherwise acquire. To us he may seem no more than a vain old man who has been led by conceit and evil counsellors into terrible mistakes. To many Frenchmen he is more than a national symbol ; he is a personal excuse. If he be in fact the consummate scoundrel whom the pamphleteer depicts, then indeed he may seek to discharge agains: ourselves the poisons which he and his gang have generated. But if, as he has so often pretended, he be the trustee of French honour. the father of defeat, then he may well take his stand upon his own armistice and prove to his countrymen that the issue has once again been joined. I have not the understanding of his character or present mental capacity to venture upon any forecast ; I suspend all Judge- ment; but I have a feeling that the Petain riddle will not for many months longer remain unsolved.