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By HUGH SETON-WATSON
DURING nearly ten years as the leader— though not quite the absolute ruler—of the Soviet Union, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev became a familiar figure to newspaper readers all over the world. The career and personality of the man who succeeded Stalin, who brought the Soviet Union out of mere menacing isola- tion into real contact with other independent states, and who recognised the limitations im- posed even on giant powers by the facts of the nuclear age, are a subject of fascinating interest. Mr Crankshaw is well qualified to attempt the task.* As a journalist, he has specialised for more than twenty years in Soviet affairs, and has often visited Russia. As a writer, he has shown himself particularly gifted in the field of biography. Though he is well aware of the im- portance of political and economic groups, in- stitutions and trends, it is the personal factor which has always most deeply engaged his interest.
He has had to face two formidable diffi- culties. The greater part of Khrushchev's career has been shrouded in obscurity. Communist regimes do not attach importance to the 'human interest' element in politics: hagiographical pub- lications on Lenin and Stalin are not really an exception to this statement. Khrushchev, as a shrewd operator in the party machine, took care to preserve a respectable anonymity as long as Stalin was in charge. What could be gleaned from the Soviet press had already been collected with great skill by Lazar Pistrak, to whose book Mr Crankshaw pays generous tribute, and in whose steps he has been largely obliged to tread. Khrushchev forms a curious contrast with the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, the subject of Mr Crankshaw's last biographical study. The early life of the Emperor was enriched by a great range of experiences and emotions, from which developed a complex character, well documented by excellent historical evidence: in the last decades of his life, however, he seemed to turn into a sort of automaton, which even Mr Crankshaw's literary skill could not make interesting.
Khrushchev, by contrast, appears for the first
42s.) KHRUSFICHEV. By Edward Crankshaw. (Collins,
forty years of his adult life a model impersonal apparatchik, only to blossom forth in his sixties into a personality of almost heroic quality. But here Mr Crankshaw comes up against his second difficulty, which is that he himself, in three ex- cellent short books, has already discussed the great political issues of the Khrushchev era. Not wishing to repeat himself, he is unable to do justice to some of the most dramatic episodes in Khrushchev's career, of which a detailed exam- ination would be essential for an understanding of his personality. These insuperable difficulties were bound to limit the value of the book. Never- theless, it is well planned and readable, and w ill no doubt have a well-deserved success with the general reader.
Khrushchev made his career, as Stalin had done, through the party apparatus. Both men seem to have possessed unusual skill in their choice of men to appoint to key positions, in the provinces and at the centre. In times of crisis they could rely on these men, even when the failure of their general policies might have been expected to give their opponents a good chance of overthrowing them. The two classic cases are 1927 and 1957.In the first case, Trotsky and his allies had a logically convincing case to demand the removal of Stalin after his re- sounding failure in China. In the second case, Khrushchev was equally vulnerable after the Hungarian Revolution and the setback in Poland. Yet on both occasions the critics were silenced by the massed cohorts of reliable apparatchiki on the Central Committee.
However, when we have said that both men rose by packing the party machine, we have not said very much. Phrases like 'skilful choice of personnel' conceal the human reality. How was the job done? What kinds of conversation took place between the party boss and the newly appointed obkoin secretaries? What varieties of flattery, blackmail or incentive were used? Questions of this sort can be answered in the history of American party bosses: the memoirs and biographies are frank, even if not always exact, and contradictory evidence can be weighed. In the case of Stalin and Khrushchev, for the key periods of their rise to power-1922-25 and 1953-55—this evidence is missing.
Mr Crankshaw makes a very good point in noting that Khruschev's years as boss of the Ukraine gave him valuable experience of govern- ing a vast region (nearly forty million inhabi- tants), which his rivals, experienced only in bureaucratic intrigue, lacked. He also notes Khrushchev's unusual interest in people and places: he is the only outstanding Soviet leader who has been willing to travel constantly all over the country, to get mud on his boots when necessary. This common touch was a source of strength to him, although it did not endear him to the men at the higher levels of the party.
His relations with intellectuals were marked by mutual dislike and misunderstanding, yet per- haps also by a certain mutual respect. On balance, he increased intellectual liberty. In the end, he proved unable to control the party machine, partly perhaps because he was less ruthless than Stalin had been, but mainly, one suspects, because Soviet society was more complex and the Soviet elite more sophisticated than in Stalin's time.
This transitional figure, coarse, cruel and formidable, yet strangely likeable, will not re-
ceive justice in his own country for many years —not, in fact, until it has become clear what the transition is going to lead to. Meanwhile, for an interim survey, we must be grateful to Mr Crankshaw.
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