TOPICS OF THE DAY.
ITALY, TURKEY, AND TRIPOLI.
IT must not be supposed that the perilous crisis which Italy has precipitated by her action in respect of Tripoli is due to a sudden outburst over a suddenly dis- covered grievance. The complaints of Italians against the treatment they have received in Tripoli from the local Turkish authorities are of long standing and are genuine enough. At the same time it is safe to say that if Germany had not sent her ships to Agadir and if, to look further back, Austria-Hungary had not annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy would not now be threatening inter- vention in Tripoli and holding the peace of the world up to auction. Violent and provocative methods become an inevitable part of diplomacy when the tone of international dealings has become so forced and reckless that quiet and simple methods no longer appeal with thenecessary urgency. Diplomacy in these circumstances is like the conversation of people who shout at one another louder and louder in order to make themselves heard. When the public law of Europe was violated in 1908 we feared that there would be many and various consequences of a very undesirable kind ; affairs in Morocco and Tripoli are instances of the new spirit of impatience and want of consideration, and we fear that there are more examples to come. The Italian Government has succeeded in imposing a. very efficient censorship on news during the last few days ; so efficient, indeed, has it been in serving its purposes that the only English com- ments which appear to have reached Italian readers are in praise of a strong anti-Turkish policy. If such praise has been expressed here we have missed it. The general feeling, which we sincerely share, is unques- tionably one of deep regret that Italy has rushed into a position from which escape may be impossible except by war. And this regret is based largely on a real sympathy and friendship for Italy, because no one here who has seriously thought the matter over can persuade himself that Italy, if committed to a military occupation of Tripoli, stands to gain anything at all proportionate to the expenditure, the sacrifice of lives, and the anxiety in which she will be involved.
In writing of the Morocco negotiations we have said more than once lately that when Germany and France had settled their differences the demands of Spain and Italy would be announced. Germany, absorbed in her negotia- tions with France, appears to have ignored the possibility that Italy's plan of action would not have direct reference to Morocco, but take shape in a country which raises most embarrassing questions for Germany. But for her absorp- tion in the Morocco business, Germany might well have remembered that last winter and again during the past summer Italy requested Turkey in the plainest terms to cease putting hindrances in the way of Italian commercial enterprises in Tripoli. The Turkish answers adopted the traditional vagueness of the Porte, and now Italy, profiting by the German example in diplomacy, has lost her judgment and embarked upon a course which of all possible courses Germany would have wished her to avoid. Germany must choose between her ally and the nation whose friendship she has assiduously cultivated in and out of season. She cannot be frankly favourable to both ; the only possible third course is a weak and equivocal shuffle which will neither retain for her in Italy the feelings which one ally ought to have for another, nor save for her in the eyes of the Turks the reputation of being the best of Turkish patrons and the true champion of the Moslem world. Whatever Germany does she will not be doing good business. It is Nemesis. The country whose ship still lies at Agadir has not a vestige of moral cogency in arguing that Italy ought not to send ships to Tripoli.
Italy knows this; she knows that Germany cannot possibly reprove her. As for the Young Turks, they are also put in a position of considerable embarrassment. The one country to which they should be able to appeal with con- fidence—Germany—is the ally of Italy, and can do prac- tically nothing for them. Great Britain in any case has no ground for interfering, and can do little but show in a general way that her greatest interest, now as always, is peace ; that she has no desire to fish in troubled waters ; and that she deplores all acts which upset the status quo. Of course if there should be war it would be impossible to say how many sleeping dogs would not be stirred. In the present state of Europe, Turkey is the pivot of peace in the Balkans. If we wished well to the Young Turk regime for no other reason we should wish it for this reason, that the existence of a reasonably stable Turkey prevents the beginning of a general scramble. To attack Turkey is to injure the symbol of Balkan peace—to lay hands, as it were, on the Ark of the Covenant. Punishment is bound to follow, and will involve many innocent persons. Greece, restless; ambitious, and rather weakly vainglorious, will want to snatch whatever she can as the scene falls about her ears. We have always desired that Greece should have Crete, but we should not wish to see her grab it in such circum- stances. Turkey herself, well knoNting the value of putting herself where she has to be bought out by the Powers which protect Christian populations, would occupy Greek territory, say Thessaly or Epirus ; the Bulgars could scarcely be restrained from rushing into Macedonia ; Austria has too many ungratified ambitions to stand still while anyone else blocked her way to Salonika ; and where Austria stepped in there Russia would be almost bound to follow. Apart from the mad rush to arms in Europe the occupation by a Christian Power of a Moham- medan country would cause a ferment from one end of Islam to the other. If ever Armageddon comes a Turkish war might well be the beginning of it.
The Young Turks are probably sensible enough not to refuse some concessions to Italy, but the fact cannot be insisted on too strongly that the Turks are a military people, and would not dream of swallowing anything that could be interpreted as an affront. In the lait few years their authority in Tripoli has actually increased ; they have sent exploring parties far into the interior, and it would be futile to overlook their desire to have a share in the development of Northern Africa. They have been encouraged by the attitude of the Senussi, those anti-foreign Moslem purists who by recognizing Turkish rule have greatly simplified the work of Turkey in Tripoli. The Turks, of course, feel quite differently about Tripoli and Tunis ; the latter country has slipped from their grasp in all but name, but Tripoli is a genuine Turkish posses- sion. Ever since the military party got the upper hand in reformed Turkey the Italians have been deeply mis- trusted in Tripoli. The local authorities have so far as possible prevented Italians from starting new commercial enterprises and from renting land. t'If Italy simply demanded that these grievances should be redressed— in other words, that the Turks should not discrimi- nate against Italians in any way and that commercial opportunities should be the same for all—we should heartily sympathize with her. It is because she threatens war without any attempt to state her grievances precisely and ask for precise remedies that we are filled with misgiv- ing. A military adventure in Tripoli would cost Italy many millions of pounds, and the returns would scarcely be as many thousands. It is true that she can prevent fresh Turkish troops from coming by sea, thanks to her vastly superior naval strength, but she would still have to get herself accepted, so to speak, by the native population in an extraordinarily difficult country—a country that is almost without water and without roads. In the interior the way is blocked by hills with narrow passes that are capable of prolonged and easy defence. A determined and decently armed population would give the Italian troops an enormous amount of trouble. The Senussi alone, perhaps, would harass them for years after the regular Turkish troops had been disposed of. We earnestly trust, for all the reasons we have mentioned, that Italy and Turkey may at the last moment be able to come to terms, and that Germany, although she has tied her own hands, may somehow be able to play the part of honest broker between them.
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